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Faculty Advisors' Introduction 
 
Greetings and welcome to the inaugural issue of #History, the student 
scholarship journal of the Department of History at the College at 
Brockport. As faculty co-advisors for this journal, we want to take this 
occasion as an opportunity to sing the praises of some of the people 
who made this first issue possible. Without their contributions, this first 
installment would never have gotten off the ground. 
First and foremost is our colleague, Dr. Angela Thompsell, who really 
did the lioness’ share of the heavy lifting that brought the journal to life: 
She oversaw everything from the basics of design and artwork, to 
supervising the student editors — showing them the ropes and keeping 
them on track. The launch of this first issue is really very much her 
achievement 
Next up would be our student Managing Editor, Martin Norment, and his 
team of student editors, who reviewed all the submissions and did much 
of the copy editing, as well. The results, we believe, reveal the scholarly 
strengths of our student historians, both undergraduates and graduate 
students. 
 
Finally, we also owe a debt of gratitude to Kim Myers, our Digital Commons point person at the College at Brockport, 
and the production staff at Bepress. Their responsiveness and eagerness to help made the complex task of putting 
together a new online journal and getting up and running seem simple. 
Welcome once again, and we hope you enjoy the articles and papers in issue number 1 of #History. 
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Mission Statement 
#History: A Journal of Student Research is a student driven, peer-reviewed, electronic journal that 
publishes articles by graduate and undergraduate students from any accredited college or 
university. #History showcases and shares exceptional student scholarship in a variety of formats 
including research papers, master theses, capstone projects, oral history interviews, posters, historical 
documentaries, and photo essays. By engaging students from multiple institutions, #History seeks to 
connect students from different schools and to create an intellectual forum that encourages historical 
dialogue and the exchange of ideas. The journal also offers promising student historians at the College 
at Brockport an opportunity for hands-on experience with the publishing end of the profession. 
 
Aims & Scope 
#History: A Journal of Student Research presents student scholarship in all fields of the discipline of 
history and is open to any topic and any methodology, including original scholarship, historiographic 
studies, archival studies, oral history (in any medium, including audio/visual), essays addressing 
historical or historiographic issues, and historical work drawing as well from other fields such as 
anthropology or literary studies. The only limitations are that all submissions must be the original work 
of a student at a bona fide institution of higher learning, and must not have been previously published in 
another venue. 
In creating this online journal, the Department of History at the College at Brockport hopes both to 
reward and encourage student excellence in the study and writing of history, and to make the work of 
promising young historians available to a wider audience, historians and non-historians alike. 
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THE PATH TO RUIN: INFLEXIBILITY, DELUSION, AND DISCORD BETWEEN THE 
KAISER, CHANCELLOR, AND GERMAN HIGH COMMAND IN THE GREAT WAR 
Nicholas Vecchio, The College at Brockport 
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on the political and military decisions of the German High Command during 
the First World War. After first examining the unresolved historiographic discourse over 
Germany’s fifth Imperial Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, it explores the 
backgrounds of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, General Erich von 
Falkenhayn, and General Erich Ludendorff, and studies the argument within the High Command 
over whether Germany should focus her war efforts on the western or eastern fronts. Two central 
theses are argued: (1) Germany had numerous opportunities to end the war diplomatically with 
favorable terms once it was clear they would not be able to win militarily, but these were all 
thwarted due to the inability of the war leaders to cooperate and agree in any capacity. (2) 
Falkenhayn, Ludendorff and Bethmann-Hollweg all vied for the support of the Kaiser in key 
military and political decisions, but by 1917 the Kaiser was largely supplanted by Ludendorff 
because the Kaiser failed in his constitutional role as Supreme Warlord and mediator between 
civilian and military branches. [Keywords: Germany, WWI, Kaiser Wilhelm, Ludendorff, 
Falkenhayn, strategy] 
 
 
 
CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS: THEOBALD VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG 
 
The discourse over Germany’s war leaders in the First World War has been highly debated since 
the end of the war.  Throughout the 1970s, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg was scrutinized by the 
leading European historians of the day.  In Das Deutsche Kaiserreich, Hans-Ulrich Wehler judged 
Bethmann-Hollweg as a “conflict shy bureaucrat, who failed in his policy of administering 
problems in a system that could no longer be governed.” 1  
Willibald Gutsche’s Aufstieg und Fall eines kaiserlichen Reichskanzlers argued that the 
Chancellor’s policies were contradictory, and claims that he was a “cunning imperialist politician” 
who championed the German war of conquest, while at the same time merely pretending to favor 
pacifism.2 However, many American historians have interpreted Bethmann-Hollweg’s policies 
and demeanor more positively within the contextual framework of Imperial Germany. Gordon 
Craig claimed that Bethmann-Hollweg was “careful and energetic in his policy, but his moderate 
foreign policy brought about his undoing under the pressure of the egotistic military.”3   
A contemporary interpretation of Bethmann-Hollweg by Mark Hewitson argued that, 
“despite occasional forebodings, Bethmann-Hollweg was confident that Germany could win a war 
of annihilation and achieve a complete surrender of France and Russia.”4 Hewitson further argued 
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that many of Bethmann-Hollweg’s decisions during the period immediately preceding the war 
were based on a policy of continental domination, and the Reich’s leaders including Bethmann-
Hollweg, were ready for an offensive war.5 Although Hewitson’s paper focused on Imperial 
Germany’s decisions at the beginning of the First World War, his critique of Bethmann-Hollweg 
implies that he was little different than any of the annexationist military leaders like Erich 
Ludendorff.   
Despite Hewitson’s more recent discussion of the Chancellor, Konrad Jarausch offers  the 
most nuanced interpretation of Bethmann-Hollweg’s actions. Jarausch incorporated previously 
unused documentation to help shape his view of the Chancellor. The Jewish journalist Theodor 
Wolff was the editor-in-chief of the leading liberal newspaper, the Berliner Tageblatt, who 
conducted several in depth interviews with Bethmann-Hollweg in 1915. The Wolff interviews 
revealed that the Chancellor harbored deep enmity towards the Pan-German annexationists like 
Ludendorff.6 Bethmann-Hollweg wanted Germany to become the dominant country in the 
European continent, but he was opposed to large-scale annexations.  Bethmann-Hollweg sought 
to establish indirect political, economic and military ties with Belgium in the west, and Poland in 
the east to serve as buffer zones, without directly annexing them.  During the war, Bethmann-
Hollweg championed political reform and peace. However, Jarausch correctly argues that the 
Chancellor’s weakness was his inability to force a moderate course on Germany’s immutable 
military leaders.7 Bethmann-Hollweg failed to achieve a peaceful resolution to the First World 
War, and his efforts were undermined by the inflexibility of Germany’s military leaders. 
 
BACKGROUND AND BUILDUP TO WAR 
 
In order to understand how Kaiser Wilhelm II came to his wartime decisions, his role as the 
German Emperor must be evaluated in the years leading up to the war that defined his character 
and gave insight into how he would act once war broke out. Kaiser Wilhelm II came to power in 
1888 after the premature death of his father, Frederick III.  Wilhelm II had grown up with the 
conflicting ideologies of his progressive, liberal father and his conservative grandfather, Wilhelm 
I. According to Christopher Clark, Wilhelm II was raised with the some teachings of traditional, 
militaristic Prussian doctrine like his grandfather, Wilhelm I. However, the marriage of Wilhelm’s 
father to the English Princess, Victoria, and the growing rift between political factions caused 
Wilhelm’s upbringing and education to be pulled in two different directions.   
One side was Anglophile, liberal-bourgeois, and based upon the creation of civil virtues, 
while the other was from the old-Prussian, aristocratic school of thought which centered on the 
cultivation of military skills and discipline.8 The struggle between the different pedagogical 
ideologies gave Wilhelm a unique personality which allowed him to be thoughtful and responsive 
to the needs of others, while also allowing him to maintain a sense of admiration for the military, 
despite not being strategically adept.9 Wilhelm’s upbringing is of importance for the purposes of 
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our evaluation because it is the reason why Wilhelm never formed a decisive set of principles and 
values, and this flaw hurt him later in his reign.  
 An important part of Wilhelm’s reign was his  period of “personal rule” from 1897-1900. 
Wilhelm was a firm believer in the idea of the Divine Right of Kings and as such, he believed it 
fell to him, and only him, to make the decisions in the best interests of different regions and 
classes.10 The Kaiser’s period of ‘personal rule’ included several reform programs such as the 
Penal Detention Bill (Zuchthausvorlage) in 1898 and the Canal Bill of 1899. Both of these 
programs were designed with the right intentions. The Penal Detention Bill was supposed to 
provide legal protection to those who continued to work during a strike. The Canal Bill was the 
product of the Kaiser’s dream of uniting the industrial west with the agricultural east of Germany.11  
Regardless of how much influence the Kaiser desired, it meant little in the new world under the 
Imperial Constitution of 1871. According to the new constitution, the Kaiser could prepare and 
promulgate new laws, but needed a consensus from both the upper (Bundesrat) and lower 
(Reichstag) houses to pass them.12 Most politicians believed that Wilhelm’s programs were too 
far-reaching. As a result, the majority of the Kaiser’s bills were quickly shot down by the members 
of the Reichstag and never came to fruition.   
 Wilhelm II believed in personal diplomacy, and wished to use existing familial ties 
between his nation, Britain, and Russia to strengthen Germany’s political position.13 He attempted 
to use these ties to alleviate the other nations’ fears of a rising, powerful Germany. However, 
Wilhelm was overzealous in his efforts, often acting without consulting his advisors, and his direct 
negotiations did not get far.14 Wilhelm wooed Great Britain, France, and Russia in an attempt to 
prevent Germany from becoming politically isolated. In the summer of 1890, the Kaiser moved to 
strengthen Germany’s relationship with Great Britain; a few months later he pursued a policy to 
strengthen Germany’s ties with France.15 However when Wilhelm visited France without first 
consulting the Foreign Office, he did more harm than good, and relations  between the nations 
cooled. After senselessly allowing former Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck’s Russo-German 
Reinsurance Treaty to lapse, the Kaiser attempted to repair relations with Russia in 1891.  
However, the Russians were not particularly receptive, as they were in the process of building a 
new alliance with France.16   
The Kaiser tried to single-handedly improve foreign relations up until 1907 when the Daily 
Telegraph affair took the wind out of his proverbial sails. Wilhelm had stayed at High Cliffe Castle 
in Surrey, England after visiting Windsor. There he conducted a mock interview with Colonel 
Edward Stuart Wortley, who published the conversation in the Daily Telegraph.17 Rather than 
improve relations, the Kaiser’s outbursts during the interview treated Great Britain, France, Russia 
and even Japan with disdain. The Kaiser’s conduct infuriated the Reichstag parties, who 
condemned his conduct.  While the current Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow should have been held 
responsible for allowing the article to be published, he sat on the sidelines while the public berated 
the Kaiser.18  Some of the more liberal political parties called for a possible abdication by the 
Kaiser or even a change in the constitution to prevent the debacle from happening again.  The 
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Daily Telegraph affair left a lasting mark on Wilhelm and thereafter he made fewer public 
appearances and did not interfere with policies as before.19   
Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg was born in 1856 at Hohenfinow near Berlin and 
became Reich Chancellor in 1909 after the Kaiser dismissed von Bülow. He was a longtime friend 
of the Kaiser, and while in power Bethmann-Hollweg attempted to pursue a policy of “diagonals,” 
meaning that rather than leaning left or right (liberal or conservative), his policies sometimes 
appealed to the Liberals and other times to the Conservatives. Bethmann-Hollweg sought to 
transcend party politics and build a bridge between the political Left and Right, hence the policy 
of the diagonal.20 While he was an imperialist by nature, Bethmann-Hollweg was a flexible 
politician who tried to please the political Right with new territorial annexations, but was realistic 
enough to pursue more limited means, including advocating for a separate peace with one or more 
of the Allied powers once the conservative dream of a Greater Germany no longer appeared to be 
feasible. Unfortunately, Bethmann-Hollweg ended up alienating both the Liberals and 
Conservatives, as his policies often undercut one side or the other.  By the time of his resignation 
he had practically no supporters on either side, and today is often seen as a tragic character whose 
policies were undermined by those around him.21 
Erich von Falkenhayn was born in West Prussia in 1861.  He became a cadet soldier at the 
age of eleven and eventually became the Prussian Minister of War in 1913. He was one of the 
major players who advocated that Germany declare war in 1914. While he is remembered today 
as the “bloody butcher of Verdun,” he was actually a man who learned from his mistakes and tried 
to incorporate both his successes and failures into his designs.22 After Germany suffered a defeat 
on the western front in the beginning of the war, he immediately changed tactics and proposed that 
Germany should instead pursue a strategy which would propel a military victory into a political 
negotiation with one of Germany’s enemies.23  However, once Falkenhayn believed he had figured 
out the best solution to a problem he stuck to his guns on the matter; his inlexibility led him into 
direct conflict with General Erich Ludendorff, who commanded the armies in the eastern front.   
Erich Ludendorff was born in 1865 in the Province of Posen. He was a hard Right 
conservative who was narrowly focused on complete military victory, with little regard for politics.  
He had been trained (like all Prussian generals) under the incomplete but influential military 
doctrine of Karl von Clausewitz, which emphasized the outright crushing of the enemy's forces.  
After Germany failed to win the war in its opening offensive, and General Falkenhayn failed to 
win a decisive victory at the Battle of Verdun, it was up to Ludendorff to engineer a decisive battle 
that would bring victory to Germany.24  This goal led to him into direct conflict with Falkenhayn, 
Bethmann-Hollweg, and the Kaiser himself. Ludendorff proved to be the most stubborn of the 
Kaiser’s entourage: he deviously, yet brilliantly, increased his own power throughout the war to 
bring down not only Falkenhayn and Bethmann-Hollweg, but inadvertently, the Kaiser and his 
government as well.25          
The assassination of Austria’s Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June, 1914 led to a mounting 
crisis in the Balkans, as Austria wished to punish Serbia for the death of the Austrian heir to the 
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throne.  The following month, known today as the “July Crisis,” amounted to the buildup of tension 
between the European powers and eventually culminated in world war. While Germany was the 
most powerful country in Europe in 1914, historian Niall Ferguson argues that German leaders 
pessimistically came to the conclusion that Germany would ultimately lose an arms race to Russia, 
who could have then used their overwhelming numbers to crush Germany. The German generals 
gambled on a preemptive attack to check Russia’s growing power and consolidate its own status 
as a major world power. Ferguson provides ample evidence to back up his claims of German 
paranoia by providing multiple quotes from Generals Moltke, Ludendorff, Grand Admiral von 
Tirpitz and others.26 When the Archduke was assassinated, it provided Germany with a political 
opportunity to launch their preemptive attack. This notion is challenged in the Kaiser’s postwar 
memoirs where he states: 
 
General von Moltke was of the opinion that war was sure to break out, whereas Chancellor 
Bethmann-Hollweg stuck firmly to his view that things would not reach such a bad pass.  
Not until General Moltke announced that the Russians had set fire to their frontier posts, 
torn up frontier railways, and posted red mobilization notices did a light break upon the 
diplomats in the Wilhelmstrasse and bring about both their own collapse and powers of 
resistance.  They had not wished to believe in the war.  This shows how little we expected— 
much less prepared for war in July 1914.27     
 
However, one must be wary of apologetic literature written after an event, especially writing that 
was meant to explain failure.  In 1922, the Kaiser had the luxury of defending his actions to make 
himself appear blameless for Germany’s entry in the war.  
 Historians disagree as to the extent of the Kaiser’s desire for war in 1914.  Historian 
Christopher Clark maintains that after hearing the news of the Archduke’s assassination aboard 
his royal yacht, Wilhelm returned to Berlin at once so ‘he could take the situation in and preserve 
the peace of Europe.’28 In this context, Wilhelm appears as a champion of peace. However, 
historian John Röhl disagrees with this conclusion, questioning the validity of the statement.  Röhl 
claims that Clark’s quote was actually just a paraphrase by Lamar Cecil, the Kaiser’s American 
biographer, in a letter written in December 1919 after Germany’s defeat.29 Röhl believes the Kaiser 
was in favor of the war, saying that on July 30 the Kaiser was determined to ‘settle accounts with 
France’ and ‘free the Balkans from Russia forever!’30 After two decades of alienating most of 
Europe, the Kaiser allowed Germany to be plunged into a world war in 1914. Regardless of 
Germany’s war aims and the Kaiser’s desire for war, Germany had to fight a war on two fronts, 
and with two relatively weak allies. The Kaiser was Supreme Warlord of the army after all, at least 
for the time being. 
At the onset of the war every member of the German Supreme Command, including the 
Kaiser, was confident of a quick, decisive military victory through the use of the vaunted 
“Schlieffen Plan,” which consisted of a sweeping attack through Belgium to get to France more 
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easily.  Although the Kaiser dreamed of upholding his constitutional duty as Supreme Warlord, he 
quickly relinquished this idea as soon as the war began.  The Schlieffen Plan failed at the Battle of 
the Marne in September 1914, and forced each side to dig in and become locked in trench warfare.  
The Kaiser’s nerves were shaken from this unexpected defeat and he slipped into a depression, 
consoling himself by reading military dispatches in an overly positive tone.   
To combat the Kaiser’s hesitancy, his military staff purposefully shielded him from any 
bad news from the front.31  Wilhelm was kept of the loop of current military affairs, and even when 
the Kaiser visited the war front he was offered only vague or outdated news to keep him busy.  The 
effect of these actions limited the Kaiser’s influence and allowed the military leaders to conduct 
affairs as they pleased without interference.32  For now, the Kaiser was content to remove himself 
from military affairs, but this isolation was not to last and would result in disastrous consequences 
for Germany. 
After the Chief of the General Staff Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke suffered a 
nervous breakdown and loss of confidence, the Kaiser relieved him of his command. Under Article 
18 of the constitution, the Kaiser had the right to appoint imperial officials.33  However, by the end 
of the war this exclusive power of the Kaiser was superseded by Ludendorff.  Moltke was replaced 
by Erich von Falkenhayn, whom the Kaiser personally knew and trusted. The appointment of 
Falkenhayn was not well received by the rest of the High Command, and he became increasingly 
loathed as the war progressed and Germany failed to break through in the West.  Despite 
Falkenhayn’s flaws (he was known to be a gambler), the Kaiser almost never attempted to alter 
Falkenhayn’s outlook while he was Chief of the General Staff.34 The failure at the Marne prompted 
discussion as to what direction the war should take from there on out.   
 
 
EAST OR WEST? THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEBATE AFTER THE BATTLE OF 
THE MARNE 
 
After the Battle of the Marne, Bethmann-Hollweg urged a cessation of hostilities as soon as 
possible.  He lost faith that Germany could win a total victory, and recognized that Germany was 
outmatched in terms of raw manpower and economic stability.  The Allies were content to prolong 
the war, but Germany needed to end it quickly. To this end, Bethmann-Hollweg proposed that 
Germany should isolate one member of the Entente Powers and conclude a separate peace with 
them.  Bethmann-Hollweg surmised that if Germany could break up the Entente, they could coerce 
the other two countries to the negotiating table, on Germany’s terms.35   
However, Bethmann-Hollweg soon shifted his initial opinion that Germany needed to win 
the war quickly. He held that Germany must defend the Western Front and outlast the Allies.   
While the West held firm, the Germans could advance slowly eastward and convince the Russians 
to sue for peace.  Bethmann-Hollweg used the Danish King Hans Neil Andersen as a mediator to 
determine whether Russia was interested in peace.  However, he was quickly disappointed to learn 
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that Tsar Nicholas II was confident Russia would win the war and thus were not interested in any 
negotiations.36   
Civilian leaders such as Bethmann-Hollweg attempted to feign military competence by 
dressing in military uniform while giving speeches or talking to military leaders. However, 
Bethmann-Hollweg admitted that it was impossible for a member of government with only general 
military knowledge to determine potential military possibilities or necessities.37 Thus, Bethmann-
Hollweg and the rest of the civilian government continued the war unsure of their military 
capabilities. Meanwhile, the military generals forged onwards with complete confidence in their 
martial skills.   
As a result of this dilemma, the flow of information between the two branches decreased.  
Falkenhayn did not tell Bethmann-Hollweg about his operational agenda and Bethmann-Hollweg 
neglected to involve Falkenhayn in diplomatic affairs.38 Falkenhayn and Bethmann-Hollweg never 
worked together, so how could Germany expect to win the war when the two most crucial branches 
failed to communicate with one another?  While Bethmann-Hollweg was busy chasing peace, the 
generals pursued efforts to win a total military victory.   
General Falkenhayn believed that Germany should focus its efforts on breaking through in 
the Western Front. They were close to achieving this at the Marne, and he believed that by 
transferring troops from the East to the West, that breakthrough could be achieved.  However, 
General Ludendorff and his like-minded partner Paul Von Hindenburg believed that Germany’s 
forces should concentrate on the Eastern Front since they had already achieved major victories 
over the Russians at the Battles of Tannenberg, Lodz, and the Masurian Lakes in 1914-1915.  
Ludendorff was adamant that if Falkenhayn diverted troops to the Eastern Front, he would be able 
to completely encircle the Russians at Lodz at the bend of Vistula River and achieve the knockout 
blow that Germany sought.39 Falkenhayn, however, was narrowly focused on the West. He 
dismissed Ludendorff’s pleas and after the war commented on the subject stating that, “It was a 
grave mistake to believe that our western enemies would give way, if, and because Russia was 
beaten.  No decision in the East, even though it were as thorough as it was possible to imagine, 
could spare us from fighting to a conclusion in the West.”40  
Falkenhayn was the Chief of the General Staff and outranked Ludendorff.  He ignored 
Ludendorff’s protests and launched a second assault on the French city of Ypres, which was 
repulsed with heavy casualties. Yet even after this defeat, Falkenhayn’s resolve did not waver.  As 
a result, by the end of 1915 the Russian armies were severely weakened but crucially still in the 
field, while Germany continued to fight an exhausting war on two fronts.  The commanders in the 
Eastern Theatre were appalled by this series of unfortunate events and resorted to name-calling 
and petty hostility to Falkenhayn.41  In October 1915, Falkenhayn sought to support Austria in an 
attack against Serbia and wanted to pull troops from the east to support the endeavor.  Ludendorff 
and Hindenburg viewed this as a personal attack on their authority and filed a formal complaint 
with the Kaiser.  However, the Kaiser resolutely supported Falkenhayn, who got his way.42  The 
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Serbs were forced to retreat all the way back into Greece, but they were not completely defeated.  
With the situation in the east stabilized, Falkenhayn now looked back to the west for victory.   
Falkenhayn was not as close-minded as his rival Ludendorff, and he believed that Germany 
needed to pursue a new strategy to win the war.  He didn’t think Germany had the strength of 
numbers to dictate the peace that it had sought at the start of the war.  Like Bethmann-Hollweg, 
he rationed that Germany needed to broker a separate peace with one of the countries to divide the 
Entente.43 While he viewed Great Britain as the largest threat, he determined that France should 
once again be the target.  He judged that France’s morale was weaker, and an offensive along the 
Meuse River could “bleed the French army white” and force France to sue for peace with 
Germany.44 This would in turn put Russia in a poor position without her main ally, and force her 
to sue for peace.  Then Germany could focus on its most stalwart enemy, Great Britain.45  
It is critical to note that at the commencement of the war the generals convinced themselves 
that the only way they could save the monarchy was through military victory and subsequent 
territorial annexations.46 The Supreme Command regarded a victorious peace associated with 
large-scale annexations and financial reparations to be the only acceptable outcome of the war.  
The Supreme Command assumed that a negotiated peace, let alone a military defeat would destroy 
the status of the officer corps, the monarchy, and the whole fabric of society as well.47  Ludendorff 
maintained this belief throughout the war. He was worried about liberal political reform in the 
empire and he believed victory could assuage civilian unrest.  Conversely, Chancellor Bethmann-
Hollweg adapted better to Germany’s present situation. Whereas Ludendorff championed total 
military victory, Bethmann-Hollweg pursued separate peace negotiations. While Ludendorff 
unrelentingly strove for outright annexations in the east and west without regard to the political 
ramifications, Bethmann-Hollweg favored more subtle measures, such as indirect economic ties 
and military conventions in those areas.48   
Which direction, east or west, was the correct front on which to focus?  While the greater 
threat to Germany was the combined might of France and Great Britain in the west, these two were 
also less likely to break than Russia. After the initial westward thrust by the Germans, only 
reinforcements from troops in the east might have provided enough manpower to break through.  
This confusion might have been enough to isolate France, who would have been under immediate 
threat and thus forced to sue for peace. However, the resistance from Bethmann-Hollweg, 
Ludendorff and Hindenburg made this a daunting task. The trenches of the western front also 
reduced the chances of a successful breakthrough offensive.  
 The successful German Gorlice-Tornow Offensive of May 1915 was a major blow to 
Russian morale.  The Russian Tsar, Nicholas II, declared himself front-line supreme commander 
to inspire the faltering troops.49  Consequently, each subsequent Russian defeat was blamed on the 
Tsar and his government. Had Falkenhayn transferred the required battalions to the east at the 
Battle of Lodz, the Russian army would have been completely annihilated—much like the fate 
suffered by the German 6th army against the Russians in a reverse situation at Stalingrad during 
World War II.  A decisive defeat at the Battle of Lodz could have produced a political and social 
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crisis significant enough to bring Russia to the negotiating table.  With Russia out of the war in 
1915, the Central Powers would not have resorted to the question of unrestricted submarine 
warfare because of the Allied economic blockade, denying the excuse for America to join the war, 
and allowing most of the eastern forces to bolster the west for a true knockout blow that the High 
Command desired. However, the inability of the German High Command to work together 
prevented a favorable outcome, and the struggle for dominance between Falkenhayn and 
Ludendorff soon reached a climax. 
 
VERDUN, THE FALL OF FALKENHAYN, AND ANOTHER CHANCE FOR PEACE 
 
Ludendorff and Hindenburg worked hard to replace Falkenhayn as Chief of the General Staff, but 
as long as Falkenhayn maintained the support of the Kaiser, he was nearly untouchable.  The 
chancellor did his best to shape German policy, but the decision was ultimately in the hands of 
Falkenhayn because he was supported by the Kaiser.  A policy of attrition as a means to victory 
was thus put in place without regard to the political implications.50 The Kaiser was unable to 
reconcile military and political demands and chose to side more with the military views of 
Falkenhayn, in part because he favored him, but also to curtail the growing popularity of 
Hindenburg, who had become a celebrity after the victory at Tannenberg in 1914.51 In order to end 
the war using his new strategy of “bleeding the French white,” Falkenhayn chose the fortress of 
Verdun as the target for his next attack.  Although this battle is traditionally remembered today as 
an atrocious meat grinder that amounted to little more than needless bloodshed, the battle was 
never intended to develop the way it did.   
 French offensives in the spring and fall of 1915 in the Champagne region using triple the 
number of men and three and a half times the number of artillery pieces were repulsed by the 
Germans with little need for reinforcements, who also inflicted heavy casualties on the French in 
the process.52  Falkenhayn sought to goad the French into another major attack while the Germans 
controlled a strong, defensive position so they could inflict a disproportionate number of casualties 
on the French.  In order to accomplish this, Falkenhayn concluded that the Germans would have 
to at least threaten to take a strategic objective that the French High Command could not afford to 
lose.53   
Falkenhayn ultimately chose Verdun as his target for several reasons. First, it had 
significant sentimental value to the French.  Second, it was a central point in the French line and 
its loss would severely weaken the French’s ability to maintain their front.  Third, Verdun was 
located in a salient which could be surrounded by the Germans on three sides and bombarded from 
above.  Finally, the land behind the German front was well supported by rail lines and the German 
artillery could easily sever the French rail lines.54  Thus, Verdun seemed an ideal target on which 
to focus.  To Falkenhayn, it didn’t matter whether the Germans could successfully capture the 
fortress.  He simply wished to launch an assault on Verdun, gain favorable ground, dig in, and wait 
for the inevitable French and/or British counterattack.  Falkenhayn kept a large force in reserve to 
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thwart the eventual Allied counterattack, and believed that his heavy artillery could produce 
enough casualties to bring the French to the negotiating table.55  However, miscommunication and 
disagreement between Falkenhayn and the commanders of the German 5th army undermined this 
unique plan for limited victory.   
The commanders of the 5th army, who represented the brunt of the German assault believed 
that they should employ artillery on the three available sides surrounding Verdun.  Artillery would 
be used to thoroughly bombard Verdun, and then the 5th army could take it. The attack order given 
to troops on January 27, 1916 urged the soldiers to fight much more aggressively than Falkenhayn 
intended.  “The entire battle for the fortress of Verdun depends upon the attack never coming to a 
halt, thereby preventing the French from ever having the opportunity to construct new positions in 
their rear and reorganizing their shattered resistance.”56    
Falkenhayn did not want to risk such a complicated three-prong attack, and instead told the 
5th army to limit their attack on just the east bank of the Meuse River; after-all, it didn’t matter if 
they took the fortress, they just needed to be in a desirable position and provoke an Allied 
counterattack. The discord between Falkenhayn and the 5th army produced disastrous 
consequences for the German forces.  Although the initial wave of attacks against Verdun were 
successful in inflicting massive casualties on the French, Falkenhayn refused to deploy his reserve 
force to shatter the faltering French line.  Crown Prince Wilhelm, the son of the Kaiser, was one 
of the commanding generals of the 5th army and after the battle he lamented that: 
 
On the evening of the 24 February, the resistance of the enemy was actually broken; the 
path to Verdun was open!… We were so close to a complete victory!  However, I lacked 
the reserves for an immediate and ruthless exploitation of the success we had achieved.  
The troops, who had been engaged in unbroken, heavy combat for 4 days, were no longer 
in the condition to do so.  Thus, the psychological moment passed unused.57 
 
Falkenhayn’s reluctance to commit his reserves on time allowed the Franco-British forces to 
reinforce the area. The Germans were halted well short of the line Falkenhayn wished to hold to 
conduct his offensive-defensive battle, and the French were content to bombard the Germans with 
their own artillery from the west bank of the Meuse.  The Battle of Verdun dragged on with 
mounting casualties, but the numbers were not lopsided enough to produce the political effect 
Falkenhayn hoped for. The initiative was finally called off on December 17, 1916.  Thus the battle 
was not only a tactical failure, but a strategic one as well, actually producing the opposite effect 
than was intended, bringing the French people together as a nation rather than breaking their 
morale to the point of suing for peace.58  This battle served to discredit Falkenhayn, and was a 
political victory for Ludendorff and Hindenburg. 
 The Battle of Verdun did not succeed mainly due to the miscommunication of Falkenhayn 
and the generals of the 5th army.  The generals of the 5th army were certain that military victory 
could have been won outright had Falkenhayn committed his reserves when they were needed in 
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the initial thrust.  However, Falkenhayn proposed a new tactic to win the war through attrition.  By 
December, while the Battle of Verdun was winding down, the German General Mackensen had 
succeeded in crushing much of the Romanian army in the Balkan Front of the war.  Bethmann-
Hollweg jumped at this new opportunity to begin peace negotiations while Germany was in a 
stronger position. Despite more objections from Ludendorff and Hindenburg, the Chancellor 
managed to convince the Kaiser that this was a prime opportunity to secure peace.  However, even 
though Ludendorff was unable to stop the talks, he did manage to alter the German note to the 
Allied Powers with his own aggressive rhetoric. The note read, “based on the consciousness of 
their military and economic strength, prepared to continue the struggle to the last man if need be, 
but simultaneously inspired by the desire of preventing  further bloodshed… the four allied 
governments are proposed to enter into peace negotiations immediately.”59 
The Entente Powers swiftly rejected the peace note claiming it was a “maneuver of war.”  
The Entente clearly did not want the war to end if there was any prospect of German victory, no 
matter how limited that victory may be. Bethmann-Hollweg looked to American President 
Woodrow Wilson as a mediator for the two sides, but Wilson was moving closer and closer to the 
Pro-Entente camp.60 Wilson had demanded that Germany give up all claims to a German controlled 
Belgium if peace was to be attained.  However, Ludendorff and Hindenburg simply refused to 
acquiesce to this demand. They were dead set on possessing Liège and Belgian railways, and on 
maintaining open access to occupying the country whenever Germany saw fit.61 Bethmann-
Hollweg’s failed bid for peace provided the opportunity for Ludendorff to bring up the notion of 
unrestricted submarine warfare as a new way to win the war, which ultimately became the great 
turning point. 
 By August, 1916 Falkenhayn’s days were numbered.  The disaster at Verdun proved to be 
a massive blow against his credibility, but the knockout punch came when Romania entered the 
war against the Central Powers.  Falkenhayn believed he could handle the situation in the Balkans, 
but this new war front located in the east proved to be enough for other generals to take action 
against him. Bethmann-Hollweg, Ludendorff, Hindenburg and Generals Lyncker and Plessen 
argued for a removal of Falkenhayn as Chief of the General Staff. The Kaiser agreed, and 
Falkenhayn was replaced by what became known as the Third Supreme Army Command (OHL) 
under the command of the poisonous duo, Ludendorff and Hindenburg.62  
 In the same month, Bethmann-Hollweg also attempted to broker peace negotiations 
separately with Russia. According to Ludendorff’s memoirs, the Kaiser had taken an earnest 
interest in the peace offer, and he notes that Wilhelm “displayed clearly his high sense of 
responsibility to bring peace to the world at the earliest moment.”63  Russia demanded that Poland, 
and especially the capital city of Warsaw, be returned to them.  Not surprisingly, Ludendorff and 
the rest of the High Command flatly refused to entertain such ridiculous demands. Poland was 
theirs now. The German Governor-General of Warsaw, von Beseler believed that Poland’s 
manpower could be harnessed to bolster Germany’s numbers in the field.  He proposed that Poland 
be declared independent with the stipulation of a minimum three regiment strong volunteer Polish 
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army who would fight for the Central Powers.  Ludendorff approved of this plan and although 
Bethmann-Hollweg did not think it would work, he did not actively resist it because he was largely 
unsupported and outnumbered by the military leaders.  However, once the plan was put in place, 
the military leaders were quickly disappointed.  Most Poles believed that even if they fought for 
Germany they would receive neither compensation nor gratitude.  Instead they chose to passively 
resist all German machinations.  Instead of adding to Germany’s strength, Poland became another 
problem.64 
 Here is a case where a purely political matter where peace with Russia could have been 
possible.  However, Ludendorff’s expansionist innuendos in the peace note to the rest of the Allied 
Powers sabotaged real efforts to end the war.  Instead, the military sphere was allowed to encroach 
into a political affair over the chancellor of the political sphere.  What is even more astonishing is 
the sheer lack of reflection by the military leaders.  Ludendorff was fixated on winning the war, 
yet even through a purely military-oriented lens, Ludendorff failed to recognize that conceding a 
small piece of territory to Russia in exchange for peace would have eliminated a major front in the 
war and given him an opportunity to win through military means.  Then, after the rest of the Allies 
were beaten or sued for peace, Germany could re-annex Poland with much less fear of reprisal.   
Ludendorff’s narrow-sightedness is astonishing on multiple levels, and his ineptitude continued 
with the debate over unrestricted submarine warfare. 
 
GRAPPLING OVER UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE, AND THE FALL OF 
BETHMANN-HOLLWEG 
 
After the failure of the Schlieffen Plan at the beginning of the war, Grand Admiral Alfred von 
Tirpitz pressed for a “wonder weapon” to defeat the Allied Powers quickly and efficiently.  From 
the beginning of the war the British had used the Royal Navy to apply an economic blockade of 
Germany. Tirpitz believed that using unrestricted submarine warfare, (using submarines to attack 
enemy merchant vessels while warning neutral merchant craft to not tread into the designated 
warzone) would serve as a strong counter to the blockade.65 Tirpitz also believed that unrestricted 
submarine warfare would inflict so much damage on the British shipping industry that they would 
be forced to surrender within a few months.66  The Grand Admiral was supported by Falkenhayn 
as well as Ludendorff who had this to say on the matter: 
 
The Field Marshall (Hindenburg) and myself, in our view of the whole situation and in our 
too correct doubt as to the success of the peace proposals, had already had under 
consideration, as part of our military problems, the possibility of carrying on the submarine 
campaign in an intensified form Unrestricted submarine warfare was now the only means 
left to secure in any reasonable time a victorious end to the war…  Our honor, our existence, 
our free economic development, must come unimpaired out of this terrible struggle… In 
the face of the enemy’s will to (our) annihilation, (this is) a call to fight to the last.67  
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Bethmann-Hollweg and as well as the Kaiser were acutely aware of the political repercussions of 
using an outlawed method of warfare.  They correctly argued that if the Germans resorted to this 
tactic, America would join the war against them, thereby erasing any chance for Germany to win.68 
Tirpitz and Falkenhayn countered that the U-boat campaign would be so successful that Britain 
would be out of the war long before America would be able to increase its strength to meaningful 
numbers.   
The question over whether to employ unrestricted submarine warfare took place over three 
debate phases over the course of 1915-1917, and throughout each phase the military and civilian 
branches struggled to win the Kaiser’s approval. The first phase began in February, 1915.  After 
the sinking of the Lusitania, America demanded that Germany cease sinking merchant vessels.  In 
this initial crisis, Falkenhayn was on Bethmann-Hollweg’s side and agreed that it was a matter of 
good military policy to halt unrestricted submarine warfare.69  The Kaiser was also firmly against 
unrestricted submarine warfare, and this coalition denied Tirpitz.  
The second U-boat debate phase occurred from January to May 1916. During this phase 
Falkenhayn switched sides after talking to Tirpitz about the probability of success, and tried to 
persuade Bethmann-Hollweg by claiming that unrestricted submarine warfare was crucial to his 
Verdun strategy and without it Germany would lose the subsequent war of attrition.70  The Kaiser 
had the final say in this debate between Falkenhayn and Bethmann-Hollweg.  Although he wished 
to end the war quickly, the Kaiser recognized the significance of the USA’s entry into the war, as 
well as the danger of giving Germany’s enemies more propaganda to show how barbaric the 
Germans were.  The Kaiser refrained from declaring unrestricted submarine war, thus temporarily 
shelving the issue.71   
The third U-boat debate phase took place during January 1917.  By this time Falkenhayn’s 
strategy of attrition had failed, and the blockade was taking a toll on the Central Powers’ food 
supply and materials. After the rejection of their peace offer in December 1916, the military leaders 
believed they had a favorable political opportunity to reinstate unrestricted submarine warfare. In 
a meeting between all relevant civilian and military leaders, it is evident that Bethmann-Hollweg 
was still in doubt about unrestricted submarine warfare but did not press his opposition too far, 
while Ludendorff maintained a firm, pragmatic stance.   
 
Bethmann-Hollweg: The determination to launch the unrestricted U-boat war depends, 
then, upon the results which we may expect. Admiral von Holtzendorff assumes that we 
will have England on her knees by the next harvest. On the whole, the prospects for the 
unrestricted U-boat war are very favorable. Of course, it must be admitted that those 
prospects are not capable of being demonstrated by proof. The U-boat war is the "last card." 
A very serious decision. But if the military authorities consider the U-boat war essential, I 
am not in a position to contradict them.  However, it may be imagined that the U-boat war 
might postpone the end of hostilities.  
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Ludendorff:  The U-boat war will bring our armies into a different and better situation. 
Through the lack of wood needed for mining purposes and for lack of coal, the production 
of ammunition is hard-pressed. It means that there will be some relief for the western front. 
And, too, Russia's power of initiative will be detrimentally affected by the lack of 
ammunition which will result from shortage in tonnage.72  
 
In this critical moment the Kaiser changed his mind and supported the OHL and their request for 
unrestricted submarine warfare. Although Bethmann-Hollweg still opposed the measure, the 
Kaiser maintained that this was a purely military matter that did not concern the Chancellor.73  
Thus, Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare, and two months later, the United States 
entered the war.   
Although Bethmann-Hollweg was initially content with Falkenhayn’s dismissal, he soon 
came to regret the role he played in the former Chief of the General Staff’s demise.  The Third 
OHL consisting of Ludendorff and Hindenburg now had control over the military, and they slowly 
reduced the Kaiser’s influence from 1917-1918. The duo also worked very hard to remove 
Bethmann-Hollweg and replace him with a conservative puppet chancellor who supported their 
ideals. The Kaiser still looked favorably at Bethmann-Hollweg but against the relentless attacks 
from the OHL, his days were numbered.  David Craig argues that Bethmann-Hollweg might have 
saved his position as chancellor after losing the battle over submarine warfare had he acquiesced 
wholeheartedly to the designs of the OHL.  However, he stuck to his beliefs.   
Up until this point, the civilian population had continually demanded political reform from 
the government.  Bethmann-Hollweg now sought to fulfill the people’s desires and regain some 
support for himself.  Bethmann-Hollweg convinced the Kaiser that political reform would get the 
civilians back on his side and increase the Kaiser’s popularity, of which the Kaiser was always 
conscious. The Kaiser delivered his “Easter Message” to the people on April 7, 1917, promising 
political reform at the conclusion of the war. This move prompted a backlash from the 
Conservatives under Ludendorff.74   
On April 23, 1917 the OHL prompted the Kaiser to call a meeting to reevaluate Germany’s 
war aims. Bethmann-Hollweg was invited by the Kaiser who had been once again making efforts 
to obtain a separate peace with Russia after the February Revolution forced the abdication of the 
Tsar and the creation of a provisional government. This meeting, known as the Kreuznach 
Conference, served as the first real instance in which the Kaiser lost faith in the Chancellor.  
Bethmann-Hollweg argued that excessive demands would upset this delicate balance and force 
Russia to fight on. However, the OHL was fixated on expansionist aims including the annexation 
of Courland, Lithuania, and the maintenance of control of Poland, even though Germany was not 
in a strong position to demand them.75   
The Kaiser’s Easter Message was an embarrassment for him due to the negative reaction 
from the Conservatives.  He attempted to rectify this mistake by taking the OHL’s side during the 
Kreuznach Conference.  Thus, once again peace efforts were thwarted because of the expansionist 
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demands of the OHL. However, because peace negotiations were in the political sphere, 
Bethmann-Hollweg, not Ludendorff and Hindenburg was the one who was blamed for the failure.  
This would not be the last time that the failures of the OHL were placed at the Chancellor’s feet. 
By June 19 the U-boat wonder weapon had lost its luster.  While the tonnage of ships sunk 
were initially well above the navy’s projections, the Allied Powers soon adopted a transatlantic 
convoy system that limited the number of ships sunk and allowed them to inflict some damage of 
their own. Amazingly, the OHL blamed the failed U-boat initiative on Bethmann-Hollweg, 
claiming that the only reason the Allies continued fighting was because they were counting on an 
internal collapse of Germany stemming from his statements about political unrest in the country.76  
Ludendorff and Hindenburg then continued their crusade by turning members of the Reichstag 
against Bethmann-Hollweg by arguing that Bethmann-Hollweg’s position in office jeopardized 
Germany’s chance for victory. Confident that Bethmann-Hollweg’s support was sufficiently 
eroded, the duo played their trump card.  On the July 12, they telephoned the Kaiser and submitted 
their resignations, saying they could no longer cooperate with the Chancellor. This childish form 
of blackmail placed the Kaiser in a hopeless position.  The war effort could not afford to lose its 
two most popular generals. To save His Majesty from embarrassment, Theobald von Bethmann-
Hollweg resigned as chancellor.77   
Article 18 of the imperial constitution gave the Kaiser the power to appoint a chancellor.  
However, Bethmann-Hollweg’s successor was chosen by the Supreme Army Command, thus 
undermining the authority of the monarchy. Georg Michaelis was hand-picked because he was 
easy to control and would not get in the Supreme Army Command’s way like Bethmann-Hollweg 
did. The Kaiser had never heard of Michaelis, but folded under pressure from Ludendorff, and 
agreed to Michaelis’s appointment as the next chancellor.78 Throughout the war the people 
attributed military victories more to Ludendorff and Hindenburg than their sovereign, who 
neglected his military responsibilities.  Now the Kaiser could not even choose his own chancellor.  
The constitutional authority of the Kaiser was being eroded more and more by the men who were 
opposed to political and social reform because it might weaken the power of the crown.79  They 
wished to preserve the monarchy but were too delusional to recognize the damage that was being 
done.     
After Ludendorff’s last ditch Spring Offensive concluded in failure on 18 July 1918, the 
German troops were at their breaking point and to desperate for peace. They believed that if the 
Kaiser was removed, then the Allied Powers were more likely to accept a swift peace and bring 
four years of bloodshed to an end. The OHL was also at its breaking point, but Ludendorff 
continued to vacillate. After telling the Kaiser the war could not be won and Germany should 
conclude an armistice with the Allies, he reneged on his words and soon avowed that Germany 
should continue the war and that the civilian leaders who wished for peace were ‘pessimists.’80  At 
this point, Ludendorff completely lost the confidence of the Conservatives because of his repeated 
failures and capricious demeanor. A coup to remove Ludendorff was devised, and when 
Ludendorff found out he convinced Hindenburg to submit his resignation along with his own, in 
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an attempt to gain leverage over the Kaiser once again. However, with Ludendorff finally 
politically weakened, the Kaiser regained temporary fortitude.  He accepted Ludendorff’s removal 
but rejected Hindenburg’s and demanded that he stay, a request to which Hindenburg acquiesced.81  
However, this act proved to be too little, too late.  
The removal of Ludendorff did not improve conditions for the Kaiser and the government.  
Despite repeated advice urging the Kaiser to abdicate in favor of one of his sons to give the 
monarchy a better chance at survival, Wilhelm stubbornly believed he could stay in power, saying, 
“I will not abdicate.  It would be incompatible with my duties, as successor to Frederick the Great, 
towards God, the people and my conscious… My abdication would be the beginning of the end 
for all German monarchies… But above all my duty as Supreme Warlord forbids me to abandon 
the army now.”82 
Unfortunately for him, the army did not share the same sentiments towards their Emperor.  
In the wake of the German Revolution, Wilhelm II fled to Holland in exile where he lived out the 
remainder of his life in the hope of someday returning to power. Even after Adolf Hitler took 
control of Germany, the Kaiser still strangely believed that Hitler would give up his position and 
reinstate Wilhelm as Kaiser.  
By the conclusion of World War I Wilhelm, Bethmann-Hollweg, Falkenhayn, and 
Ludendorff had all lost their power. Chief of the General Staff Erich von Falkenhayn and 
Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg were ousted by the machinations of Erich 
Ludendorff, who was in turn removed by the Kaiser.  Although not defeated in battle, the German 
army and people were tired of the war, and in their eagerness for peace, they forced the Kaiser 
from power as well.  These four men vied for power and tried to pull Germany in their own desired 
directions. But, because of the inflexibility of Ludendorff and the Kaiser, the delusion of 
Ludendorff, Falkenhayn, and the Kaiser, and the discord between them all —Germany not only 
lost its chance to win the war, it lost multiple chances for a favorable peace as well.  Had the 
civilian and military branches worked better together, and the man constitutionally in charge of 
them been stronger and more self-reflective, Germany’s fortunes might have been very different.   
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THE GREAT WHITE DAWN OF THE PUEBLO: REVOLT AND PUEBLOAN 
WORLDVIEW IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY NEW MEXICO 
Martin Norment, The College at Brockport 
 
Abstract 
Previous historical scholarship on the origins of the 1680 Pueblo Revolt argues that the rebellion 
resulted from either poor environmental conditions, harsh Spanish treatment of the Pueblo 
Indians, or a combination of the two. Using Puebloan myths, Spanish documents from colonial 
New Mexico, and anthropological studies of various Puebloan groups and religions, this paper 
contends that the Pueblo identified the disease, worsening environmental conditions, and harsh 
Spanish treatment as an indicator that they had failed to meet their ceremonial obligations to 
their ancestors. Therefore, Spanish occupation and prohibition of customary Pueblo religion 
acted as a barrier to their restoration of harmony. Thus given a tangible cause for their suffering, 
the Pueblo people rebelled to rid themselves of the Spanish in order to practice rituals and secure 
their prosperity.  [Keywords: Pueblo Indians, New Mexico, Spain, Native American religion] 
 
 
 
In 1680 the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico rose in rebellion, quickly regaining their sovereignty 
by removing their Spanish overlords. Historians intrigued by the unique, but limited, success of 
the Pueblo Revolt have struggled to explain the origins of the Indian insurrection. Scholars such 
as Henry Warner Bowden, Ramón A. Gutiérrez, and Jack D. Forbes have cited religious 
differences and Spanish suppression of native Puebloan rituals as the chief determinants of the 
uprising. Specifically, the authors see the Franciscan missionaries’ violent and despotic 
enforcement of decrees prohibiting “idolatry” and traditional native religious practices as the 
motivations for Puebloan assault against their colonial oppressors.1 Contrasting the claim that the 
revolt was the result of the Indians’ desire for religious self-determination, historian Van 
Hastings Garner attributed the revolt to economic and environmental conditions. Garner argues 
that increasingly poor crop yields due to drought, fierce outbreaks of disease, and repeated 
Navajo and Apache forays against Puebloan settlements demonstrate that the Spanish were not 
as powerful as they had initially seemed and could not guarantee prosperity or protection.2 
Similarly, Andrew L. Knaut contends that the proliferation of drought, pestilence, and violence 
significantly increased the burden of Spanish demands for tribute. This, he reasons, prompted the 
Pueblos to challenge Spanish authority and rise in rebellion.3  
Although the aforementioned arguments acknowledge many of the conditions in 
seventeenth-century New Mexico that antagonized the Pueblos, they do not adequately account 
for the cultural context in which the revolt occurred. The Pueblo Indians possessed a worldview 
that connected prosperity with the timely performance of traditional rituals and misfortune with 
the failure to appease their ancient gods and grandmothers through the fulfillment of their 
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ceremonial duty. 4  The Pueblos’ worldview helps to compensate for the lack of Puebloan 
documents describing the rebellion and the surrounding events, subsequently improving the 
historical understanding of the revolt.  
The Pueblo Indians experienced the Spaniards’ religious repression and the proliferation 
of poor environmental conditions within the context of their cultural understanding of the world. 
They identified their suffering as the result of a failure to adhere to their ceremonial and ritual 
norms, which their myths and oral histories confirmed would guarantee prosperity. Thus, the 
Pueblos revolted in order to remove Spanish authority, which prevented them from paying 
homage to their ancestors and assured a perpetual decline in security for the indigenous people of 
New Mexico.   
With the advent of Spanish colonization of New Mexico, two distinct changes to the 
Puebloan experience occurred, subsequently challenging the natural order of their world and 
motivating the Indians to rebel. First, in 1598 Franciscan missionaries began to destroy all signs 
of Puebloan religion in their campaign to convert Indians to Christianity. Later, during the 
seventeenth-century, the Spanish colonial government and missionaries instituted an era in New 
Mexico where violent repression of native religion was the norm. Then, with the arrival of 
Governor Juan Francisco Treviño in 1675, the Spanish commenced a crusade against native 
religion and “witchcraft” that resulted in the execution or imprisonment of those accused. In one 
instance, “forty-seven medicine men who admitted practicing witchcraft were arrested, flogged, 
and sold into slavery.”5  
Second, from the onset of Spanish-Puebloan contact, European diseases had decimated 
native populations in New Mexico. By 1680, the Puebloan population was reduced to one third 
of estimates from 1600.6  Beginning in the second half of the seventeenth century drought, 
famine, and Apache raids further worsened environmental conditions in New Mexico. In the 
1660s, the Pueblos suffered a succession of crop failures that led to widespread famine in the 
1670s, which prompted starved Athapascan tribes to raid Puebloan settlements in search of 
sustenance.7 
The changes in seventeenth-century New Mexico prompted Puebloan medicine men and 
religious leaders to argue for the revitalization of native religion and the overthrow of the 
Spanish in order to restore cosmic order. Popé, a Puebloan religious leader from San Juan and an 
instrumental organizer of the revolt, told the Pueblos that, if they killed the “priests and 
Spaniards” and returned to their ancient traditions, “they would gather large crops of grain, 
maize with large and thick ears, and everything else” they needed.8 
 
The absence of historical documents regarding the Puebloan interpretation of the 1680 
insurrection posses a significant hurdle in the understanding the revolt. Thus, the Pueblo 
worldview offers the best available insight into how the Indians interpreted their predicament 
under Spanish colonial rule. The Pueblo peoples are comprised of two major groups: the eastern 
Pueblo, centered in New Mexico along the Rio Grande, and the western Pueblo, whose villages 
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dominated Arizona and western New Mexico. The eastern Pueblo include smaller Indian tribes 
that speak the Keresan and Tanoan languages. Additionally, the western Pueblos include the 
Hopi, Zuni, Acoma, and Laguna Indians.9 Although the different Pueblo tribes have their own 
distinct myths, reciprocity between man and god is an overreaching trait not unique to any one 
tribe.10  
Puebloan myths and oral histories establish a relationship between the Pueblos and their 
gods based on mutual exchange. The Pueblos’ primogenitors expected their descendants to honor 
them with gifts and prayers; in return, the ancestors answered the requests of their descendants. 
According to Pueblo theology, “The gods control more than man and they, therefore, are 
basically under the same obligation to share their bounty as man is.” 11  Historian Ramón 
Gutiérrez argues that the Pueblos desired to achieve cosmic harmony through the careful 
maintenance of their relationship with the gods: 
 
So long as people performed religious rites joyfully and precisely, careful that every 
prayer was word-perfect and full of verve, and that the ritual paraphernalia was exact to 
the last detail, the forces of nature would reciprocate with their own uninterrupted flow. 
The sun would rise and set properly, the seasons of the year would come and go, bringing 
rainfall and verdant crops in summer, and in the winter, game and snow.12 
 
Clearly, the Pueblos attached a strong importance to the relationship between themselves and 
their gods. The Pueblos concluded that through the repeated performance of rituals they secured 
a prosperous and harmonious future.   
The ritual obligation of ceremonial dancing stimulated the gods to reciprocate the 
Pueblos’ gifts. Within the nature of Puebloan reciprocal obligations, dancing indicated service to 
the gods which, if done properly, encouraged the gods to “honor man’s claims.”13 Similarly, 
presents of corn given to Puebloan gods produced a return on investment. The Pueblos believed 
that an oblation of cornmeal required the gods to honor the Indians’ requests or, at least forced 
the them to consider their appeal.14  
The creation myth, The White Dawn of the Hopi, demonstrates the idea of reciprocity 
between the Hopi and their gods. In the legend, the Huruing Wuhti of the east and the Huruing 
Wuhti of the west, goddesses of the east and west, dried the land once covered in water and 
brought life to the world. The goddesses made a Hopi man and woman out of clay, brought them 
to life, and taught them their language; in this way the goddesses populated to world. When the 
goddesses departed they left clear instructions for the Hopi: 
 
Finally the goddess of the west said to the people: “You stay here; I’m going to live in the 
middle of the ocean in the west. When you want anything, pray to me there.” Her people 
were sorrowful, but she left them. The Huruing Wuhti of the east did the same…Hopi 
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who want something from them must deposit their offerings in the village. And when 
they say their prayers, they think of the two goddesses who live far away.15 
 
Similarly, the Acoma creation myth, Emerging Into the Upper World, also placed a strong 
significance on the offering of prayer and cornmeal to obtain happiness and worldly success. In 
the legend, the Acoma spirit Tistctinako told the first two Acoma sisters to “Pray to the sun with 
pollen and sacred cornmeal…Ask for a long life and happiness, and for success.” 16 Creation 
myths instilled the belief that gods would fulfill the the people’s requests as long as they 
continued to pray and make offerings.  
 Other legends clearly identify reciprocity as the crucial aspect of the relationship between 
the Pueblos, their ancestors, and prosperity. The myth, A Journey to the Skeleton House, 
describes the Hopi interpretation of the afterlife and the role that deceased ancestors play in the 
lives of Hopi Indians. In the story a young man, with the help of a medicine man, embarks on a 
long journey to the skeleton house, where the dead reside, in order to better understand the 
afterlife. Upon satisfying his curiosity, the young man returns home and tells his mother, father, 
and the medicine man about what he has learned: “Then he told them about the nakwakwosis and 
bahos. ‘If we make prayer offerings to them, they will provide rain and crops and food for us. 
Thus we shall assist each other.’ ‘Very well,’ they said. ‘Very well; so that is the way.’”17 In 
myths discussing both creation and death, tales stressed the importance of reciprocity between 
the gods and the Pueblos. If the Pueblos pray and make offerings to their gods and ancestors, 
they will be rewarded with prosperity.  
Although Puebloan religious figures held the potential to grant comfort and security, they 
were also to be feared. If the Pueblos disregarded their ceremonial duties or shunned their 
ancestors, the gods would punish the Indians. Anthropologist Leslie A. White argues that the 
Pueblo understood that “to ignore or violate, to lose the customs of the old days, is, according to 
native feeling and belief, to bring misfortune and disaster, even extinction, upon themselves.”18 
The Pueblos believed, as an Isleta Pueblo tradition demonstrates, that their ancestors created 
misfortune and sickness to remind the Pueblo of their ritual obligations: 
 
The Mother thought that nobody would remember her after they had come up into this 
world. So Weide had the Witch chief born with us, come up with us, through whom we 
could remember the Mother. That is why there are witches, we believe; from getting sick 
through witches, people will remember the Mother and Weide.19  
 
Failure to make proper offerings to the Puebloan gods and purify oneself against the dead could 
harm cosmic equilibrium and result in negative consequences such as disease, drought, and 
misfortune.20  
 The cultural importance of the reciprocal relationship between the Pueblo and their gods, 
and the significance of ritual offerings, sheds light on the 1680 Pueblo Revolt. This worldview 
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defined the Pueblos’ interpretation of the Spanish occupation of New Mexico. The strict 
religious repression, poor environmental conditions, and events leading the seventeenth-century 
insurrection challenged the Pueblos’ notions of reciprocity between man and the gods. Thus, the 
Puebloan insurrection should be understood within the context of Puebloan beliefs.  
 In January 1598, Don Juan de Oñate, a Spanish explorer who had assisted Hernán Cortés 
in the conquest of Mexico, departed with 129 Spanish soldiers on an expedition to colonize New 
Mexico.21 “Your main purpose,” his superiors stated, “shall be the service of God Our Lord, the 
spreading of His holy Catholic faith, and the reduction and pacification of the natives of said 
provinces.”22 With the party’s arrival in New Mexico on April 20, 1598, the Spanish Pueblo 
quickly submersed the Pueblo Indians in a European-dominated society that demanded 
acculturation. Ten days after his arrival, Oñate ordered a chapel to be constructed, held High 
Mass, and forced the Pueblos present to kneel and kiss the feet of the Franciscan missionaries.23 
Quite apart from Oñate’s mission of reduction and pacification, and the symbolic loss of 
Puebloan authority that kneeling in front of the Franciscans represented, life under Spanish rule 
grew much worse. 
 Upon the missionaries’ arrival, they quickly identified Puebloan religion as a challenge to 
Christianity. During a late-sixteenth century expedition to New Mexico, a Franciscan friar stated, 
“Here in this pueblo of Aguico and in the others are some small prayer houses where the Indians 
speak to the devil and give him offerings.”24 The friars began the Christianization process by 
removing all forms of Puebloan religion. They instructed the Pueblo Indians to abandon their 
gods or, according to the missionaries, their devil worship and witchcraft and to disavow their 
belief in idols. Furthermore, the friars sought to remove all evidence of Puebloan religion 
through the destruction of their idols. For example, Fray Alonso Benavides described a 
collection of over one thousand idols, which he took from the house of elderly Indian and 
promptly burned in a public square.25  
 In addition to the destruction of native idols, the Friars demanded a strict obedience to 
Christian values and behavior, which they enforced with the use of violence. One method of 
securing the Indians’ abandonment of native ideology was with the use of “spiritual police” and 
“church wardens,” Puebloan subordinates who enforced Christian norms. These religious 
officers “freely administered half a dozen lashes to anyone found negligent in their Christian 
duties.”26 Thus, the Spanish incursion into New Mexico forced the Pueblo to renounce their 
ancestors, an ominous event in Puebloan worldview that guaranteed the gods’ abandonment of 
the Pueblos and the advent of their suffering.  
 Although the Pueblos appear to have accepted Christianity, at least outwardly, many 
natives reverted back to their traditional religious beliefs. The Franciscans’ entrance into New 
Mexico convinced many Puebloans that the Spanish were gods who, in accordance with their 
worldview, would bring prosperity. However, by 1640, “The novelty of their gifts had worn off 
and their magic had been had proven ineffectual in producing rain, health, prosperity, and 
peace.”27  
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With the world apparently out of order, Puebloan medicine men began an attempt to 
restore harmony by ridding their communities of Catholic friars and praying to their ancient 
gods. Several Pueblo towns rebelled against Spanish colonial authority, destroying all signs of 
Christian culture. In a 1641 report on the state of Christian conversion in New Mexico Fray 
Bartolomé Márquez writes, “The Pueblo of Taos rebelled, killed its minister, destroyed a very 
beautiful church and convento, and profaned everything relating to divine worship; a very 
barbarous people.” 28  Similarly, Fray Márquez notes that the Zuni province was “severely 
punished” for destroying churches and killing a minister who was working to convert Zuni 
Indians.29 
 With the realization that the Pueblos had returned to idolatry and devil worship, Spanish 
government officials and missionaries setout to quell native revitalization by again using 
violence to enforce Christian norms. Don Fernando de Villanueva, during his service as governor 
between March 1665 and November 1668, pacified idolatrous Indians who had reverted to their 
old ways. Villanueva’s service record documents one such example in the pueblo of Senecú 
where he apprehended several Indians who conspired against the Spanish: 
  
And without any consideration given either to the inconvenience of time or to his man 
years…he went to the Pueblo of Senecú where the major danger emanated and he had six 
of the principal heads of the mutiny executed by harquebuses and he punished other 
delinquents who were the keepers of many idols and instruments of witchcraft and 
rancor.30  
 
In another particularly vicious example, Fray Salvador de Guerra discovered that a Hopi Indian 
man, Juan Cuna, had been practicing “idolatry” and subsequently whipped him until he was 
covered in blood. After issuing a second beating, Guerra poured burning turpentine over Cuna 
killing him, as one historian writes, “in flames that surely resembled those of hell.”31 While 
Cuna’s death was particularly savage, the Spanish use of violence as a method of enforcing 
Christian conformity characterized their war against native religion.  
 In spite of the Spaniards’ violence, by the 1670s they began to lose control of New 
Mexico. The Pueblos openly attacked the Spaniards and practiced their traditional religion. In 
1672, Indians from Abó Pueblo attacked the Franciscan missionary Fray Pedro de Avila y Ayala, 
beating him to death with a bell and setting fire to the town’s church. Moreover, Puebloan 
medicine men began proclaiming that the root of their suffering was the abandonment of their 
ancestors and ancient gods. With the hope of restoring order to their world, the Pueblos began to 
defy Spanish prohibitions against native religion, performing ritual dances and making offerings 
to their ancestors. 32  
Puebloan revitalization became so widespread that Spanish clerics from the districts of 
Teguas, Taos, Acoma, and Zuni complained of  “being unable to work and fulfill completely 
their obligations as ministers in the midst of so much idolatry.”33 Governor Don Juan Francisco 
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Treviño dealt with the Puebloan challenge to authority by launching a crusade against native 
religion. Treviño ordered the arrest of Indians accused of witchcraft and seized idols from the 
houses of the accused. During the explosion of Puebloan revitalization, the Spanish arrested 
forty-seven Puebloans from the Teguas nation for the bewitching of the missionary Fray Andrés 
Durán and his native interpreter Francisco Guiter. Sargento Mayor Diego López Sambrano, a 
Spanish soldier, attested to Treviño’s use of the arrests to demonstrate that native religion would 
not be tolerated under the Spanish crown:  
 
Forty-seven Indians were arrested…four of whom, because of having declared that they 
had committed the witchcraft referred to, were sentenced to be hanged, both for the above 
crimes and for the other deaths which were proved against them…and of the others who 
remained, numbering forty-three, some he released with a reprimand, and others he 
condemned to lashings and imprisonment.34  
 
Governor Treviño’s campaign against native religion only reinforced Puebloan anger at the 
Spanish. The Pueblo, with guidance from their traditional spiritual leaders, had identified 
revitalization as the path to peace and happiness, but continued Spanish attacks on native 
attempts to restore cosmic order directly challenged native ideas of reciprocity between man and 
their ancestors, further fueling Puebloan frustrations.  
  
 Compounding the effects of Spanish attempts to suppress native religion, poor 
environmental conditions in the second half of the seventeenth century further challenged 
Puebloan ideas of proper world order.  Beginning in the mid-1660s, New Mexico entered a 
period characterized by drought, famine, and the proliferation of disease. Between 1666 and 
1670, a severe drought initiated the decline of the region’s agricultural yields. Despite Spanish 
attempts to distribute food, the native population of New Mexico plummeted from around 40,000 
in 1638 to 17,000 in 1670.35 In a letter to the king, Fray Francisco de Ayeta documented the 
bleak outlook of Puebloan life in drought and famine afflicted New Mexico: 
 
In the year 1670 there was a very great famine in those provinces, which compelled the 
Spanish inhabitants and the Indians alike to eat the hides that they had and the straps of 
the carts, preparing them for food…by this means almost half the people in said 
provinces escaped [starvation].36 
 
Although the Spanish attempted to aid the starving Indians, a wave of pestilence swept over New 
Mexico. On June 18, 1669 Fray Juan de Talabán wrote his colonial superiors regarding the 
spread of famine and disease stating, that the Indians were “dying without any human means of 
remedy. The conclusion to be drawn from what had been said is that there is no recourse what so 
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ever there.”37 In 1671, disease struck again, further worsening conditions in New Mexico and 
resulting in the deaths “of many people and cattle.”38  
 Also, constant attacks from Apache raiders plagued the Pueblo Indians. In a 1669 letter, 
Governor Juan de Medrano Messía wrote of the repeated sorties against Puebloan villages: 
 
The Apache Indians, common enemies, who during the seven months I have been 
governing have killed six Spanish soldiers and 373 Christian Indians, stolen more than 
two thousand horses, mares, and mules, and more than two thousand head of ganado 
menor [sheep], the property of the conventos of this holy custodia and of the citizens and 
inhabitants of these [provinces] so ravaged and destroyed, that it is a miracle anyone 
remains in them.39 
 
The Apache raids constituted such a significant problem that the colonial government of New 
Mexico commissioned several expeditions to take revenge for the combative tribe’s attacks.  
Similarly, missionaries frequently complained to the colonial authorities about the devastating 
effects of the Apache forays.40 
The drought and great famine of the 1670s, and the subsequent spread of hunger, 
motivated Apache tribes to increase their attacks on Puebloan and Spanish settlements with a 
renewed ferocity.41 In response to a September 1670 Apache raid, Governor Messía described 
the attack and ordered Spanish retaliation: 
 
By my order, reprisal and just war is to be made against the Apache enemies of the 
cordilleras [mountains]…because on the third of this month they launched a great 
ambuscade on the pueblo of Humanas, took possession of it, and killed eleven persons, 
carrying off thirty-one captives, destroying the holy temple…and committing many other 
atrocities.”42 
 
Despite the swift Spanish response to the attacks, the raids continued to plague the Pueblo 
Indians. Again, Francisco de Ayeta attested to the devastating effects of the Apache incursions:  
 
In the year 1672, the hostile Apaches who were then at peace rebelled and rose up, and 
the said province was totally sacked and robbed by their attacks and outrages, especially 
of all the cattle and sheep…They killed, stole, and carried off all except a few small 
flocks.43 
 
Certainly the famine, disease, and Apache raids during the two decades preceding the 1680 
rebellion caused the Pueblos to question the power of the Spanish. Contrary to Puebloan 
assumptions that the Spanish were gods, the Europeans in New Mexico failed to exert control 
over the environment: They could not provide rain and successful harvests, nor could they halt 
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the onslaught of disease and Apache incursions. In accordance with Puebloan tradition, the 
Spanish failure to secure prosperity contradicted native ideas about world order. This realization 
prompted the Pueblos to question their acceptance of the Spanish and their Christian culture. At 
this point Indian medicine men began claiming that the source of the suffering was the Spanish 
and their Christian friars.44 
The Spanish colonization of New Mexico had forced the Pueblo into a foreign cultural 
system that actively suppressed their native beliefs. The Spanish government and Franciscan 
missionaries repeatedly used violence to quell native attempts to restore their ancient belief 
systems, which the Pueblo believed guaranteed success and prosperity. Then, in 1666, a series of 
ecological disasters struck the Pueblo. Drought and famine decimated the Indian population and 
forced them to eat hides and the leather from saddles. Similarly, a wave of disease further 
reduced the native population. As a result, the Apache, who also suffered from the same natural 
disasters, renewed their savage campaign against Puebloan settlements in search of sustenance. 
As the Spanish occupation dragged on, the Pueblo became increasingly frustrated with their 
colonial overlords.  
Medicine men began to argue that the reason for the Pueblo’s troubles was that their 
ancient ancestors and gods were angry. If the Pueblo returned to their old ways and offered 
maize and deference, the Indian religious leaders argued, the gods would answer their prayers 
with rain, prosperity and happiness.45 One such religious leader was a Pueblo Indian from San 
Juan named Popé. Jerónimo, a Tigua Indian, later described Popé’s role in the revolt aginst the 
Spanish:  
 
He [Jerónimo] knows that the said Indian Popé presented himself as a great captain, and 
that it was said that he was the one who made them kill priests and Spaniards, together 
with their women and children, and burn images and churches…and he caused them to 
wash their heads in order to take away the water of baptism, so that they might be as the 
had been in ancient times; and he told them that they would gather large crops of grain, 
maize with large and thick ears, many bundles of cotton, many calabashes and 
watermelons, and everything else in proportion.46 
 
Soon, the fear of Spanish punishment for practicing idolatry forced Popé to flee to the Pueblo of 
Taos, where he continued to argue for the return to ancient Puebloan tradition. While in Taos, 
Popé claimed to enter a kiva, an underground Puebloan ceremonial chamber, where he spoke 
with ancient spirits from the underworld. The gods told Popé to overthrow the Spanish and to tie 
knots in a cord that would signify the coming of the revolt and to pass the cord from village to 
village spreading word of the rebellion. Popé organized a group of Indians who went to other 
pueblos, ordering all that they encountered to “break up and burn the images of the holy Christ, 
the Virgin Mary and the other saints, the crosses, and everything pertaining to Christianity, and 
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that they burn the temples, break up the bells, and separate from the wives whom God had given 
them.”47  
 On August 9, 1680, Popé set the planned rebellion in motion, sending two messengers 
carrying deerskins with two knots to all the pueblos, letting the Indians know that two days 
remained until the revolt. The couriers repeated Popé’s message and told the Pueblos “that the 
father of all Indians,” Po-he-yemu, “their great captain, who had been such since the world had 
been inundated,” had ordered all pueblos to rebel. The messengers stated that Popé commanded 
all the Spanish to be killed, and with this accomplished, “they would live as in ancient 
times...and gather a great many provisions and everything they needed.”48 
 Despite Popé’s attempted secrecy, the pueblo of San Cristóbal was unwilling accept the 
message of Po-he-yemu and subsequently refused to participate in the revolt. It is unclear why 
the San Cristóbal Indians refused to rebel, however, it is clear that they choose to side with the 
Spanish authorities, whom they promptly notified of the planned attack. Before the Spanish 
could react to allegations of the impending insurrection, the Pueblos rebelled. On August 10, 
1680 Fray Juan Pío, went to collect the Indians for mass in the pueblo of Tesuque only to find it 
deserted. Pío continued to search for the Indians, who he found gathered outside the village 
“wearing war paint, with their bows, arrows, lances, and shields.” The father approached them 
asking, “What is this children; are you mad? Do not disturb yourselves,” and prompted them to 
return to the pueblo to receive mass. However, the Puebloans dismissed the priests demands, 
killed Fray Pío, and attacked a Spanish soldier, Pedro Hidalgo, who had been traveling with the 
priest.49 
 The revolt continued over nine days as Popé and the Pueblo’s ancient ancestors had 
commanded. Antonio de Otermín, the residing governor during the revolt, stated, “In a single 
day and hour they broke with everything, renouncing their obligation as Christians and vassals of 
his Majesty, and waging war hennery throughout the kingdom.”50 “With barbarous ferocity” 
Otermín continues, the Pueblos razed everything associated with Spanish rule and the Christian 
faith. The rebelling Indians killed twenty-one Christian missionaries including eighteen clerical 
ministers, two lay brothers, and the head of a church. The rebels burned churches, destroyed 
images of Christianity, and performed ceremonial dances. The Pueblos continued their 
campaign, killing three hundred and eighty Spaniards, many of whom were women and children, 
and mutilating their bodies. They proceeded to rob the “whole kingdom, taking possession of the 
cattle and horses and of everything in the entire kingdom.”51  
 On August 13, 1680, the Pueblo surrounded Governor Otermín’s villa in Santa Fe, 
sending in an elected native representative to offer the Spanish peace if they agreed to leave New 
Mexico. Otermín refused and the siege of Santa Fe began. During the nine-day siege, the Pueblos 
killed four more Spanish soldiers and threatened to annihilate all the remaining Spanish men in 
New Mexico. On August 21, 1680, Otermín and the remaining Spaniards abandoned Santa Fe, 
with the hopes of regrouping with other surviving colonists in the pueblo of La Isleta.52  
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 Afterwards, the Spanish were determined to learn the reasons for the revolt. In their quest 
for answers, the Spanish questioned captured Indians. Although Spaniards wrote the records of 
these interrogations, portraying the Indians from a Spanish perspective, they grant significant 
insight into the stimuli that motivated the Pueblo to rebel.53  
 Don Pedro Nanboa, an elderly Pueblo Indian whom the Spanish captured after the revolt, 
answered the Spaniard’s questions about why the Indians had risen against the Spanish. On 
September 6, 1680, when asked why the Indians rebelled “forsaking their obedience to his 
Majesty and failing in their obligations as Christians,” Nanboa stated that for a long time the 
Pueblos, “because the Spaniards punished sorcerers and idolaters,” had been constantly “plotting 
to kill the Spaniards and the religious.” He continued declaring:  
 
That the resentment which all the Indians have in their hearts has been so strong, from the 
time this kingdom was discovered, because the religious and the Spaniards took away 
their idols and forbade their sorceries and idolatries; that they have inherited successively 
from their old men the things pertaining to their ancient customs; and that he heard this 
resentment spoken of since he was of an age to understand.54 
 
Nanboa was not the only Indian to express bitterness over the treatment of ancient Pueblo 
tradition. Pedro García told Spanish authorities that the Pueblo had rebelled “because they 
resented it greatly that the religious and the Spaniards should deprive them of their idols, their 
dances, and their superstitions.”55  
Another Pueblo, Josephe, mentioned similar motivations for the revolt. He stated that the 
leaders of the insurrection told the Indians to never mention Jesus or Mary again and ordered the 
destruction of all the churches, rosaries, and crosses. Once the images of Christian religion had 
been removed, the pueblos “went to offer flour, feathers, and the seed of maguey, maize, and 
tobacco, and performed other superstitious rites, giving the children to understand that they must 
all do this in the future.”56  
Other Puebloan testimonies supported Nanboa, García, and Josephe’s stories. Two Indian 
brothers, Juan and Francisco Lorenzo, argued that Popé and the other chiefs of the rebellion had 
instructed them to burn the churches and images of Christianity and were to observe their ancient 
gods and that in this way, “they would have everything they might desire.”57 
 Popé and other religious leaders’ assertion that the Puebloan tribes suffered because they 
had abandoned their ancestral gods indicated that the Pueblos still clung to their cultural 
perspective of the world. Despite the significant changes that the Spanish brought to New 
Mexico, the Pueblo remembered the way in which their forefathers taught them to secure a 
harmonious world order and prosperous future.  
 The Pueblo Indians of New Mexico possessed a worldview emphasizing a relationship 
between man and god characterized by reciprocity. Their oral histories, creation myths, and 
stories of the dead instructed the Pueblos to remember their ancestors and the gods who created 
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their world. These narratives instructed the Pueblo to perform ceremonial dances, make offerings 
of maize, and to pray to their gods and ask for happiness, rain, and prosperity. The Puebloan 
Indians believed that as long as they continued to fulfill traditional ritual duties, their ancestors 
would continue to grant them wealth, comfort, and success, and the world would continue as it 
should. Pueblo cultural traditions also told the natives of New Mexico that if they abandoned 
their ancestors, the result would be suffering, disease, and an end to their world. 58  
 From the onset of Spanish colonial expansion into New Mexico, they attempted to exploit 
the Puebloan worldview by portraying themselves as gods. Initially, the Pueblo Indians 
interpreted the foreign presence and demands for conformity within the context of their cultural 
understanding of the cosmos. However, in 1598, the arrival of the Franciscan missionaries 
subjected the Indians to an alien ideology that demanded they abandon their customary religious 
practices. The Spanish outlawed Puebloan rituals, destroyed their idols and ceremonial 
chambers, and ordered them to live according to Christian values.59  
 The Pueblos soon realized that the newcomers were not omnipotent and were even less 
successful at bringing rain and happiness to New Mexico than their traditional gods. With this 
awareness, the Pueblos began to revert to their old ways, performing ceremonial dances and 
making offerings to their ancestors. In an attempt to enforce conformity to European and 
Christian values, the Spanish colonial authorities and Franciscan missionaries began to use 
violence to purge native traditions from the Puebloan New Mexico. 60  This only fueled the 
prevalent belief that the Spaniards were preventing the Pueblo from worshiping their ancestors 
and achieving the prosperity they desired.  
Additionally, environmental conditions in New Mexico worsened throughout the second 
half of the seventeenth century. In 1666, drought vastly reduced agricultural yields, giving rise to 
widespread famine while forcing Indians to eat leather and hides in order to survive.61 In the 
midst of this ecological disaster, disease further reduced native populations. Other hostile Indian 
tribes, such as the Apache, who were affected by the same environmental conditions, began a 
renewed campaign of violence against Puebloan settlements. Despite Spanish attempts to curb 
the Apache raids, the Pueblo’s enemies continued to destroy their villages and steal what little 
food they had left. By 1670, these conditions had reduced the native population of New Mexico 
by over forty-two percent, as compared to 1638.62 The suffering brought on by drought, famine, 
the profusion of disease, and the forced desertion of their ancestors aligned with Puebloan 
traditions, which told the Indians that if they ignored their ancestors, their gods would not grant 
them happiness and instead would allow the Pueblos to suffer.  
The result of Spanish cultural repression, famine, disease, and hostile raids by their 
traditional enemies gave the Puebloans a grim outlook on their lives under Spanish rule. 
Puebloan religious leaders, such as Popé, began telling other Puebloans that the cause for their 
misfortune was the abandonment of their ancestral traditions. The Pueblos identified the Spanish 
as the barrier that prevented the proper performance of their ceremonial obligations and the 
observance of their customary belief system. With an explanation for their problems, the Pueblo 
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rebelled to restore the cosmic order of their world. They sought to remove the Spaniards from 
New Mexico and return to their traditional lifestyles, thus pleasing their gods and securing a 
prosperous future with all that they desired.  
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At the turn of the nineteenth century, European countries were in a competition to spread their 
influence around the globe. They began to focus their greed on Africa, one of the last remaining 
areas of land that Europeans had yet to fully control. Desperate to get in on the action, King 
Leopold of Belgium convinced other Europeans to allow him to receive a large chunk of the 
continent that he called the Congo Free State. Thus began a series of events that would lead to 
the whole-sale slaughter, rape, and manipulation of Congolese peoples living in Leopold’s Free 
State. The terrifying atrocities that happened under Leopold’s rule did not go unnoticed. 
Spearheaded by E.D. Morel, a reform movement gained momentum in Britain then spread across 
the Atlantic Ocean to the United States. The movement was backed by prominent authors such as 
Arthur Conan Doyle and Mark Twain, who worked to expose the abuses that Leopold oversaw. 
They utilized newspapers and other forms of media to spread their message. To combat growing 
cries for reform in the Congo Free State, Leopold enlisted the help of agents to counter Congo 
reformers and gain the influence of high-ranking officials in Washington.  
The reform movement has been the subject of much research. William R. Lewis wrote 
extensively on E.D Morel and the reform movement he led to combat atrocities committed in 
Leopold’s Congo. Similarly, Dean Pavlakis wrote of the reform movement, adding information 
about its entrance into the United States and how it helped to expose a lobbying scandal in the 
U.S. senate operated under Leopold.  
Stories of Leopold and the Congo reform movement jumped to the forefront of popularity 
with the success of Adam Hochschild’s book, King Leopold’s Ghost. His work highlights the 
grotesque crimes perpetrated by the Congo Free State and describes the life of Leopold and his 
reactions to attacks against his rule. Hochschild writes of agents who worked to support Leopold 
in the United States, most famously Henry Kowalsky. On December 10, 1906 the New York 
American exposed Henry Kowalsky as an agent working for King Leopold of Belgium. The 
media fire storm that ensued spread to headlines in papers across the United States. Feeling the 
heat from media outlets, the U.S. government promptly removed all support for Leopold and his 
Congo. Kowalsky was merely a pawn in a much larger chess match. While Hochschild wrote of 
other accomplices to Leopold in the United States, he failed to mention a man named James 
Gustavus Whiteley.  Behind the scenes, James Gustavus Whiteley quietly worked to secure King 
Leopold II’s interests in the United States and garner support for his Congo. His background in 
financial institutions helped him to arrange business deals that would entice potential supporters. 
Most of all, Whiteley depended on his inconspicuous nature to work covertly to promote 
Leopold in the U.S.  
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Whiteley has remained nearly invisible in the popular histories written on Leopold and 
the Congo Free State. His elusive nature has left a void in the full understanding of Leopold’s 
agents’ infiltration of the United States. An article written by Jerome L. Sternstein briefly 
mentions Whiteley and the role he played in helping Leopold to gain the favor of a high ranking 
senator in Washington, but Sternstein does not mention who Whiteley was and how he got to 
play such a high-ranking role for Leopold. Similarly, an article written by Robert G. Weisbord 
tells of a Catholic Cardinal who led Whiteley to people in Washington who would listen to 
Leopold’s proposals. The evidence presented in these articles identifies Whiteley as a 
contributor, but do not address his significance as a key member of Leopold’s lobbying scheme 
in the United States. The clues found in newspapers from the era and information presented by 
Sternstein and Weisbord indicate that there is information that has been overlooked regarding 
Leopold and his battle against the Congo reform movement.  
Pulling together these strands of information reveals a more cohesive narrative on 
Leopold and the Congo reform movement. This more complete story helps to bring a better 
understanding of Whiteley’s role and how he remained so elusive. It examines his life before he 
became a key member of Leopold’s ring of agents, his writings, and how his extensive 
knowledge of language and Belgium led to him to catching the eye of Leopold. Working for 
Leopold propelled Whiteley down a path from atrocity supporter into acting in a reverse role for 
Belgium during World War I. He utilized his previous role as Leopold’s agent to become 
Belgium’s most outspoken supporter during the German occupation of World War I. This 
research differs from previous works because it presents evidence that has remained excluded 
from the analysis of Leopold and his fight against the Congo reform movement. It examines 
Whiteley’s largely unknown story as a key player in countering the Congo reform movement’s 
allegations against Leopold and his Congo Free State.  
James Gustavus Whiteley was born in Baltimore on July 9, 1866. After attending private 
schools as well as being tutored, he became a clerk at the Savings Bank of Baltimore in 1882.1 
He was not passionate about banking but was very interested in studying “diplomacy and 
international law.”2 Whiteley’s studies introduced him to an understanding of the relationships 
between nations as well as foreign cultures. His interest in foreign cultures and diplomacy led 
him to “master several languages.”3 In 1899 Whiteley was part of a delegation in Washington 
that urged the president to step in and mediate a conflict in Africa between Great Britain, 
Transvaal and Orange Free State republics.4 He and the other delegates urged the president to 
“allay the bloody conflict going on in Africa” and bring terms of peace.5 An ominous and ironic 
beginning for Whiteley, this event foreshadowed his career as an apologist for atrocities in the 
Congo Free State.  
 As his knowledge of foreign countries and writing ability grew, Whiteley began to write 
articles for American and foreign periodicals.6 One of these articles caught the eye of Leopold II 
of Belgium and jump-started Whiteley’s role as an agent for the king. In August of 1903, 
Whiteley had one of his book reviews published in the New York Times. The review praised 
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Leopold for bringing “the blessings of civilization” to central Africa. A place that Whiteley says 
was a “great blank space with which map makers wont to decorate.”7 Whiteley attributed the 
growing campaign in London against Leopold’s Congo to a “desire to possess land.”8 He 
believed Britain was creating the Congo atrocities movement so that they could have their 
possessions in the Congo connected “from Cape to Cairo” - a view on Britain Whiteley still held 
from his previous work on a delegation trying to stop Britain from continuing their participation 
in the Boer War.9 Regardless of Whiteley’s motives for writing the article, he clearly viewed 
Leopold and his Congo Free State as a positive force in the lives of the native Congolese. 
Leopold jumped at the opportunity to gain an ally, especially one with connections within the 
United States.  
After seeing Whiteley’s article, Leopold quickly invited him to Brussels.10 One could 
assume that Leopold wanted more than just to praise Whiteley for his flattering words. Leopold 
was actively looking to recruit supporters of his regime in the Congo. After reading Whiteley’s 
work, Leopold saw him as a perfect candidate and turned the visit into a business meeting. 
Leopold recognized that Whiteley could be extremely useful to him in the United States. His 
background in foreign relations, interest in diplomacy, and understanding of the Belgian 
language would undoubtedly have been appealing to Leopold. But in order to make Whiteley a 
dependable agent, he had to ensure he would be loyal. According to the National Cyclopedia of 
American Biography, “Leopold made Whiteley a director of the Forminiere, gave him a grant of 
25,000 acres in the Congo, and appointed him consul-general of the Congo Free State.”11 This 
ensured that Whiteley would not just be a supporter of the Congo Free State, he would also have 
a stake in it.  
Leopold must have felt confident in his decision to invest in Whiteley. His diplomatic 
skills and interest in Belgian culture played a major role in Leopold’s decision. In July of 1904 
Whitley had another book review published in the New York Times. His review critiqued a work 
by Demetrius C. Boulger, titled Belgian Life in Town and Country. In the review Whiteley 
showed an extraordinary knowledge of Belgian government and culture. He wrote that “while 
differing in language and in origin Belgians have two points on which all agree—industry and 
religion.”12 He went on to write that they “are all united by the Catholic communion . . . 
Belgium, Bavaria and Ireland are considered the three most devoted faithful daughters of the 
Church.”13 Seeing that Whiteley had such a vast knowledge of Belgian demographics must have 
comforted Leopold in his choice of a supporter. Whiteley was not just another paid henchman of 
Leopold, he was an intelligent diplomat and shrewd business man with extensive knowledge of 
Belgian affairs. On his return to the United States, Whiteley would get to work finding 
supporters for Leopold in Washington.  
In 1905 Whiteley began his work for Leopold as consul-general for the Congo Free State 
in Baltimore. He utilized connections—his own as well as those that Leopold had already 
formed. One such connection was with the Belgian minister in the United States, Baron 
Moncheur. The Baron was another one of Leopold’s paid agents who, Robert G. Weisbord 
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writes, “lobbied Senators and Congressmen to prevent American governmental interference in 
his sovereign’s Congo affairs.”14 Similar to Whiteley, Baron Moncheur wrote articles in 
periodicals showing his support for Leopold. In October of 1904, Moncheur had his article 
published in The North American Review. It praised Leopold for bringing “civilization to a 
benighted people.”15 He used poetic metaphors comparing the Congo Free State to a “tree which 
has flourished so excellently in Africa, and which has brought forth such good fruit both in 
commercial and in a humanitarian sense.”16 Moncheur and Whiteley used these tactics to conceal 
the real crimes that had been committed. Their articles argued that Leopold brought the greatness 
of “civilization and Christianity” to the people of the Congo.17 Moncheur even went as far as to 
call Leopold’s accomplishments “one of the wonders of the world.”18 These tactics attempted to 
counter Congo Reform Associations movement that had begun to pick up steam in the United 
States.  
Reformers did not hesitate to attack Whiteley directly in the media. An article in The 
Medina Daily Journal said that an investigation into the Congo, led by the British consul, found 
that “Whiteley contains a number of statements of cruel treatment of natives.”19 A boy named 
Epondo claimed “his left hand had been cut off by a native sentry in the service of La Lulonga 
Rubber Company.”20 Whiteley denied these accusations, saying that Epondo had lied about his 
hand being cut off by a sentry and in fact, he “lost it in a boar hunt.”21 Whiteley went on to say 
that “mutilated victims” could be blamed on “inter-tribal wars” and not on the Congo Free 
State.22 Whiteley and Leopold’s other agents consistently denied these accusations. They knew 
that they could blame missing limbs on the “barbarism, cannibalism, inter-tribal wars”23 of the 
native Congolese and no one would be the wiser. The layman who read an article such as this 
would assume that cases such as Epondo’s were normal and believe that the government was not 
responsible for such atrocities. To counter this, reformers such as E. D. Morel would take their 
claims to important men in the United States government, leading Whiteley and his other agents 
to maneuver in defense.  
On October 17, 1904. E. D. Morel traveled to the United States in hopes of meeting with 
the President to gain his aid in the Congo Reform movement.24 Morel had been the most 
outspoken critic of Leopold and for years had been working against him in Britain. His Congo 
Reform Association worked tirelessly to find evidence of the misdeeds that Leopold had 
sponsored and showcase them to the world. Morel was no fool and was aware Leopold had 
agents attempting to work against him. Morel was correct because it was falsely reported that 
President Roosevelt turned down the opportunity to meet with him.25 Morel denied this report 
but did go on to say that agents of Leopold were “very much in evidence” at a peace congress he 
attended.26  
Whiteley and his fellow agents appear to have viewed Morel as a major threat to their 
work in the United States. Evidence of this can be found in an article published in The 
Ogdensburg Journal, a mere two days after Morel arrived. The article states that The Belgian 
Minister, Baron Moncheur, hosted a lavish party in the banquet hall of the New Willard building 
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in Washington D.C. calling it “the most important entertainment of the week.”27 In attendance 
were many key figures for Belgium, including Lawrence Townsend, the United States Minister 
to Brussels; Walter V. Berry, the Minister from the Netherlands; and James Whiteley.28 The 
party was hosted for M. Francotte, the Belgian Minister of Industry and Labor, who was visiting 
the country with his wife.29 Clearly the party was for more than celebration. Whiteley and the 
other agents used this time to discuss their next move against Morel and the mounting 
accusations against Leopold.  
Jerome L. Sternstein writes that soon after Whitley went to Belgium to devise a plan of 
action with the King.30 On his arrival back in Washington, Whitley arranged to meet with 
Senator Nelson Aldrich, one of the most prominent politicians in the United States and was 
unofficially named the “general manager of the United States.”31 
Sternstein’s research highlights Leopold’s growing desire to gain influence in the United 
States by appealing to the business minds of America’s top political figures. In his article, 
Sternstein addresses Whitley’s role in attempting to accomplish this. His meeting with Aldrich 
was the beginning of Leopold’s attempt to gain influence in Washington and the first attempt by 
Whiteley to infiltrate the United States political arena. E. D. Morel and his Congo Reform 
Association were working to garner support in the United States. A subcommittee for Senate 
Foreign Relations in the U.S. was already considering a Congo Reform Association memorial 
calling for congressional action in the Congo.32 To counter this, Whiteley set up a meeting with 
Aldrich to ask his advice on “the best way to of bringing Leopold’s case before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee.”33 The man that the New York Times called “the most powerful 
man in the United States” would be an important asset to have, and Whiteley knew that Aldrich’s 
influence would be indispensable in gaining support for Leopold.34  
Feeling confident in himself and in Leopold’s offer after their first meeting, Whiteley 
asked Aldrich to introduce a counter memorial in the senate to combat the CRA’s memorial.35 
Aldrich declined, but where some would have felt defeated it appears Whiteley was only 
convinced to work harder. Conventional public tactics to gain support did not work with Aldrich, 
so Whiteley turned to a more shrewd backroom approach to gain influence in Washington.  
Whiteley used his close businesses ties in the Congo to influence Senator Nelson Aldrich 
to support Leopold and his Congo in Congress. In 1901, Aldrich and Thomas Fortune Ryan, who 
was an “influential Catholic Financier and philanthropist,” formed the Continental Rubber 
Company.36 The company grew quickly into a “30,000,000 dollar corporation.”37 But the 
company was growing faster than the guayule bush from which they harvested crude rubber. As 
a result, Aldrich and Ryan found themselves in a precarious situation. On January 14, 1906, 
Whiteley gave Senator Nelson Aldrich a “confidential letter” offering him concessions in the 
Congo. Whiteley knew of Aldrich’s struggling rubber business and turned it to his advantage. In 
the letter Whitley wrote, “I understand you are interested in a new Rubber Company . . . I may 
add confidentially that I was assured in the ‘highest quarters’ that every facility and 
encouragement would be given to a properly organized American company.”38 Jerome L. 
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Sternstein writes that Whiteley’s letter “allowed Aldrich to choose among five different plans, 
each of which offered . . . broad and potentially lucrative concessions in the Congo.”39 The first 
plan being that Aldrich’s Continental Rubber Company, “could become the exclusive American 
selling agent for rubber in the Congo.”40 By approaching Aldrich through a business mindset 
instead of a political one, Whiteley knew he could convince Aldrich to work for him. Whiteley’s 
“behind closed doors” mentality allowed him to find support for Leopold without attracting 
attention to himself.  
 Whitley used Aldrich as an ally to gain support for Leopold in Washington. Even though 
some saw the concessionary deal made with Aldrich as “a blatant attempt by Leopold to ‘utilize 
the influence of American Trust interests in American politics,” Aldrich and Whiteley were not 
worried.41 Although Aldrich made no formal agreement to improve Leopold’s interest in 
Washington, his actions in Washington seem to prove that he knew what was expected of him. 
Amid mounting pressure, Secretary of State, Elihu Root “decided to appoint a Consul General to 
the Free State to investigate conditions there.”42 One can easily assume that Whiteley viewed this 
move as a threat, but even more threatening was the candidate Root wanted to place as Consul. 
Sternstein writes that Root asked G. Stanley Hall, who at the time was president of the Congo 
Reform Association (CRA).43 The CRA was the staunchest opponent of Leopold’s Congo and 
Whitley viewed anyone that was affiliated with the CRA as someone who “could not under any 
circumstance be looked upon favorably by the Congo Free State.”44 Whiteley must have 
expressed his concern to Aldrich, who threatened a veto. As a result, Root withdrew his 
nomination.45  This example of the influence Whitley gained in Washington demonstrates his 
ability to pull the strings while remaining out of site of the press.  
Even though Whiteley was successful at lobbying support for Leopold, he could not 
control the outcome for other agents working for the king. At the height of Whiteley’s influence 
in Washington, another agent of Leopold named Henry Kowalsky brought it crashing down. The 
Kowalsky scandal brought an end to Whiteley’s participation as one of Leopold’s agents, but it 
also shielded him from incrimination. After the New York American published the expose 
incriminating Kowalsky for lobbying in Washington on Leopold’s behalf, the U.S. government 
acted swiftly. Adam Hochschild writes that only “hours after the story broke, Senator Lodge of 
Massachusetts . . . introduced a resolution calling for an international investigation of the Congo 
scandal.”46 The scandal quickly and decisively “changed the climate in Washington” regarding 
their position on the Congo and Leopold.47 As Kowalsky took most of the heat, Whiteley quietly 
continued his work as consul-general for Leopold’s Free State. 
On November 1, 1907, The New York Times published an article that Whiteley had sent 
to their editor. In the article Whiteley denied accusations that “King Leopold has deprived 
Belgium of a large part of the Congo by transferring the Crown lands to a private company.”48 
This was a blatant lie in the wake of Leopold and Whiteley’s efforts to gain support from Senator 
Nelson Aldrich.49 Not to mention the 25,000 acres that was exclusively granted to Whiteley 
himself. His open denials in the media shielded him from the same fallout that afflicted 
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Kowalsky and other agents. After Belgium annexed the Congo from Leopold in 1908, Whiteley 
slipped away from being an agent of Leopold’s and “returned to his banking activities in 
Baltimore and continued to write articles.”50  
 Whiteley must have found it hard to regress back to banking duties after living a much 
more interesting life working for Leopold. World War I provided the opportunity for Whiteley to 
use his valuable skills once more, this time in defense of Belgium, not Leopold. As the war 
began, Whiteley entered the service of Belgium.51 In 1916 he was appointed consul of Belgium 
at Baltimore once more by King Leopold’s heir, King Albert.52 This time, instead of lobbying for 
support of Leopold, Whiteley lobbied Washington to send aid in support of German occupied 
Belgium. He began writing articles for The New York Times, speaking out against the German 
occupation in hopes of gaining support for Belgium. In an article published on October 17, 1915, 
Whitley wrote that Germany was using Belgium as a “milch-cow.”53 Ironically, another article 
Whiteley wrote echoed a similar argument that the CRA used against him and Leopold. He 
stated that “the brutality of Germany is equaled only by her hypocrisy. Germany’s brutality in 
sending thousands of Belgians into slavery will never be forgiven . . . Germany’s sanctimonious 
pretense that she has enslaved these innocent people ‘for their own good and for the good of 
Belgium’ only adds hypocrisy to crime.”54  An interesting comparison coming from a man who 
so vigorously defended Leopold against the cry of atrocity raised by Congo Reformers. 
Nevertheless, Whiteley strongly supported Belgium during World War I. He was made 
secretary-general of the central committee for Belgian Relief Fund. His work in the United States 
was beneficial to gaining support for Belgium.  
 After the end of World War I, Whiteley invested his time in restoring war-torn Belgium. 
He was secretary of the committee for the restoration of University of Louvain that was 
destroyed by the Germans during the war.55 He was also given an honorary membership to the 
Royal Zoological Society of Antwerp for his “aid in restoring specimens destroyed during the 
First World War.”56 His strong commitment to Belgium left a lasting impression in the country. 
Even though Whiteley was an American by blood, his heart was fully Belgian. In 1945 he was 
awarded the Medaille Civique, “in recognition of his service to Belgium during the reigns of 
three kings, and a regent.”57 His benevolent work during and after the war would help to ensure 
that Whiteley’s memory in Belgium would be a positive one that was not directly related to 
Leopold and his Congo Free State.  
 Whitley has remained nearly invisible in histories written about Leopold and the Congo 
Free State. His elusive nature has left a void in the full understanding of Leopold’s agent’s 
infiltration in the United States. Whitley’s articles defending Leopold against Congo Reformers 
helped to ensure that all accusations would be met with firm denial. Evidence presented by 
Sternstein tells us that Whiteley’s efforts lobbying for Leopold in Washington paid off after he 
gained Aldrich as an ally. Whiteley used his influence in Washington to prevent legislation from 
being passed that would negatively affect Leopold. His ability to use others to do the work for 
him enabled him to remain hidden from the spotlight. 
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 Contributing to his elusiveness was the fact that he was consul-general for Belgium. The 
consulship was a government position that gave Whiteley legitimacy as he made his rounds to 
prominent senators in Washington. Henry Kowalsky held no formal titles from Belgium or from 
any government. This made him an easy target for accusation of lobbying that unfolded into a 
full-fledged scandal.  Whiteley, unlike Kowalsky, was a paid government employee. He used his 
formal position to cover his back-door lobbying for Leopold. Researchers investigating 
Leopold’s infiltration of U.S. congress could easily overlook Whiteley as nothing more than 
consul-general for Belgium, never suspecting him of being a prominent lobbying agents of 
Leopold’s behind the scenes.  
Another reason Whiteley has remained largely removed from the story of Leopold’s 
lobbying in the United States is the work he did after the fall of Leopold and because his actions 
in America were overshadowed by his work in Belgium. Whiteley’s most remembered and 
recorded work is almost entirely related to Belgium. His high honorary status in Belgium led to 
possible misinterpretation of his citizenship as an American explaining his absence in the history 
of Leopold and the Congo that focus on the United States. His benevolent work for Belgium 
after the Leopold era helped to bury his earlier, questionable behavior. In Belgium he is 
remembered for his charity in re-building a war torn country, not for lobbying for Leopold or his 
denial of Congo atrocities.  
James Gustavus Whiteley’s elusive nature has allowed him to be overlooked in much of 
the popular historiographies written on Leopold and the Congo Free State. His intelligence and 
government position provided him with the necessary cover as he worked behind the scenes for 
Leopold. His dedication and hard work for Belgium during World War I overshadows much of 
his work before the war. This made evidence of his benevolent work more apparent than his 
hidden work for Leopold. Whiteley should be remembered as a major player in Leopold’s 
lobbying of the United States and his defense of Congo atrocities, but he should also be 
remembered as an intensely loyal man who was devoted to a king and a country for which he 
cared deeply.   
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Abstract 
 
British Prime Minister George Grenville is frequently misunderstood. Unlike his predecessors, 
he sought compromise with the British colonies in North America, did not abuse the power and 
influence granted to him by him appointment, and did not award himself lavish gifts and a high 
salary under the guise of financial responsibility. Grenville actively sought to consolidate 
Britain's debt through his unwavering work ethic and honest business ideas. He also worked to 
find a new way to govern and control the British North American colonies. Left in debt by the 
costly Seven Years War, Britain expected her colonies to pay for the war waged for their benefit. 
At the same time that Britain passed new taxes, the colonies suffered a severe economic 
depression. Thus British attempts at debt reconciliation left the colonists hostile towards 
Grenville and Great Britain, who they perceived as ignoring their financial plight. Grenville 
heard their complaints and concerns, understood they felt threatened by British lawmakers 
enacting a direct tax in their country, and offered them the chance to tax themselves. When the 
colonists failed to provide a new system, he fell back on his original taxation plan created 
through Parliament.  [Keywords: American colonies, Britain, American Revolution, salutary 
neglect, taxation] 
 
 
 
 
Often vilified by the American Revolutionary effort, Prime Minister George Grenville became a 
lightening rod for misguided colonial anger. Frustrated with what they saw as unjust taxation, 
colonists called for an end to the Sugar and Stamp Acts that Grenville conceived. As tensions 
rose and tempers flared, Grenville found himself stuck between an unsympathetic king and 
colonists who complained of taxation without representation. When Grenville entered the office 
of Prime Minister in 1763, two major problems awaited him: the hemorrhaging debt from 
defending the British colonies in the Seven Years War, and the question of how to govern the 
territories added to the empire by the Treaty of Paris. First, Grenville saw the need to stop the 
illegal trade that had arisen between the colonies and the French during the war and began a 
series of political reformations in the colonies that severely punished those caught trading with 
the French. New tax acts followed, the purpose of which was to consolidate the accumulated 
debt, create new revenue for the British, and to cover the cost of the British Army in America. 
Colonists at first met the new regulations with mild forms of resistance, but generally complied. 
As time went on, colonial resistance became louder and more sophisticated. 
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When the Stamp Act passed in 1765, the situation reached its boiling point, and groans of 
frustration evolved into active resistance. A clash resulted between colonial desire to return to a 
policy of salutary neglect and Britain’s determination to balance her budget and return her 
colonies to their subservient role. Grenville showed a desire to listen to colonial concerns about 
an intrusive Britain in a time period where many colonists felt they were not being represented or 
heard in British government. Parliament did not approve, arguing that if colonists could 
influence lawmaking, they ceased to be colonies and would become a completely separate 
nation. Caught on both sides by the growing instability of the colonial situation and the King's 
frustration at his personal conduct, Grenville was removed from office only two years after his 
appointment. 
 How then could someone so willing to listen be so vilified in the eyes of the colonists and 
their leaders? In order to understand the complicated legacy Grenville left, his life before, during, 
and after his position in office must be closely examined. A well-educated and motivated young 
man with close familial ties to politics, his entrance into the life of a career politician was all but 
predetermined by his parents. Holding a variety of important political roles in varying levels of 
local and national government, Grenville became known for his business skill with managing 
and creating money where needed. Britain needed both a fresh take on a new situation with the 
colonies and an economically-minded man to correct horrendous spending policies. Grenville fit 
the bill. Grenville's business-first approach with financing led him into the Prime Minister role in 
1763 and led to his resignation only two years later. His greatest strength proved to be his 
greatest weakness.  
 George Grenville was born on October 14th, 1712. He was educated at Eton before 
entering into college at Christ Church, Oxford. Grenville originally trained to be a lawyer, and 
succeeded in being called to the bar in 1735.1 With a politically powerful brother (Lord Temple) 
on one side of him, and an equally politically active brother-in-law (William Pitt) on the other, 
Grenville soon left the law behind to join his family in politics. Grenville entered Parliament in 
1741 as member for Buckingham, a post he held until his death in 1770.2 Both Pitt and Temple 
saw their relative as a means of garnering more support for their plans and policies. Grenville 
was smart enough to help push their politicking, but not well-liked enough to pose any threat to 
their own political careers. Although he was respected by his superiors for his dedication to 
business and efficiency, his less-than-amiable personality caused his peers and superiors to 
question his usefulness in higher posts. Grenville's work ethic surprised both himself and his 
family members, and he excelled early in his political life. In December 1744 he became a lord 
of the admiralty in the Pelham administration, and three years later in June 1747, Grenville 
became a lord of the treasury.3 These early posts culminated in his appointment as Treasurer of 
the Navy in 1754. His legacy at this post included the the Navy Act of 1758, a law which made it 
easier for sailors of the royal navy to receive their wages and send them back home to wives and 
loved ones.4 It was not the first time, nor would it be the last, that Grenville helped those of the 
working class. Upon his resignation from the post of Prime Minister, Sir James Porter 
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commented that the King's servants owed Grenville a statue because he ensured the regular 
payment of their wages.5 
 Despite George Grenville's experience in financial management, finances still caused the 
greatest friction between the British colonies and their motherland. With a larger empire than the 
British could have ever imagined, they faced the question of how to solve their debt crisis 
utilizing the colonies they had spent so much to defend. The source of this issue began during the 
Seven Years War, long before George Grenville became Prime Minister. The cost of the war 
aside, the conduct of the colonies during the conflict left a sour taste in the mouths of British 
rulers and merchants. Colonists had engaged in a deep and illegal trade network with the French, 
selling them provisions and goods that aided their war effort directly (wood and guns) or 
indirectly (supplies and foodstuffs). The first step in Grenville's plan was to stop the illegal 
French-American trade. As the former first lord of the Treasury, Grenville was undoubtedly 
familiar with the trade connections and how much money the colonists had generated at the 
expense of the British.6 Swiftly moving into action, Grenville established new incentives for 
Royal officers and privateers to search, find, and seize colonial ships involved in any illegal 
dealings. The same act also created new maritime courts in the colonies so that smugglers could 
no longer get off easy on account of their familiarity with the colonies’ judges and juries.7 
Colonial merchants said it was an injustice to use British judges to try colonial criminals, but 
their complaints fell on deaf ears. Even the rich and well-connected found themselves, if not 
summoned to court on suspicion of illegal trade, intimidated enough to cut their smuggling ties. 
Grenville also established new positions and promoted new customs officials to make sure that 
the taxes and duties he created were well-enforced and followed to the letter. No longer could 
rich colonial merchants drop money into the pockets of customs collectors in exchange for their 
silence. Each collector was well-respected and made aware that their compliance to British law 
would be worthwhile in the end. 
 Next came the start of debt reconciliation. During the war, the British asked local colonial 
governments to provide militia men to bolster military ranks and supportive taxes to help fund 
the war effort. Their pleas for both were often ignored often; no men arrived to help the Royal 
troops, nor were any taxes received to pay for guns, ammunition, and food. Debt continued to 
accumulate and by the end of the war, Britain had reached a total deficit of one hundred and 
thirty-two million British pounds8, a massive amount of money that almost doubled the debt left 
from the 1748 War of Austrian Succession.9 The money had to come from somewhere, and 
Grenville knew more money could not be pulled from the British people. The English already 
paid exponentially higher taxes than their colonial counterparts, and their pockets were emptying 
fast; Grenville instead looked to the colonies. The first to propose a tax strictly to raise revenue 
from the colonies, Grenville said that it was the right of the British to request that such taxes be 
paid in fair proportion. In an address to Parliament he once said: 
 
That this kingdom has the sovereign, the supreme legislative power over America, is 
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granted. It cannot be denied; and taxation is a part of that sovereign power...The nation 
[Britain] has run itself into an immense debt to give them [the colonies] this protection; 
and now they are called upon to contribute a small share towards the public expense... 10 
 
Grenville looked first to an older law set to expire in the same year of his election, the Molasses 
Act of 1733.11 Passed as the Revenue Act of 1764 but known more commonly as the Sugar Act, 
this act altered its predecessor's duty collection. Originally, the Molasses Act had a sixpence-per-
gallon duty per gallon on molasses and sugar. At the time, the law sought to prohibit French-
American trade with such a damagingly high tax. The smuggling during the Seven Years War 
proved how ineffective the plan was. Grenville altered the tax and proposed cutting the duty in 
half. He stated that a lowered duty finally paid (and paid more often) would increase revenue, 
and stronger British control of the seas would force compliance. Parliament passed the new law 
without a word of protest.12 
 After the passage of the Sugar Act, more regulatory measures came about. For years 
colonies had printed their own paper money as a medium of trade and exchange. One of the most 
influential regulatory laws was the Currency Act of 1764. In an attempt to stabilize trade 
relations between Britain and America, this act sought to end colonial money printing.13 
Colonists needed a currency to exchange during inter-colonial trade. They faced shortages of 
paper currency regularly because the only way to get new paper money was in trade regulated by 
Great Britain. American colonial governments began to print their own paper money to solve the 
shortage problem. For colonists conducting their colonial business, no problems arose. For the 
British looking on, the issue with the colonial money laid in its backing, or lack thereof. The 
British pound had a “hard” backing, in that it held value through gold or silver in the British 
treasury, while colonial money was based upon mortgaged land.14 Without a “hard” backing, 
colonial paper money was distrusted and held no value in the eyes of the British. Further 
complicating the issue was the lack of standard value and uniformity in money issuance. Some 
notes had interest payments, others did not. Some could only be used for purchases and not for 
debt payments, the opposite was true for other issued money.15 When a British merchant 
received colonial bills as payment, they were useless anywhere outside of the American colonies 
and often of no use outside of the specific colony in which it was issued.16 In legal cases when a 
British merchant sued a colonial trader, his payment if he won was ssued in the form of colonial 
dollars issued by the colony in which the legal action took place. Stuck with worthless colorful 
paper, English merchants clamored to Parliament for restrictions and regulations, and got their 
wish with the passage of the Currency Act 
 George Grenville recognized that even the enormous amount of money raised from the 
Sugar Act would not be enough to cover all of Britain’s debts. The colonies posed a special 
problem that none of his predecessors could have predicted. It was necessary to protect British 
colonial interests and prevent the colonies from forcing Britain to extend so much capital. To 
limit trans-Atlantic military costs, Grenville planned to station ten thousand active troops in the 
Caleb Follmer / “George Grenville” 
 50 
colonies. The question then became how to prevent this expense from adding to Britain's massive 
debt. In early 1765, Grenville proposed a colonial Stamp Tax on any and all official papers, 
including newspapers, pamphlets, diplomas, legal documents, and even playing cards.17 Such a 
law existed already in Britain, so it made sense to extend similar taxes to their colonies. 
Grenville defended the act, saying that unlike the Sugar Act, funds raised by the Stamp Act did 
not go to the British, but would remain in the colonies to help facilitate colonial defense and 
other local needs; colonists, however, did not care. The eventual passage of the Stamp Act left in 
its wake angry and motivated colonists, ready to actively push back against its overbearing 
motherland and to fight against taxation without fair representation. 
Grenville’s next quandary was how to govern the new land and to control the colonies 
after the financial situation was eventually resolved. The majority of the issues between the 
American colonies and George Grenville's office were due to a lack of identity for the colonies. 
After the French and Indian War, the colonial economy began to boom. Ready to take the step 
away from being a middleman for British trade, colonists became restless with the countless 
regulations and trade restrictions placed upon them. Grenville's strict Admiralty courts and 
maritime laws ensured that smuggling no longer gave them the profiting outlet they desired. The 
colonies wanted more: not only the economic freedom granted to them during the years of 
salutary neglect, but the ability and freedom to nurture their maturing industries Before chaos 
could erupt, the colonies sent representatives to British Parliament and Grenville welcomed 
them. Grenville, like the colonial representatives, had high hopes of finding an alternative 
solution to the British tax plans. One of these representatives was Benjamin Franklin, who wrote 
to Grenville in February of 1765 asking for the Currency Act to be reformed as an alternative to 
the Stamp Act: “we...beg leave to submitt [sic] to your consideration a measure calculated for 
supplying the Colonies with a Paper Currency, become absolutely necessary to their 
Circumstances, by which Measure a certain and very considerable Revenue will arise to the 
crown.”18 Grenville entertained these representative bodies and listened to each argument with 
an open mind. He recognized the pushback against his Stamp Tax and offered the representatives 
a chance to suggest an alternative. Seeing the concern the representatives had over a strictly 
enforced law from across the ocean, Grenville desired a plan that would leave the colonists 
complacent and willing to contribute their fair share. Grenville even wrote to other colonial 
leaders who were unable to make the trip to Britain to expand his understanding of the situation 
and why the law was so abhorred by their constituents.19 In the end, it was decided that a locally 
created and enforced tax to generate the revenue would be necessary and satisfactory to pacify 
the colonial administrations. Grenville was happy to comply, and asked what tax plan they 
planned to create and how much revenue could be expected as a result. When neither those he 
wrote to nor those in person were able to answer this question, a frustrated George Grenville 
made it known that the Stamp Act would go into effect in November of 1765.  
 When word reached home that no settlement had been reached, American colonists were 
incensed. In October the colonists created a Stamp Act Congress to establish a more unified 
#History A Journal of Student Research, Number 1 
 51 
voice, but their attention focused on an appeal to the crown, rather than to the financial leader 
George Grenville.20 Even if colonists had aimed their ire at him it would have had no effect: 
Grenville had resigned from his office in July of 1765. Nevertheless, the colonial mob took to the 
streets and effectively boycotted British goods. Local papers published the names of residents 
who did not follow through on the boycott to force them to correct their behavior. Colonists 
publicly burned stamps instead of applying them to their papers, they harassed local Stamp Tax 
collectors, and went as far as to dismantle the home of a local governor and staunch Loyalist, 
Cadwallader Colden, an activity which became a popular tool of protesting crowds. 21 The 
colonial resistance was further motivated by the timing of the Currency Act. At the end of the 
war, colonies felt the pressure of a post-war recession. Extra ships sat in harbors, unemployed 
sailors roamed the streets causing trouble, and warehouses sagged under the weight of unsold 
goods.22 Just when the colonists needed a source of money to help their suddenly-sagging 
markets most, it was taken away.  
 What George Grenville might have done to quell the colonial riots will forever be a 
mystery. Unpopular in the colonies because of assumed British arrogance, and increasingly 
unpopular in Britain herself, Grenville resigned from his post with a mixed legacy. Though he 
left the office of Prime Minister, that was not the end for Grenville in politics. He kept his seat in 
Parliament where he defended his American colonial policies with an even deeper passion, and 
called for the taxes to remain in place. In an address for the King in February of 1766, Grenville 
warned of the dangers of backing down to colonial pressure for the future of colonial rule: 
 
 America would not have been in this condition if they had believed that we would 
 enforce the law...Whoever advises the King to give up his sovereignty over America is 
 the greatest enemy to this country and will be accused by all posterity. ...Says he finds the 
 Americans disputing the authority of this country and was willing to try how far their 
 disobedience could reach ...Let those who encourage America and have raised and 
 increased this condition by such encouragement extricate us out of it, and God grant that 
 they may meet with success.23 
 
Grenville wanted to remind the colonists that they were not a sovereign nation, but subjects of 
the British government and were expected to behave as such. Despite Grenville's impassioned 
warning, his successor, the Marquis of Rockingham, had the Stamp Act repealed in March of 
1766.24 To prevent future misunderstandings about the rights of the motherland over the 
colonies, Parliament passed the Declaratory Act later that same month. This Act cemented 
Parliament's right to make laws binding the colonies in whatever manner Britain saw fit.25 The 
American colonists saw the Declaratory Act as a desperate attempt for Britain to save face after 
crumbling under colonial pressure to repeal the Stamp Act. Such weakness from their 
overbearing government gave fire to the colonists who saw that they could influence change if 
they pushed for it. Grenville's words proved prophetic. Britain's inability to hold-fast and enforce 
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colonial laws and codes would be the undoing of the empire. 
 A legacy of mixed emotions and misdirected hate characterized the tenure of George 
Grenville. Well-respected for his work ethic, the man climbed the ranks of the British colonial 
system quickly, efficiently, and honorably. Known as a businessman, not a statesman, Grenville's 
legalistically structured mind dictated his policies and the beliefs to which he clung while in 
office. As a member of the Whig Party, Grenville and his fellow party members believed 
strongly in the importance of preserving the British Empire and way of life. No one knew how to 
govern such a wide expanse of territory, stretching from North America, across the ocean to the 
Far East. Such an expansive empire over such different cultures and land had never before been 
seen on Earth. What is known now as the Commonwealth system had never been suggested or 
created. This system, if thought of at the time, would have brought the peaceful solution the 
colonies and Britain desired. While Grenville did not directly suggest the Commonwealth 
system, he gave examples and hints of a similar system of unification in which both sides had 
their voices heard. Much of the debate over what to do with the colonies came during the time of 
the Stamp Act debate in Parliament. Issues with roles of the American colonies in the empire as 
well as their other territories became hotly debated topics with no answers. “All colonies 
[American and other] are subject to the dominion of the mother country, whether they are a 
colony of the freest or the most absolute government.”26 When other Parliamentary members 
discovered that Grenville had listened to the colonial suggestion that they would take it upon 
themselves to raise the necessary funds through self-imposed taxes, Parliament struck out against 
the idea. Despite warnings that allowing the colonies such autonomy could spark feelings of 
independence and endanger the empire, Grenville remained undaunted.  He was not alone: 
William Beckford stated that, “No precedent found of foreign taxation but the Post Office,... If 
this principle was established, why not tax Ireland . . . The North Americans would be glad to be 
rid of the troops from the Government and the expense of supporting them.”27 Colonel Isaac 
Barré built upon these ideas, praising Grenville's slow and cautious progression, but warned 
about the future. “We are working in the dark, and the less we do the better. Power and right; 
caution to be exercised lest the power be abused, the right subverted...”28  Barré continued later 
that time could be taken to see the efficacy of the Sugar Act, reminding his compatriots that it 
had not yet been a year since the law took effect. This debate continued long after George 
Grenville had resigned. No one knew quite how to handle the American colonies and no one 
seemed willing to create a brand new governing system. 
 How then does Grenville fit into the framework of history? Grenville did not support 
American independence, but he did support the unification of the colonies with England, and 
recognized the importance of this relationship for the future success of the British empire. 
Grenville felt that the colonies had a role to play, and that they needed to be brought under 
control to better play it. His taxation plans and the reorganization of colonial rule both sought to 
rectify this situation. He saw the future before the idea took hold, and his arguments in 
Parliament and his taxation plans and ideas paved the way for a future system that considered 
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relative colonial freedom and autonomy. Not freedom to the extent of the system of the British 
Commonwealth; a system where unification depended on loyalty to similar languages, histories, 
and the British crown, but more than subjects of (and to) whatever the British willed. Grenville's 
unique position came from his willingness to listen, though he undoubtedly placed the will of the 
British government above that of the American colonies or colonial government. What 
Parliament said would be law would be the supreme law of the British Empire. This is evident 
from his tax conversation with colonial leaders. He reminded them that should they not be able 
to solve their own problem, Parliament would solve it for them. Yet, he still listened. For a man 
portrayed as uncaring and oppressive, he heard the airing of their frustrations and concerns loud 
and clear. Colonists had long complained that they felt like second class citizens to their English 
brethren on the British Isles. Even the rallying cry to the Revolution, “no taxation without 
representation” cast light on their feelings of subordination. Grenville did not see them in this 
manner, however. While he saw colonial governments as second class, he did not see the people 
in this way. He wanted to give them the chance and the opportunity to speak for themselves and 
to participate in the financial life of their colonies. He wanted them to have a voice. It was only 
when the colonists could not solve the issues presented to them that Grenville saw the need to 
intervene and directly enforce the taxes. One can only imagine what would have happened had 
the colonists devised their own taxation plan, as Grenville would have more than likely 
implemented it. Maybe the Commonwealth system would have been created then and there, or 
perhaps some new form of mutual governance between the two nations. The simple fact remains 
that the possibility existed for colonists to exercise a freedom they requested and felt they 
deserved. The blame for their inability to solve their own issue was wrongly placed on Grenville. 
 The effect that this knowledge has on American history is noteworthy. From the first day 
of school, we are told the story of a British government who cared little for their American 
colonies, who exploited and abused them and never listened when they cried out for a response. 
Grenville's actions are an example of the willingness British officials had to listen to the 
colonies. Most American historians write from the stand point of a young America fighting 
desperately for her freedom, but the idea of a unified America and Britain is discussed by 
historian Charles McLean Andrews. At the time of his study after the First World War, Andrews 
had the benefit of seeing and experiencing the British Commonwealth system firsthand. As he 
wrote about our history, he lamented the fact that the two powers did not find this system of 
government before the bloodshed of the American Revolutionary War. Grenville's willingness to 
listen reminds us to be wary of those who present the Revolution as a completely one-sided 
affair. George Bancroft argued that the American Revolution was a war to give Americans back 
the freedom and liberty that Britain had stolen from them, but fails even once to mention the 
diplomatic alternatives that were presented to the colonists. The importance lies in what could 
have happened and the understanding that Americans had the chance to make it happen. Charles 
Beard argued that upper-class colonists sparked the Revolution as a response to the thinning of 
their fat wallets. How could he then defend the inability of these men to come up with a system 
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that protected and guided their interests? Members of this high class came to Britain to talk with 
George Grenville face to face, and he corresponded with them through letters. They did not seize 
the chance presented to them and then focused their anger on the most public figure they could 
find, the face behind the Acts and taxes they so loathed: George Grenville.  
 The information in this paper is important to the study of both pre-Revolutionary times 
and of George Grenville's life. Traditionally, Grenville and King George are painted as the 
Revolutionary enemies of America. They are evil and repressive, set to smother the colonies in 
their crib before they have the chance to grow. Grenville is the victim of circumstance and the 
political climate of the time. He established and created a variety of new laws and regulations set 
to correct the vagaries of British rule and bring the colonies back under the influence of Great 
Britain. With only two years in office, he did not have the ability to restructure and then police 
any of his new policies. Given the way he fixed, listened and reformed, perhaps the Revolution 
could have been avoided all together. Beyond Parliamentary debates in regards to the Stamp Act 
and his insistence that the taxes remain in place, he could not influence his regulations anymore 
or alter them after his dismissal. His behavior with the King is no less to blame for his shaky 
legacy. King George once remarked, “When he has wearied me for two hours, he looks at his 
watch to see if he may not tire me for an hour more.”29 Considered a terrible bore because he was 
all-business, Grenville could not repair the damage he had done, and his inability to politic 
became his undoing. So then how should George Grenville be looked upon in history? He should 
be remembered as exactly what Britain had asked for; a business-minded man ready to help his 
country solve her financial crisis, not the villain of the Revolution as he is so often portrayed. 
Grenville worked diligently to consolidate British debt and reign in the American colonies, while 
trying simultaneously to repair the strained relationship between the two. This no-win situation 
made him an easy scapegoat for colonists looking for a target and for members of Parliament to 
criticize and blame. Grenville still did not give up, even after resigning as Prime Minister. From 
his seat in Parliament and until his death in 1770, he continued to warn Britain about the growing 
unrest in the American colonies and the need to come to an agreement.  
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THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE BLACK LOYALIST EXODUS 
Julia Bibko, The College at Brockport 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides an account of the experiences of Black Loyalists in Nova Scotia, London, 
and Sierra Leone after the American Revolution. Tens of thousands of North American slaves 
fled to the ranks of the British army when they were promised freedom in return for service. 
When the British lost the war, they began the evacuation of both White and Black Loyalists out 
of the colonies. Black Loyalists were sent primarily to Nova Scotia and England and, to a lesser 
extent, the Bahamas and West Indies. Yet the Black Loyalists were not content with freedom 
alone; they actively fought for equality and against discrimination in their new countries. Black 
Loyalists thus took charge of their own emancipation by fighting for the British and continuing 
to fight for equality even after their exodus from the colonies. The results of the Black Loyalist 
exodus were mixed, as shown by letters from the Sierra Leone colonists themselves. Yet the 
experience of the Black Loyalists is significant because this massive migration of free Blacks had 
international implications, the founding of the Sierra Leone colony being one example. This 
narrative also brings into question the concept of the Revolution as a national struggle for 
independence, in addition to revealing the complexity of Loyalist ideology. [Keywords: 
American Revolution, Britain, race relations, slavery, emancipation, Loyalists] 
 
 
 
 Ever since the American Revolution, historians have written and rewritten the Loyalist narrative 
countless times. Yet within this narrative, the Loyalists are often portrayed as a small, 
homogenous group. In reality, the Loyalists were highly diverse; there were a significant number 
of Black Loyalists during the Revolution, most often escaped slaves who fought for the British. 
They won their freedom after the end of the war, even though they were on the losing side. The 
1783 poem, “The Tory’s Soliloquy,” captures the dilemma that faced all Loyalists after the war’s 
end: “To go - or not to go - is that the Question?”1 Massive numbers of escaped slaves took this 
opportunity to leave America as Loyalist refugees for Canada, England, and other various 
destinations. In this way, the Black Loyalists were able to facilitate their emancipation by 
fighting for the British and then continued their pursuit of equality after they settled in their new 
countries. By synthesizing previous research on the black Loyalists, this paper intends to reveal a 
diverse, but often neglected perspective on the American Revolution. This work challenges the 
traditional definitions of loyalism, in addition to complicating the concept of the Revolution as a 
struggle for national liberation. 
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I. DEFINING LOYALISM  
 
Who were the Loyalists? The historical stereotype is that they were an elite group of wealthy, 
educated Anglicans that had close ties to Britain. Maya Jasanoff argues that in reality, Loyalists 
came from all different regions, social classes, races and ethnicities, making them as diverse as 
their patriot counterparts. As a group, their size is often underestimated. Estimates today claim 
that Loyalists made up a fifth to a third of the population of the American colonies. These people 
did not have one unified ideology, but in fact held a wide range of beliefs. Some were loyalists 
for intellectual reasons, others for economic reasons, and still others preferred maintaining the 
status quo to all-out revolution.2  
  Yet defining and analyzing loyalism in the American colonies becomes much more 
complicated when race is considered. Besides the White Loyalists, there were Indian tribes that 
decided to support the British. Most relevant to this paper, however, is that there were a large 
number of Black Loyalists. The British promised freedom to slaves who signed up to fight in 
their army and, according to Jasanoff, twenty thousand Black slaves took this opportunity.3 
Because of these promises, Black Loyalist ideology was different from White Loyalist ideology. 
Both free and enslaved Blacks seem to have aligned with the Loyalist cause because they firmly 
believed that a British victory would benefit their race. By becoming Loyalists, slaves believed 
they were fighting not just for their own personal freedom, but the end of slavery and racial 
prejudice. American slaves came to see the British as “an enemy to slavery,” and the British 
army was flooded with runaway slaves ready to fight for their emancipation.4 Mary Beth Norton 
argues that there was an irony in slaveholding Patriots arguing for the “equal rights of man” and 
writing about their fear of being “enslaved” by Britain. Recognizing this paradox, American 
Blacks flocked to the British cause.5  
  Yet historians still debate whether Black Loyalists should be called Loyalists at all. This 
debate exists in part because defining loyalism is complex. Jasanoff characterizes Loyalists 
somewhat simplistically as “colonists who had sided with Britain during the war.”6 She uses the 
phrase “black Loyalists” again and again throughout her book, yet she never fully addresses 
where this group fits within her definition of loyalism. James W. St. G. Walker argues that those 
Blacks who fought for the British showed an ideological commitment to their cause by doing so, 
for not all runaway slaves joined the British army.7 Yet in an earlier article, Walker writes that 
the Black Loyalists were “less pro-British than they were pro-Black,” suggesting they were 
risking their lives in pursuit of freedom rather than victory.8 These conflicting arguments show 
the difficulty of examining these former slaves-turned soldiers within the traditional definitions 
of loyalism. Perhaps the most complete definition can be found in The Canadian Encyclopedia, 
which describes Loyalists as “American colonists of varied ethnic backgrounds who supported 
the British cause during the American Revolution…for highly diverse reasons.”9 This paper will 
focus on the Black Loyalists who fought for the British and their resulting exodus. Therefore 
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they will continue to be referred to as Loyalists, despite their complicated relationship with the 
British government during and after the Revolution.  
The Loyalist cause was attractive to many Blacks because it came to symbolize their 
liberation. The most famous promise of freedom in return for military service came from Lord 
Dunmore of Virginia in November 1775. In his proclamation, Lord Dunmore declared that “all 
indented servants [and] negroes…able and willing to bear arms” in support of the British would 
be given their freedom for doing so.10 By making such promises of freedom, the British army 
attracted tens of thousands of Black recruits over the course of the Revolution. These new 
loyalists fled from their masters in Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas, before heading north 
to New York City, where the British army was headquartered. Men of all ages were sorted into 
Black regiments, guerilla units, or else used as spies, pilots, and wagon drivers. Black women 
also contributed to the British war effort by working as cooks, servants, and laundry maids.11 It is 
interesting to note that the slaves of White Loyalists were never offered liberation and in fact 
there were measures in place to retrieve these slaves if they did escape.12  
 
Historians have struggled to pinpoint the exact number of Black Loyalists. Many provide 
only a wide range, such as Graham Russell Hodges, who estimated that 25,000 to 50,000 
fugitives came north to join the British.16 Thomas Jefferson estimated in 1778 that 30,000 slaves 
had escaped from Virginia alone - he lost thirty slaves personally - and some historians have used 
this figure as the basis for their own estimates.17 Still other historians make different estimates. 
Maya Jasanoff claims in Liberty’s Exiles that only twenty thousand American slaves escaped and 
joined the British cause. Some historians fail to acknowledge Black Loyalists at all in their 
accounts of the Revolution, mentioning only the slaves of Loyalists. Even if scholars have not 
reached a consensus about the exact number of Black Loyalists, they have been able to agree on 
the historical significance of their escape as the greatest emancipation of slaves in North America 
prior to the Civil War.18  
 
II. THE AFTERMATH OF THE REVOLUTION  
 
David V. J. Bell writes that with every revolution, there is also “some type of counterrevolution, 
one aspect of which may involve expatriation.” Bell examines the Loyalists as the “first 
American expatriates,” and looks at the difficult choices that faced them after the Revolution, the 
worst being whether to stay or leave. Even after the conclusion of the war, public attitudes 
toward Loyalists were cold, if not outright hostile. John Adams argued that the Tories should all 
be fined, imprisoned, and hanged, while George Washington called them “abominable pests of 
society” and suggested that suicide would be most appropriate. Thomas Paine argued for a 
distinction between the British soldiers and the American Loyalists that fought with them: “The 
first are prisoners, but the latter are traitors. The one forfeits his liberty, the other his head.”19  
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  Because of this pervasive anti-Loyalism, Bell argues that the choice of Loyalists to leave 
America was hardly voluntary. The situation would have been even more dangerous and 
complex for Black Loyalists. According to state lists of “disloyal practices,” Black Loyalists 
were guilty on at least two accounts: for enlisting on the “royal side” and also for escaping from 
their masters. If Loyalists did not sign oaths of allegiance to the new American government, they 
could face punishments ranging from disenfranchisement to incarceration.17 Yet it is unlikely 
that these oaths were offered to runaway slaves. Even if they had the opportunity to declare their 
allegiance, Blacks still would have had few rights in post-revolutionary America. Upon 
consideration of these factors, it becomes clear that the Black Loyalists had just two choices after 
the war. They could stay in America and risk re-enslavement, or they could leave during the 
British evacuation and hope to find freedom beyond the colonies.  
  The British made their slave proclamations to attract recruits and support their war effort. 
Once defeated, however, British officials had to begin evacuation plans and the status of Black 
veterans had to be addressed. Walker argues that the evacuation of Boston in 1776 set a 
precedent for including “loyal Blacks” in their retreat.20 Anticipating a patriot attack, Boston was 
evacuated in March 1776 and British military headquarters were relocated to New York City.  
Before leaving Boston, General William Howe issued an order granting free passage to 
Loyalists who wished to leave the city in the wake of the British army. Approximately eleven 
hundred civilians left Boston for Halifax, Nova Scotia, making this the first major evacuation of 
Loyalists.21 Although Walker claims that “loyal blacks” participated in this retreat, his account is 
problematic because it is never explained whether they were free Blacks or in fact the slaves of 
Loyalists.22  
 
 
In 1782, the British began to process claims from Black Loyalists who wanted to leave 
the colonies. The evacuation of Charleston was addressed first, as it boasted the largest 
concentration of Black Loyalists. General Alexander Leslie, who was the British commander for 
Charleston, created a commission that would handle appeals made by former slaves as well as 
owners. If the runaways had served the British, the stated policy of the commission was to 
compensate their owners and then recognize these veterans as free Blacks. By June 1782, 
General Leslie reported that there were 4,000 Black Loyalists wishing to emigrate, as well as 
6,000 slaves ready to depart with their White Loyalist masters. Freedmen had boarding priority, 
but some White Loyalists circumvented this by claiming their slaves were free Black Loyalists in 
order to gain passage. In the end, over 5,000 Blacks departed from Charleston, the majority of 
which were likely freed Loyalists. This departure occurred while peace negotiations were still 
taking place in Paris.25  
  In a similar manner, other Black Loyalists left from Savannah and later New York City. 
The main record of this exodus is the register that was kept of Black Loyalists departing from 
New York City, which became known as “The Book of Negroes.” As African Americans were 
#History: A Journal of Student Research, Number 1 
 61 
considered property, the list included their names, ages, former owners, physical descriptions, 
and other notes; no such record exists of White Loyalist refugees. In spite of its racist 
undertones, the “Book of Negroes” is an exceptional document that has provided historians with 
information for 3,000 of the Black Loyalists who left the colonies after 1783.26 Graham Russell 
Hodges compiled the immigration records known as the “Book of Negroes” into one volume and 
added later records from England as an appendix, as well as other relevant primary sources. 
Thumbing through his “Black Loyalist Directory,” one gains a sense of the diversity of the Black 
Loyalists who left the colonies after the war. Adults and children, men and women, families and 
lone travelers; the one thing these African Americans had in common was their newly earned 
freedom.27  
As the Loyalist diaspora began, freed Blacks sailed toward uncertain futures in foreign 
lands, leaving family, friends, and all that they knew behind them in America.  Free Blacks and 
slaves traveled together, which increased the risk of confusion and abuse. Some of these Black 
refugees would move several more times after their initial departure. Yet many still held onto the 
hope that their lives would be better as British subjects.28   
  
III. BLACK LOYALIST IMMIGRATION TO CANADA   
  
After the Revolution, the choice that faced all Loyalists was not whether to leave America, but 
where to go. Due to its proximity, emigration to Canada was an attractive destination for all 
Loyalist refugees. Black Loyalists in particular flocked to Canada by the thousands. Nova Scotia 
received the majority of Loyalist refugees to British North America in the years after the war. 
Population surveys conducted in 1784 found that Nova Scotia had gained over 28,000 new 
inhabitants, which was double the number of settlers who had lived there before the war. By the 
end of the Loyalist migration, about 30,000 refugees had arrived in Nova Scotia. This estimate 
includes 3,000 free Blacks, as well as 1,200 slaves brought over by their Loyalist masters. In July 
1783, a town was founded near Port Roseway as a settlement for Loyalist refugees. This town 
was named Shelborne, and by the end of the year it already had almost 8,000 settlers. During this 
influx of refugees, Nova Scotia Governor John Parr decided that Black Loyalists should have a 
separate settlement nearby, rather than residing within Shelborne. This neighboring settlement 
was named Birchtown, after the general who had signed certificates of freedom for the Black 
Loyalists in New York. By January 1784, Birchtown had become a parallel Loyalist town that 
was home to 1,485 free Blacks, making it one of North America’s biggest Black settlements.29  
  Quoting a British traveler, Jasanoff writes that the Shelborne Loyalists were “much at 
variance with one another,” while the Birchtown Loyalists appeared to be a close-knit group. 
Land allotments for Blacks were often only a quarter or half acre each, which was much smaller 
than given to most White Loyalists. Black refugees often had fewer resources as well and 
struggled to finish their houses before winter. Yet as former slaves, they possessed valuable 
skills and were better prepared for hard labor than their White counterparts, most of which had 
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lived in cities in America. A vibrant Christian community also grew up in Birchtown, mainly of 
the Methodist and Baptist denominations. David George, a Black preacher from Charleston, was 
responsible for founding Nova Scotia’s first Baptist church.30   
  Although these Black Loyalists had left slavery behind them in America, racial 
discrimination followed them to Nova Scotia. Wage labor was a foreign concept for freed 
Blacks, and White Loyalists capitalized on this, hiring them to work for low wages. Other 
Birchtown Blacks became indentured servants or sharecroppers, working for Whites in 
Shelborne in a system of quasi-slavery. At the core of these issues were the widespread racial 
beliefs “connecting servitude and skin color,” which greatly influenced how free Blacks were 
treated in Nova Scotia.31 Black Loyalists also faced discrimination during land allotment, as a 
select few received small, poor quality lots while the majority got none. Free Blacks in Nova 
Scotia were also not allowed to vote, were subject to discriminatory laws, and were segregated in 
communities like Birchtown.32   
   Despite these hardships and disappointments, scholars like Walker recognize that Black 
Loyalists received good treatment in Nova Scotia compared to other destination countries. Yet 
Walker also notes that Black Loyalists in British North America were not content with being 
free; they also wanted equality. They actively petitioned Britain to end slavery in Nova Scotia, as 
their Black settlements started to attract the runaway slaves of White Loyalists. Despite their 
loyalty, Blacks realized that they did not have the full rights of British citizens. The Black 
Loyalists of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick even sent a representative, Sergeant Thomas 
Peters, to London to bring their complaints directly to the British government. Walker argues 
that the “Peters mission” demonstrates the desire for true equality and full citizenship among 
Black Loyalists.33   
 Peters’ trip did little to change conditions at home in Nova Scotia, but it did have one 
significant result. When Peters returned, he was accompanied by John Clarkson, an agent of the 
recently formed Sierra Leone Company. They began to spread the offer that the British 
government had made to Black Loyalists of a new life in the colony of Sierra Leone. If the Black 
Loyalists migrated, they were promised farms, full equality including political rights, the full 
abolition of slavery in Sierra Leone, and a homeland.34 After experiencing years of poverty and 
discrimination in Nova Scotia, this proposal was received enthusiastically by many free Black 
Loyalists. Unlike their White neighbors, Black Loyalists did not have the option of returning to 
the United States, where their freedom was not guaranteed. Therefore, in January 1792, about 
1,200 Blacks left British North America for a new life in Sierra Leone.35  Once there, they 
encountered other disillusioned Black refugees from London who had arrived years before and 
together they struggled to establish a settlement for themselves despite countless challenges.  
 
  
IV. BLACK LOYALIST IMMIGRATION TO BRITAIN  
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Another major destination for Loyalists after the war’s end was Great Britain. This would seem 
an obvious choice: many Loyalists viewed Britain as a refuge, or even “home.”  
Yet when they arrived in London, the city was both overwhelming and alienating. Many 
White Loyalists chose to move out to smaller towns, like Bristol and Bath, where the cost of 
living was lower and life moved a little more slowly. Jasanoff estimates that up to five thousand 
Black loyalists immigrated to Britain, the majority of them male and former soldiers. Those who 
were lucky (or unlucky) enough to survive the war now struggled to make a living in England. It 
soon became common to see Black veterans begging for food on the streets of London.36   
Black Loyalists soon realized that they could hardly rely on the British government for 
aid. In order to be compensated, claimants needed clear proof of their losses, evidence of their 
freedom, and most importantly, money. Therefore “the illiterate, the poor, and the poorly 
connected” were routinely marginalized within this system.33 Only 47 Blacks successfully filed 
claims for pensions or property compensation from the British government. The result was that 
just one man was awarded money for his property losses, while three received meager annual 
allowances and twenty were given small sums that ranged from five to twenty pounds. In 
contrast, few White Loyalists were totally denied assistance, while the majority of Blacks 
received nothing. Allowances for even the poorest Whites tended to be higher than those for the 
wealthiest Blacks and Whites who were given direct compensation rarely collected fewer than 
twenty-five pounds.37  
  The discrimination practiced by the commission becomes even clearer in their reports. In 
cases with Black claimants, the reports include variations of the same key phrase: “he ought to 
think himself very fortunate in being in a Country where he can never again be reduced to a state 
of Slavery.”38 The commissioners clearly believed that since these Blacks had been given their 
freedom by the British, they should view that as compensation enough for their loyalty. This 
attitude resulted in many Black Loyalists being denied relief after reaching England. In the 
words of the commission itself, claims made by Black Loyalists “hardly deserve[d] a serious 
Investigation or a serious Answer.”39   
  While Black Loyalists waited in vain to receive their claims, they struggled for survival, 
many of them homeless and starving. For some Londoners, the sight of poor Blacks begging on 
their streets only fueled their racist attitudes toward these refugees. However, there were 
philanthropists like Jonas Hanway who responded differently to the situation, deciding to stand 
up for London’s new arrivals. Together with several of his wealthy friends and fellow 
businessmen, Hanway decided to form a “Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor” in 
January of 1786.” They started up a collection to help feed the starving Blacks in London and 
donations soon began to flow in. The fundraising campaign was so successful that by the end of 
that January, over two hundred poor Blacks began to receive free meals from three soup kitchens 
funded by the committee. They were also able to give out new shoes and stockings to two 
hundred and fifty of these people.40  
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  The idea behind Hanway’s commission was simple: these Black Loyalists had faithfully 
served Britain, only to end up penniless and hungry on London’s streets. These individuals felt 
that it was unfair that these loyalists were not being compensated and were starving in the streets 
as a result, just as it was unfair that Black captives were still being sold across the Atlantic as 
slaves. Abolitionist sentiment was growing in Britain at this time, so it was no coincidence that 
the committee’s largest contribution came from a Quaker abolitionist group. The participation of 
abolitionists like Granville Sharp would continue to be a significant factor in this relief effort.41  
 Yet as the soup kitchen lines got longer and longer, the members of the committee began to 
realize that their programs could only provide temporary aid. These poor Blacks needed jobs to 
lift them out of poverty, but the post war depression in England had produced widespread 
unemployment. With such bleak prospects, some of the “black poor” began to talk of leaving 
Britain, perhaps for Nova Scotia, where many other Black Loyalists had found refuge. Then 
word started to spread of another possibility: a much warmer place on the west coast of Africa, 
called Sierra Leone. Henry Smeathman, an English entomologist, had argued for many years that 
Britain should colonize Sierra Leone and in 1786 he made his case in front of the Black Poor 
Committee. He advocated to the philanthropists that London’s poor Blacks should be sent down 
to Sierra Leone as “pioneer colonists,” an idea that was met with enthusiasm.42  
 Smeathman’s proposal was quickly approved by the committee as well as the British 
Treasury, which agreed to allot him 14 pounds per emigrant to Sierra Leone. Yet as Mary Beth 
Norton argues, “so far neither the Treasury nor the committee had displayed the slightest concern 
for the desires of the Blacks themselves.”43 Greater than any philanthropic motivations was the 
desire of the committee and the British government to get the black poor off the streets and out 
of England. The black poor were a nuisance to the English, so the priority during planning was 
speed, rather than the welfare of the Black refugees. In turn, the black poor seem to have 
perceived that their only leverage in this situation was threatening not to leave and they used this 
threat on several occasions.44  
  When Jonas Hanway finally began to discuss immigration with the Black refugees 
themselves, he was disappointed to find that they were not as enthusiastic as the committee had 
expected. They refused to set sail for Sierra Leone until they had a written guarantee of their 
freedom from the British government. Ultimately Hanway had no choice but to surrender, 
providing the black poor with a formal agreement explaining how the colony would be 
established and operated. In reality, this agreement promised little; neither the British 
government nor the committee had committed to protecting the new colony and little was said 
about the rights the settlers would have. The committee did promise that if the Blacks signed this 
agreement, they would be committed to immigrate to Sierra Leone. Soon, the situation evolved 
so that signing the agreement became a requirement for monetary aid. If the black poor wanted 
to receive their sixpenny daily allowance, they had to sign this legally binding agreement and 
promise to leave England as soon as the ships were ready.45     
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  As the plans for the Sierra Leone colony were evolving, Henry Smeathman died 
unexpectedly in July 1786. Confusion about how to proceed followed his death, as it was 
Smeathman who had initiated the whole Sierra Leone scheme. Smeathman was also meant to 
oversee the Blacks once they landed in Africa, because the committee believed they needed 
someone to ensure the Black settlers would be “properly trained to labour, and Civil and 
Religious Government, so as to render them good Subjects.”46 But rather than looking for a 
replacement, the committee started to explore other destinations for the black poor, showing a 
willingness to abandon the Sierra Leone plan completely. The Black Poor Committee considered 
first sending them to settle in the Bahamas, but the plan could not be carried out because the 
Black Loyalists refused to go, seeing the danger in trying to establish themselves as free Blacks 
in these slaveholding islands. Next the committee explored sending them to New Brunswick, but 
the Blacks were unconvinced that this was a better alternative to settling in Sierra Leone.47   
After these various setbacks, the committee had no choice but to revisit the Sierra Leone 
scheme. Joseph Irwin, a former associate of Smeathman, was placed in charge of the colony and 
the rest of the plans came together quickly. The British Navy Commissioners supplied two ships 
(and later a third) to hold the 675 people who had been formally contracted to go to Sierra Leone. 
A Scottish missionary named Patrick Fraser was officially commissioned by the Archbishop of 
Canterbury to serve as the settlement’s missionary. The Black Poor Committee spread the word 
that the ships would leave the Thames on October 31, 1786, and there would be no further 
allowances paid after this date. With the Atlantic and the Belisarius slowly filling up, everything 
seemed to be in order. Then in late November, the committee was informed that only 259 people 
had actually boarded the two ships, although 675 people had signed emigration agreements.48  
  Stunned, the members quickly issued a declaration ordering all the signees to report to 
the docks as agreed and threatening to use the Vagrancy Act to penalize any who refused. After 
this declaration, a few hundred more Blacks prepared to leave and they were placed on a third 
ship, the Vernon. The committee never succeeded in sending all 675 out of England, as some 
Blacks were still unconvinced that they would in fact be free and safe in the new colony. For 
those waiting on the ships, days and weeks stretched into months as the boarding process 
dragged on. Conditions on the ships were so poor that 73 of the 259 original passengers counted 
in November 1786 were unaccounted for three months later, whether because they had died of 
disease or escaped to shore. After months of delay, the three ships set sail on February 23, 1787, 
for Sierra Leone.49   
  
V. THE SIERRA LEONE COLONY  
 
 The British ships caught sight of land on May 5, and five days later the grueling journey to 
Sierra Leone was finally over. The colonists landed in Frenchman’s Bay, which they soon 
renamed St. George’s Bay. Thomas B. Thompson, captain of the Nautilus, chose the place 
nearby where the settlement would be built. Thompson, Joseph Irwin, and Patrick Fraser (the 
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missionary) officially bought the land on June 11 from King Tom, a local Temne chief. 
Thompson’s naval vessel had served as a convoy for the three settler ships on the journey to 
Sierra Leone and he wanted to see the colony off to a good start before he returned to England.47  
  By the end of July 1787, Thompson had sent both the Vernon and the Belisarius home, 
but he remained in Sierra Leone, becoming increasingly pessimistic about the venture. He wrote 
to the British Admiralty that the Black settlers’ “obstinacy and laziness, which neither 
remonstrance, persuasion, or punishment have yet been able to subdue, do not give me great 
hopes of their future welfare.”50 In addition to Thompson’s pessimism (which was shared by 
Fraser), the situation was further complicated because the colonists had landed in Sierra Leone at 
the start of the rainy season. The poor weather made it difficult for the Black settlers to build 
huts for shelter, or to plant grain to replenish the stores of food that were brought over on the 
ships, which were starting to run low. The constant rain also caused “fevers, fluxes, and bilious 
complaints” among the settlers, according to Thompson. Whatever the sickness being spread, it 
contributed to the 30 Black settlers between May and July of 1787. Fraser also estimated that of 
the 330 surviving colonists, about half of them were sick during this time.51    
The situation deteriorated further when Joseph Irwin died. Thompson told his superiors 
that he believed Irwin had never been fully committed to the experiment in Sierra Leone, but 
Irwin had nonetheless been given the responsibility of managing the colony. Therefore his death 
caused great confusion and concern among the colonists, which no doubt contributed to the 
disorganization and idleness that Thompson had noted. By the time of his next report at the end 
of August, conditions in the settlement had thankfully improved. Thompson wrote that the 
colony was finally recovering from its bout of disease and noted that several of the Black settlers 
were even “possessed of some share of industry,” which made him optimistic. By mid-
September, Thompson had unloaded the last of the supplies from the Nautilus and on September 
16, he started his journey back to England at last. He left in his wake the 268 surviving 
colonists.52  
  Meanwhile, the Reverend Patrick Fraser continued to have doubts about the venture. 
Frustrated that the Black settlers had not yet built him a house or a church, Fraser began to spend 
more and more time on Bance Island, which was home to a slave factory. Here, he lived more 
comfortably and enjoyed being able to preach regularly to a congregation of “Englishmen and 
natives.” Fraser became so dissatisfied with life in Sierra Leone that he gave up his mission there 
and returned to England the next spring. Yet Fraser was not the only deserter; by June 1788, the 
rest of the White men in the colony had “reportedly joined the slavers” on Bance Island.53  
 All the while, the Black settlement on St. George’s Bay continued its struggle for 
survival. They elected a governor, Richard Weaver, but he soon fell ill and James Reid replaced 
him. During Reid’s term in office, over half of the settlement’s arms were strangely lost. Weaver 
took back over as governor, but it was too late to reverse the damage that Reid had done. Now 
vulnerable, the settlement experienced losses of both materials and men to local slave traders and 
chiefs like King Tom. When Fraser reported in spring 1788 on the dismal state of the colony, 
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Granville Sharp decided to send a “relief expedition” to Sierra Leone. He quickly charted the 
Myro, filled with supplies and a handful of new settlers, to sail to West Africa. According to 
Norton, the ship landed in August 1788 and “the settlers later told Sharp that it had been their 
salvation.”54  
 Once the Myro left, however, the settlement continued to be threatened by the Bance 
Island slavers as well as passing slave ships. On several occasions, the Black settlers resorted to 
retaliatory kidnappings of White captains in order to regain those unlucky enough to be captured 
by the slave traders. Successful or not, this strategy did not help the reputation of the Black 
settlers in the surrounding areas. But the colony managed to survive into the summer of 1789 and 
its population stabilized around 120. Yet its future was jeopardized once again when the 
settlement was caught in the middle of a conflict between a local chief, an American slaving 
ship, and a British man-of-war. As the conflict escalated, the chief gave the settlers three days to 
evacuate and then burned their entire town.55  
  When Sharp received word about the incident, he sent another relief expedition under 
Alexander Falconbridge. He arrived in early 1791 to find that there were only 60 settlers left in 
Sierra Leone. Falconbridge gathered the survivors together at a new location about six miles 
away from the old settlement and then he returned to England. The new site was named 
“Granville Town.” Given the poor state of the colony, British officials gladly permitted the 
Black Loyalists from Nova Scotia to move to Sierra Leone. The plans moved forward quickly 
and these new settlers arrived from Canada in March 1972. Curiously, they decided to settle on 
the original site that was occupied by the old settlers and named it Freetown (now the capital of 
modern Sierra Leone). Tensions grew up between the “old” and “new” settlers, peaking when 
the original colonists were ordered to leave the new settlement by John Clarkson, the leader of 
the Nova Scotians.56  
  The British were quick to offer up explanations for the failure of the first Sierra Leone 
settlement. Thompson chose to blame the settlers themselves, who he saw as “a worthless, 
lawless, vicious, drunken set of people.” Sharp also tended to blame the colonists, rather than 
considering the difficulties they faced because they could not build or plant during the rainy 
season. Sharp and Thompson did admit that the timing of the expedition was unlucky, but they 
never gave due credit to the Black settlers for surviving despite these obstacles. Norton argues 
that only one observer identified the true cause of the colony’s failure. Ottobah Cugoano, who 
had been a slave in North America, stated that the colony’s advocates in England never had a 
clear, thought-out plan for establishing a free Black settlement in Sierra Leone. Instead, Cugoano 
wrote, the British wanted the Black Loyalists “to be hurried away at all events, come of them 
what would.” 57  This quote exemplifies the underlying racism that Black Loyalists were 
confronted with throughout the British Empire. Even with abolitionism on the rise, British 
notions of paternalism and racial superiority remained strong. Those who survived the war 
gained their freedom, certainly, but the Black Loyalists consistently suffered as a result of British 
indifference to their situation.   
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VI. OTHER LOYALIST DESTINATIONS   
  
Canada and England were not the only destinations for Blacks after the Revolution. Thousands 
of loyalists, mainly those from the southern colonies, fled to the Bahamas and the West Indies 
starting in 1782. It is estimated that 3,000 Loyalists came to Jamaica, bringing with them over 
9,000 slaves. Records show that 2,000 Loyalists went to the Bahamas, with about 6,000 slaves in 
tow. The Loyalist exodus had the most dramatic effect in the Bahamas, as it doubled the White 
and nearly quadrupled the islands’ Black population. Life in the Bahamas and the West Indies 
was difficult, with overcrowding being the most immediate problem. However, life on the 
islands would have been most difficult for the Black refugees from the former colonies. With the 
arrival of the Loyalists and their slaves, Whites were outnumbered for the first time, which led to 
a tightening of control over the Black population. In the disarray of the evacuations, some 
Loyalists claimed slaves they did not own (which may have been stolen from patriots) and others 
enslaved Blacks who should have been legally free. Yet contemporary commentators argued that 
despite this confusion, slavery as an institution in the Caribbean was “comparatively benign.”58  
Most Black Loyalists avoided the Bahamas and the West Indies, likely because they feared 
re-enslavement. However, some Black Loyalists did come to the islands, the majority as 
members of British regiments. After being evacuated out of Charleston, five hundred soldiers 
from Lord Dunmore’s Black regiment sought refuge in Jamaica, as did a Black South Carolina 
corps. This presence of free Blacks in Jamaica raised concern among the White Loyalist 
population, unhappy with the example this would set for their slaves. As a result, the White 
Loyalists were greatly relieved when the Black regiment was relocated to the Leeward Islands, 
where they would fight again for the king during the French Wars. The regiment’s departure 
meant that Jamaica and the Bahamas were no longer home to a sizeable number of free Black 
Loyalists; however, they still retained their thousands of North American slaves.60    
Following this discussion of Loyalists havens after the American Revolution, one might 
ask: why did these individuals settle where they did? The evacuation of East Florida in the early 
1780s provides scholars with a clearer understanding of the Loyalist diaspora. Once the 
Revolution had begun, the St. Augustine garrison attracted Loyalist refugees from Georgia and 
the Carolinas. The evacuation of this British colony began in early 1782 under the leadership of 
East Florida’s governor, Patrick Tonyn. British ships relocated the East Florida Loyalists - both 
White and Black - to England, Nova Scotia, and the Caribbean. Carole W. Troxler argues that 
the evacuation of East Florida reveals a pattern for White Loyalists’ immigration: those who 
owned slaves tended to relocate to the Bahamas and the West Indies, while those who owned 
few or no slaves at all went to Canada and Europe.61   
After studying Troxler’s data closely, one can argue that a similar pattern exists for Black 
Loyalists as well. Historical evidence shows that the majority of slaves were taken to the 
Bahamas and the West Indies by their Loyalist masters, as this region maintained a strong slave 
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trade. In contrast, the vast majority of free Black Loyalists settled in Canada and Europe, where 
slavery was less common. Even though these evacuations created chaos and confusion, these 
immigration trends show that the Loyalist diaspora was not in fact a random scattering of 
expatriates, but an exodus based on the pursuit of self-interest. In the case of Black Loyalists, 
freedom was the ultimate factor in deciding where they settled.  
  
VII. RESULTS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BLACK LOYALIST EXODUS   
 
After studying the mass migration of Black Loyalists, one final question must be answered: were 
these individuals better off because they chose to leave the colonies? In other words, did they 
benefit from becoming Loyalists? When considered in terms of slavery, the obvious answer is 
yes. African Americans who decided to fight for the British gained their freedom after the war 
and were able to leave the colonies with their families. These individuals were clearly better off 
than the African Americans who had stayed with their masters (whether Loyalist or Patriot) and 
therefore had no immediate hope of being freed. Yet the answer to this question becomes far 
more complicated when the lives of these Black Loyalists beyond the colonies is considered. 
They gained their freedom, but then Black Loyalists struggled to survive in their new countries 
and were forced to work in servitude to Whites or else live in poverty. Evidence shows that some 
Black Loyalists did not survive the journey to their new homes, while others died of disease and 
starvation after arriving.  
It is clear that life abroad was extremely difficult for the majority of Black Loyalists, 
despite having escaped slavery. In Nova Scotia, England, Sierra Leone, and the Caribbean, these 
newly freed Blacks experienced varying degrees of discrimination as well as disappointment. 
One could argue that they still benefited in the end from siding with the British, but this 
assumption should not be made without examining the perspectives of the Black Loyalists 
themselves. Christopher Fyfe published a series of letters and other documents that were written 
by relocated settlers from Nova Scotia in the 1790s to the Sierra Leone Company officials. These 
letters provide a glimpse of how these Black Loyalists viewed their own exodus after having 
moved twice and experiencing hardships in both places. Some of the letters take the form of 
simple requests, whether for supplies like soap and food or for marriage licenses issued by the 
colonial government. However, these humble requests should not be mistaken for submission on 
the part of the Black settlers. In other letters, the settlers made detailed demands regarding how 
they felt the colony should be run and what rights they were entitled to as British subjects.64  
Yet the most telling documents are those in which the Black settlers reflect on their life in 
the colony. In one such document, titled “Settler’s Petition,” they wrote to colonial officials in 
London that “we have feeling the same as other Human Beings…[but] here we are afraid that if 
such conduct continues we shall be unhappy while we live and our Children may be in bondage 
after us.”65 Other documents reflect this disillusionment, such as a letter from two settlers who 
wrote, “We are sorry to think that we left America to come here to be used in that manner,” 
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referring to perceived misconduct on the part of the colony’s governor. 66  Still other letters 
contain a degree of hopefulness, like the letter written by Richard Corankeapoan, who reported 
that there were many dissatisfied settlers, but the situation in the colony was slowly improving.  
Corankeapoan remarked that “thear is some of our pepol will not Be Contented with aney 
thing…but we donot mind wat everey one says.”67 These letters and documents help demonstrate 
the complex perspectives of the Sierra Leone settlers and, by extension, the Black Loyalists. 
These individuals had been granted their freedom, but they were not content with freedom alone. 
Many promises had been made to the Black Loyalists, and after their evacuation they began to 
realize that the British government had not been truly committed to fulfilling them.  
No matter the results, the significance of the Black Loyalist exodus is undeniable. The 
sheer size of this mass migration is remarkable. As has been previously stated, an estimated 
20,000 escaped slaves fought for the British and were then given the opportunity to leave the 
colonies after the war was over. Therefore, an unforeseen result of the American Revolution was 
the emancipation of slaves on a massive scale, not to be witnessed again until the Civil War.68 In 
addition, this was the first voluntary movement of free Blacks out of America. After centuries of 
slave ships crossing the Atlantic to reach North America, vessels began to take willing Black 
Loyalists to the far reaches of the British dominion, including West Africa. Black Loyalists were 
instrumental in the founding of Sierra Leone, a remarkable colonial experiment. In many ways, 
Sierra Leone helped to inspire the nineteenth-century “back to Africa” movement and the 
eventual settlement of Liberia by African Americans.69   
Additionally, research on this subject is significant because it highlights the diversity and 
complexity of the Loyalist ideology. In the case of Black Loyalists, they chose to fight for the 
British not for political, but rather personal reasons. By becoming Loyalists, these escaped slaves 
facilitated their own emancipation in an exceptional way. Despite their motivations, the Black 
Loyalists became an important asset to the British military and the Loyalist cause itself. For these 
reasons, the Loyalists should not be studied as a monolithic group, but as a diverse collection of 
people with a wide range of beliefs and goals.70  
Furthermore, the experience of the Black Loyalists challenges the fundamental 
understanding of the American Revolution as a struggle for national independence. Robert M. 
Calhoon argues that the Revolution was “a special kind of civil war” because it was ultimately a 
“struggle for national liberation.”71 Yet implicit in this assertion is the irony of the Revolution in 
regards to African Americans. Crying out for independence from tyrannical British rule, the 
Patriots wrote of the “equal rights of man,” while many of them were in fact slave owners. This 
irony is noteworthy because as many Americans were fighting to overthrow the British, the 
Black Loyalists were simultaneously fighting to win independence from their American 
masters.72 Upon closer analysis, then, this commonly held view of the Revolution as a national 
fight for independence is rather one-dimensional.    
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VIII. CONCLUSION  
 
Due to their service and loyalty to the British, thousands of escaped slaves were freed after the 
American Revolution was over. Free Blacks had few prospects in post-revolutionary America 
and, recognizing this, many of them participated in the British evacuation of the colonies. Black 
Loyalists traveled all over the British Empire in search of a better life, settling in large numbers 
in Canada, England, the Caribbean, and eventually Sierra Leone. Though they were often 
disappointed with life in their new countries, these former American slaves ultimately benefited 
from their Loyalism because it created the conditions for their emancipation. The Black Loyalist 
experience had implications both in America and abroad, fueling abolitionism and inspiring 
other migrations of free Blacks. Yet their journey has been largely ignored by historians, creating 
a whitewashed account of the American Revolution. Nevertheless, the Black Loyalists deserve to 
be recognized for their contributions to the war and for their dedication to securing their own 
liberty at a time when few were truly committed to equality for all mankind. 
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NEOSLAVERY: THE PERPETUATION OF SLAVERY AFTER THE AMERICAN 
CIVIL WAR 
Ben Falter, The College at Brockport 
 
 
Abstract 
Many Americans are under the impression that slavery ended following the Civil War. However, 
this is a vast oversimplification of the reality that Black men and women faced in the South after 
the war’s end. Freedmen’s bureau reports, “Black Codes,” and the research of historians 
demonstrate the ways in which Black men and women were treated following the end of the Civil 
War. Comparing the conditions revealed in the aforementioned sources to the conditions Black 
men and women faced during legal slavery reveals startling similarities. Violence against Blacks 
continued to be widespread in the post-war period, and many Black men and women were even 
bought and sold through convict leasing. In short, slavery continued in all but name.  [Keywords: 
slavery, American Civil War, Reconstruction, emancipation, race relations] 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
After the end of the Second World War, colonial empires broke apart and their former imperial 
domains asserted themselves as independent nations. However, many of these countries discovered 
that imperialism had not really ended. Independent nations still found themselves under the control 
of their former imperial masters. However, the former imperial nations no longer directly 
controlled these nations politically. Instead the colonizers dominated these new nations 
economically, culturally, and occasionally militarily. This system is called Neocolonialism and is 
a powerful force in the world today. Former colonial dominions discovering that they were not 
truly free from their imperial masters serves as an excellent analogy to a system that this paper 
terms “Neoslavery.” Just as the Second World War brought an end to the colonial empires of 
nations such as the United Kingdom and France, so too did the American Civil War bring an end 
to slavery, at least officially. However, former masters still controlled the men and women that 
had once been their property. The new Freedmen may not have been called slaves anymore, but 
they were far from free. In short, though the American Civil War technically brought an end to 
slavery, Whites kept former slaves in bondage. 
 By no means is this paper the first piece of writing to suggest that slavery did not actually 
end with the American Civil War, nor is this paper the first to use the term neoslavery. Both David 
Oshinsky and Douglas Blackmon argue that convict leasing, in which the state leased out prisoners 
to individuals and corporations as a labor force, was a continuation of slavery. Blackmon uses the 
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term neoslavery to describe the convict leasing system. Although Blackmon and others have used 
the term before, this paper uses the term more broadly to describe Blacks’ experience more 
generally after the Civil War, but. John Daly’s The Southern Civil War argues that Reconstruction 
was actually a war, where one of the sides was fighting for a return of the old system, of which 
slavery was the key component. These authors’ research explores individual aspects of Blacks’ 
experience following the Civil War in a great deal more depth than this paper will. However, this 
paper combines elements from these authors’ research in order to paint a broader picture of 
freedmen’s experience. Even without these authors’ research, primary evidence demonstrates the 
conditions freedmen faced. Black Codes written into every southern state constitution blatantly 
took away the rights of former slaves. Violence against freedmen ran rampant as former masters 
tried to push them back into slavery; Freedmen’s Bureau reports attest to this fact. This paper, 
then, compares the conditions faced by Blacks under Antebellum slavery to Whites’ legal and 
extralegal oppression of Blacks following the American Civil War, attested to in primary 
documents and other historians’ research. By making this direct comparison, this paper will 
demonstrate that slavery continued after the Civil War in practicality. 
 In order to make the claim that slavery continued after the conclusion of the American 
Civil War, this paper will first demonstrate the conditions that men faced under slavery. Doing so 
will enable a comparison to the conditions Freedmen faced following the end of the Civil War 
under neoslavery. For this reason, this paper is divided into two broad sections, each looking at a 
broad time period. The first section will explore the conditions faced by slaves in the Antebellum 
(literally, before war) Period. The second section will explore the perpetuation of slavery in the 
Postbellum (after war) Period. Geographically, the focus is on the southern states. That is not to 
say that racial oppression did not exist in northern states, but neoslavery as a direct extension of 
Antebellum slavery was primarily a southern phenomenon. By examining and comparing the 
conditions Black men and women faced in the South during these two periods, this paper will 
conclusively prove that slavery continued through legal practices and through violence. 
 
SLAVERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM PERIOD 
 
Slavery was a great evil. As John Boles stated, “Any labor or social system that defined persons 
as property and deprived them of basic autonomy over their lives was irredeemably evil.”1 Despite 
the horrid conditions within slavery, slaves experienced a degree of flexibility within the system, 
which was often dependent on the slave’s master. For instance, some slaves could supplement their 
diet with food that they gathered via fishing, hunting, trapping, and so on.2 It is precisely this 
relative flexibility that made Neoslavery so bad. In short, conditions during slavery were extremely 
poor, even with the noted minor flexibility, precisely because masters treated slaves as property as 
opposed to human beings. 
 It should be noted that slaveholding was not the norm. Most Whites did not own slaves, 
even in the South. Of the Whites who did own slaves, most of them owned only a few. 
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“Slaveholding was concentrated in the hands of a significant minority of the population, and 
plantation-sized slaveholding was confined to a tiny minority.”3 Plantations were in the hands of 
only the extremely wealthy. Plantation owners were the period’s “one percent,” to use modern 
parlance. Because the rich were able to concentrate slaves in their hands, a discussion of slavery 
will necessarily focus on these slaves. 
 Perhaps the most important part of slavery in the Antebellum South was the slaveholding 
elite’s denial of the basic humanity of slaves. Slaves were property, and masters treated them as 
such. Much of the injustice perpetrated against slaves stems from this fact. In court, for instance, 
trials involving slaves were civil suits. “While white men rarely faced criminal prosecution for 
striking out at slaves, they quite often found themselves in court for civil suits regarding property 
damage to the slave of another.”4 If a White man injured someone’s slave, he would face trial not 
on the grounds of harming another human being, but rather for damaging property. The solution 
to many of these trials was that one party would have to pay the other. For instance, in Natchez, 
Mississippi, there was the 1856 case Andrew Brown v. Samuel Cox. Samuel Cox had shot Andrew 
Brown’s slave, Jake. Andrew Brown wanted money for damages.5 
 
The jurors … could have found that Cox was justified in shooting Jake [a slave], simply 
out of the belief that a runaway slave is inherently threatening. Yet the jury found for 
Brown and awarded high damages, the full fifteen-hundred-dollar price asked for Jake. … 
It seems likely that the jury found for Brown in part because he was prominent and popular 
in Natchez whereas Cox was unknown, rather than because of any community standard 
against killing slaves.6 
 
In the aforementioned trial, the court only required Cox to pay Brown for damaging his property, 
even though Cox had killed a man. As noted in Gross, further evidence demonstrating slaves’ 
status as property is the use of slaves as a form of credit. “Slaves were the cornerstone of the 
Southern credit economy.”7 Gross goes on to point out that “because [slaves] were easily 
convertible into cash, [they] were ‘especially desirable for collateralizing debt arrangements.’”8 
Slaves were worth quite a bit of money, and so, of course, Whites used them for credit and debt 
related transactions. Moreover, owners would often lend out slaves to other individuals or even 
“corporate entities, especially towns and cities” for temporary use.9 If one party breached the terms 
of the contract, the other would likely sue. “In some similar cases, owners sued hirers for 
mistreating a slave. More often, these cases resembled warranty suits in that hirers sued owners 
when the leased slave turned out to be ‘unsound,’ died, or ran away.”10 Essentially, if the slave’s 
owner felt his property had been damaged, he would sue. If the person leasing the slave felt that 
he had been leased defective property, he would sue. Of course, slaves themselves were denied 
access to the courtroom. “The most silent participants in circuit court trials were the subjects of 
the disputes: the slaves themselves.”11 This makes sense; if two people were to get into a dispute 
about a chair, they would not seek the chair’s testimony on the subject. The systematic denial of 
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slaves’ humanity within the court system is a powerful reminder of the insidious nature of slavery. 
Slaves were not people, and were, therefore, not liable to be treated humanely. 
  Few slaves could share their experience without Whites filtering their stories. One notable 
exception is Frederick Douglass. Douglass grew up a slave before escaping to the North, and so 
his experiences provide an excellent window into the conditions many slaves faced. Douglass 
wrote of Colonel Lloyd’s plantation in Maryland, where he lived for many years, that 
 
Public opinion was, indeed, a measurable constraint upon the cruelty and barbarity of 
masters, overseers, and slave-drivers, whenever and wherever it could reach them; but there 
were certain secluded and out of the way places, even in the State of Maryland, fifty years 
ago, seldom visited by a single ray of healthy public sentiment, where slavery, wrapt in its 
own congenial darkness, could and did develop all of its malign and shocking 
characteristics, where it could be indecent without shame, cruel without shuddering, and 
murderous without apprehension or fear of exposure, or punishment.12 
 
During the Antebellum Period, most members of White society believed that slavery in Maryland 
was not as bad as it was elsewhere due to the tempering influence of the nearby Free States.13 
Douglass acknowledges this belief, and even holds that it may be true where such tempering 
influences can be felt. However, he points out that on isolated plantations, such as the one on which 
he lived, slavery is just as brutal as it is elsewhere. Douglass shares many examples of masters’ 
and overseers’ cruelty and inhumane treatment of slaves. For instance, a slave came to their master 
complaining that her overseer was mistreating her. Rather than reprimanding the offending 
overseer, the master instead reprimanded the slave girl and ordered her to return to the cruel 
overseer.14 “Thus the poor girl was compelled to return without redress, and perhaps to receive an 
additional flogging for daring to appeal to authority higher than that of the overseer.”15 Another 
incident that Douglass describes revolves around a young woman named Esther, a slave on the 
same plantation as Douglass. Another slave, Ned Roberts, was courting her. Douglass points out 
that while some slave holders would have been pleased with the match, their master, Captain 
Anthony, was not. He forbade the two from continuing to meet, but they disobeyed.16 Captain 
Anthony, of course, was not tolerant of this disobedience. 
 
I was … awakened by the heart-rending shrieks and piteous cries of poor Esther. … 
Esther’s wrists were firmly tied, and the twisted rope was fastened to a strong iron staple 
in a heavy wooden beam above, near the fire-place. Here she stood on a bench, her arms 
tightly drawn above her head. Her back and shoulders were perfectly bare. Behind her 
stood old master, with cowhide in hand, pursuing his barbarous work …. He was cruelly 
deliberate, and protracted the torture as one who delighted with the agony of his victim. 
Again and again he drew the hateful scourge through his hand, adjusting it with a view of 
dealing the most pain-giving blow his strength and skill could inflict.17 
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Such deliberate torture clearly demonstrates the inhumane conditions that slaves regularly faced. 
One final example from Douglass’s book is the murder of a slave by the name of Bill Denby. 
Whilst the overseer was flogging him, Denby broke away and dove into the nearby creek. 
Understandably, Denby refused to emerge even when the overseer ordered him to.18 
“[W]hereupon, for this refusal, Gore [the overseer] shot him dead!”19 Both Captain Anthony, their 
direct master, and Colonel Lloyd, who owned the plantation, redressed Gore for killing Denby. 
However, Gore merely explained “that Denby had become unmanageable; that he set a dangerous 
example to the other slaves, and that unless some such prompt measure was resorted to there would 
be an end to all rule and order on the plantation.”20 Anthony and Lloyd found Gore’s explanation 
satisfactory, and he returned to his job without repercussion.  
Douglass mentions other occasions on which Whites killed slaves without consequence.21 
“One of the commonest sayings to which my ears became accustomed, was that it was ‘worth but 
half a cent to kill a nigger, and half a cent to bury one.’”22 This seems to conflict with the cost at 
which slaves were purchased (“‘Prime male field hands’ in the New Orleans market sold for about 
$700 in 1846; their price had more than doubled by 1860 to upwards of $1,700.”23). But in a way, 
Douglass was nonetheless right. He points out that according to the law and public opinion, Whites 
were almost always justified in killing a slave.24 The expense of a slave was not about the slave’s 
life, but rather his labor. If the master, overseer, or another White deemed the slave to be unruly 
or dangerous and killed him, then said White was considered justified in his actions, and could 
often get off with little to no legal action, especially if the murdering party owned the slave. The 
blatant disregard for slaves’ lives demonstrates, once again, the belief held by many Whites, that 
slaves were not human, or were less than fully human. It is for this reason that slaves were so 
harshly redressed for “misbehaving.” 
 There were many punishments that slaves could face for displeasing their masters 
dependent on the severity of their transgression. At the harsh end of the spectrum was whipping, 
which looms large in the modern world as a symbol of slavery. For those who lived as slaves, 
whipping, whether it occurred frequently or not, remained a powerful reminder of who had 
authority. As John Boles stated, “The frequency of punishments like whipping has been hotly 
contested by historians, and the variables involved from planter to planter make any kind of 
numerical analysis futile. … [But] in the minds of everyone involved, White and Black, the lash 
stood as an ever-present reminder of where authority lay.”25 Regardless of how often whipping 
actually occurred, it always remained a possibility. The threat of violent redress was there, which 
was itself a very effective tool for maintaining the status quo, regardless of how frequently masters 
and overseers actually whipped slaves.26  Thus, slave parents taught their children from a young 
age “to fear the lash and taught them behavior that would avoid it, and the visible scars on many 
Black backs bore silent testimony to the pervasive reality of force.”27 The threat of whipping was 
so present in the minds of slaves that they would ensure that even their small children knew about 
it. As shown above, whipping was an ever-present part of Frederick Douglass’s life, which backs 
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up Boles’s assertion that regardless of frequency, whipping was a significant part of slavery. It is 
difficult to imagine the fear that slaves must have felt, unless one can visualize what a harsh 
whipping looked like. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Whipped Slave,” photographer unknown, (Washington, D.C.: National Archives, c1863). 
 
This photograph provides a moving image of what whipping could do to a person, and thus is one 
of the most infamous photographs concerning slavery. According to the original caption, the 
whipping was particularly harsh and left this man in bed, unable to work, for two months. As a 
result, the master fired the overseer who was responsible. However, one should note two things. 
The first is that the master likely did not punish the overseer because he felt the slave man had 
been treated unfairly, but rather he was likely angry at having lost the man’s work for such an 
extended period. Second, even though this whipping represents the more extreme end of the 
punishment spectrum, it is still an important indicator of Whites’ attitudes towards slaves. Put 
simply, if someone were to perpetrate such an act against someone the law considered a man, his 
punishment would have been worse. As it stood, since masters and the law regarded slaves as 
property and as inferior persons, the offending overseer’s punishment was losing his job.  
 It is important note that the slaves had agency, which they used to improve their conditions 
and treatment. 
 
Mules inexplicably let out of the barn lot, tools left in the rain, cotton plants accidentally 
plowed under, chores that required double the normal time to complete for mysterious 
reasons, sickness that struck down a large portion of the field hands – maladies too vague 
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to doctor but too “real” to ignore – such were the weapons “defenseless” slaves could bring 
to bear against rigid taskmasters.28 
 
Masters’ mistreatment of slaves could lead to a variety of responses that would cut production of 
the plantation. Therefore, if masters wanted their plantation to be efficient, they had to assure a 
certain quality of living. “In clothing as in food, and, indeed, in their whole culture, slaves never 
simply accepted what the White man gave or left them ….”29 Despite other people owning them, 
despite the conditions that they faced, slaves exercised a degree of control over their lives. Perhaps 
one of the most important examples of slaves’ agency had to do with food, “Food was if anything 
even more basic to the slaves’ well-being than clothing and shelter, and the quality and quantity 
of food available varied at least as widely.”30 While slave-owners did provide enough food for 
slaves to maintain sufficient health, variety was lacking, and this is where slaves’ agency comes 
into play. Many slaves maintained their own gardens, and sometimes masters would buy some of 
the slaves’ produce. If slaves produced a surplus in their individual gardens, many of them would 
take their goods into town in order to sell them and earn some money.31 Furthermore, “[i]t was not 
uncommon for slaves to own pigs, cows, even horses, wagons, boats, and household utensils 
beyond those provided by the master.”32 Slaves could accumulate some wealth for themselves 
(though obviously not much). Beyond their own small gardens, some slaves could even hunt, fish, 
and trap “and the result of these activities added nutritional value and much-wanted variety to their 
meals.”33 By exercising their agency, slaves improved the food that masters allotted to them, and 
masters allowed it, either explicitly or implicitly. In this way, at least, slaves were more than just 
property. Property cannot, through its own work, improve its lot. People can. That slaves could 
exercise a degree of their own agency proves false the notion that they were somehow less than 
human and merely the property of their masters.  
 Nevertheless, the fact remains that Whites bought and sold slaves; they did not receive the 
freedoms associated with being a fully recognized person. 
 
[The] critical question about slavery is the absence of freedom, not the presence of relative 
physical comforts. No recitation of survival rates, daily caloric intake, and quality and 
quantity of living space can negate the psychological effect of bondage. The possibility of 
being whipped or being separated forever from a loved one and the reality of having little 
control over most aspects of one’s life must have been ever-present burdens oppressing 
most slaves.34 
 
Throughout the Antebellum Period, masters denied slaves the basic freedoms associated with 
being a full person. Yet even within the bounds of a system which defined them as property, slaves 
were able to exercise agency in order to improve their condition.  Despite the horrible conditions 
that slaves faced, they survived, and as traditional histories would have it, achieved their freedom 
following the end of the Civil War. Neoslavery, however, paints a different picture. 
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NEOSLAVERY IN THE POSTBELLUM PERIOD 
 
Following the end of the American Civil War, slaves were suddenly free. White former 
slaveholders obviously did not welcome this change. William DeRosset, of North Carolina, 
“remained willing to sacrifice his right arm if it would help to ensure the ultimate triumph of the 
Lost Cause.”35 The “Lost Cause” was slavery, or, more specifically, southern states’ attempt to 
establish independence in order to safeguard slavery. Whites resorted to several methods to 
maintain a social hierarchy that ultimately resembled slavery so much, that slavery never truly 
ended. Several states enacted legal structures or “Black Codes” that severely curtailed the freedom 
of the Freedmen. Perhaps worst among the Black Codes were provisions that created the convict 
leasing system, in which the state sold “criminals” (whose only real crime was their skin color) 
out to corporations and individuals as a work force. 36 Violence, of course, pervaded the entire 
system, but even outside of the aforementioned legal systems, Whites committed organized acts 
of violence against former slaves. The ultimate result of these actions was the practical 
continuation of slavery. 
 Despite the Union forcing southern states to officially acknowledge the end of slavery as a 
prerequisite for reentry into the country, southern states quickly enacted a series of laws designed 
to perpetuate the “Peculiar Institution” in all but name. These so-called Black Codes were similar 
across the region, and all had the same effect: the legal continuation of slavery. Black Codes even 
thrust those Blacks who had already been free before the Civil War into neoslavery due to what 
historians call the “one drop” rule. “[N]egroes and their issue, even where one ancestor in each 
succeeding generation to the fourth inclusive is White, shall be deemed persons of color.”37 All 
Blacks, whether recently freed slaves, or men and women who had been free for years, were now 
subject to the same set of laws that systematically deprived them of their freedoms. The Black 
Codes took more than just their abstract rights, too. “[N]o freedman, free negro or mulatto … shall 
keep or carry fire-arms of any kind, or any ammunition, dirk or bowie knife....”38 If free Blacks 
possessed these items or any other pieces of property that the state felt was inappropriate for them 
to own, they would face legal charges. For all intents and purposes, Black Codes denied African 
Americans the right to private property. And this denial did not just extend to weapons. “[No] 
freedman, free negro or mulatto … [can] rent or lease any lands or tenements except in 
incorporated cities or towns, in which places the corporate authorities shall control the same….”39 
For many Americans in the nineteenth century, the idea of freedom and the idea of owning land 
were closely tied. Thus, Whites took this possibility away from neoslaves, “except in incorporated 
cities or towns, in which places the corporate authorities shall control the same….” Which means 
that even in towns and cities, where the law technically allowed neoslaves to own land, the town’s 
authorities ultimately had control over the neoslaves’ property.  
 
Furthermore, Black Codes curtailed neoslaves’ right to become skilled laborers. 
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No person of color shall pursue or practice the art, trade or business of an artisan, mechanic 
or shop-keeper, or any other trade, employment or business (besides that of husbandry, or 
that of a servant under a contract for service or labor,) on his own account and for his own 
benefit, or in partnership with a white person, or as agent or servant of any persons, until 
he shall have obtained a license therefore from the Judge of the District Court; which 
license shall be good for one year only.40 
 
Once again, this dramatically changed the condition of Blacks who had been free for a long time. 
Beforehand, the law entitled them to any work they chose. After state legislatures wrote the Black 
Codes into law, the only job a long freed Black person could legally do was work for a White 
person (unless of course a judge decided to grant them a license, and even then the license was for 
one year only). However, more recently freed slaves also felt the effect of such stipulations. During 
slavery, there had been skilled slave workers on plantations. For instance, Frederick Douglass 
wrote that “‘Uncle’ Toney was the Blacksmith, ‘Uncle’ Harry the cartwright, and ‘Uncle’ Abel 
was the shoemaker, and these had assistants in their several departments.”41 These men were 
skilled workers, and these men were slaves. Clearly, then, the aforementioned clause affected more 
than just long-free Blacks.  
 And then there were the vagrancy laws. Here are just two examples. 
Version 1, from Mississippi: 
 
...That all rogues and vagabonds, idle and dissipated persons, beggars, jugglers, or persons 
practicing unlawful games or plays, runaways, common drunkards, common night-
walkers, pilferers, lewd, wanton, or lascivious persons, in speech or behavior, common 
railers and brawlers, persons who neglect their calling or employment, misspend what they 
earn, or do not provide for the support of themselves or their families, or dependents, and 
all other idle and disorderly persons, including all who neglect all lawful business, 
habitually misspend their time by frequenting houses of ill-fame, gaming-houses, or 
tippling shops, shall be deemed and considered vagrants….42 
 
Version 2, from South Carolina: 
 
All persons who have not some fixed and known place of abode, and some lawful and 
respectable employment; … those who are found wandering from place to place, vending, 
bartering or peddling any articles or commodities, without a license from the District 
Judge…; all common gamblers; persons who lead idle or disorderly lives …; those who … 
are able to work and do not work; those who … do not provide a reasonable and proper 
maintenance for themselves and families; those who are engaged in representing publicly 
or privately … without license, any … entertainment …; … those who hunt game of any 
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description or fish on the land of others … shall be deemed vagrants, and be liable to the 
punishment hereinafter prescribed.43 
 
These two examples are almost identical; while the exact wording between the two versions may 
vary, both make almost all of the same things illegal. Under vagrancy laws, the police could arrest 
Blacks for a wide variety of crimes, but the basic effect was to make it illegal for former slaves to 
do much besides work. Vagrancy laws created the legal grounds for neoslavery more than any 
other Black Code. Not only did the laws force neoslaves to constantly prove suitable employment, 
but they also provided the convicts for the convict leasing system.  
 
If any freedman, free negro, or mulatto, convicted of any of the misdemeanors provided 
against in this act, shall fail or refuse for the space of five days, after conviction, to pay the 
fine and costs imposed, such person shall be hired out by the sheriff or other officer, at 
public outcry, to any white person who will pay said fine and all costs, and take said convict 
for the shortest time.44 
 
Men convicted of nothing more than being unable to provide proof of suitable employment could 
be sold back into slavery. Officially, Black Codes and their associated laws ended under 
Congressional Reconstruction, but they would return as Jim Crow laws only a decade later. 
 A discussion of convict leasing will necessarily focus on Mississippi. The aforementioned 
Black Code introducing the earliest version of convict leasing laws originally hails from 
Mississippi. Furthermore, convict leasing first took off in Mississippi, thanks to a man named 
Edmund Richardson.45 Post-emancipation, White southerners’ greatest fears had been realized – 
Black men were now free, and Whites believed that Black men were naturally criminals. “Southern 
whites had long viewed criminal behavior as natural to the Negro. They took his stealing for 
granted, as a biological flaw. An ‘honest darkey,’ most believed, was as rare as a Negro virgin of 
fifteen.”46 As a result, former slaves were arrested in droves “for acts that in the past had been 
dealt with by the master alone.”47 The policing of ex-slaves’ behavior became the principal job of 
law enforcement. Southern prisons filled with Black prisoners. During the Antebellum and war 
years, prisons were for Whites. In the early years of the Postbellum Period, the reverse became 
true. “By 1866, the Natchez city jail held sixty-seven Black prisoners and just eleven whites. In 
Grenada … there were seventeen Blacks and one white. In Columbus … there were fifty-three 
Blacks and no whites. Almost overnight, the jailhouse had become a ‘negro preserve.’”48  
The problem faced by southern states was that their prison systems were inadequate for 
such a sharp increase in prison populations, especially considering the Civil War had destroyed 
many of their prisons.49 It is here that the aforementioned Edmund Richardson comes into play. 
Richardson needed labor, and the state needed a place to send ex-slaves. “The result was a contract 
that allowed Richardson to work these felons outside the prison walls.”50 Richardson took the ex-
slave convicts off of the state’s hands, and the state paid Richardson $18,000 a year. Convict 
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leasing had officially begun in Mississippi.51 In the mid-1870s, convict leasing took off. The state 
legislature passed new laws, the sentences for minor crimes increased, and local courts began to 
destroy what protection neoslaves did have. From 1874 to 1877 the number of convicts 
quadrupled.52 The state coupled these actions with an official leasing act, “All prisoners, it 
declared, may ‘work outside the penitentiary in building railroads, levees or in any private labor 
or employment.’ With the gates now officially open, Mississippi leased more than a thousand of 
its convicts in one fell swoop.”53 And of course, the law makers cleverly wrote the law so as to 
virtually exclude Whites from the leasing system.54 The convict leasing system kept growing, and 
became exceptionally lucrative for rich Whites. “The exclusive right to lease state convicts quickly 
became Mississippi’s most prized political contract, coveted by planters, businessmen, and 
speculators across the board.”55 Convict leasing had become a profitable enterprise, and everyone 
wanted the enormous wealth that they could gain from it. 
 In 1876, a man by the name of Jones Hamilton made a deal with the Mississippi state 
government, obtained the rights to all leased convicts, and began subleasing those convicts to 
others. He acted as something of a middle man between the state and the subleasers, making him 
rich in the process. Though the state paid Hamilton no money, he derived enormous profits through 
subleasing convicts out at nine dollars a month.56 “From a business standpoint, the subleasing was 
ideal. It plugged the major weakness of the old system [slavery]: the high fixed cost of labor.”57 
 
In terms of human misery, however, this system could hardly have been worse. The convict 
now found himself laboring for the profits of three separate parties: the sublessee, the 
lessee, and the state. There was no one to protect him from savage beatings, endless 
workdays, and murderous neglect. ‘It is to be supposed that sub-lessees [take] convicts for 
the purpose of making money out of them,’ wrote a prison doctor, ‘so naturally, the less 
food and clothing used and the more labor derived from their bodies, the more money in 
the pockets of the sub-lessee.’ If a convict died or escaped, his employer lost nothing. 
Colonel Hamilton would profitably supply a replacement – at nine dollars per month.58 
 
Here lay the major difference between convict leasing and slavery. Because slaves were expensive, 
and because the masters needed their labor, it made sense to make sure that the slaves were 
reasonably well-cared-for, even allowed a certain degree of freedom, as borne out in Black 
Southerners. Convicts, however, were cheap and by no means was leasing one a permanent 
agreement. Therefore, convicts became expendable commodities, and were treated as such. Their 
places of employment became veritable death camps, with the annual mortality rate reaching a 
staggering sixteen percent at points during the 1880s.59 “In 1882 … 126 of 735 Black state convicts 
perished, as opposed to 2 of 83 whites.”60  
Black men were not the only ones leased out under this system. Although Black women 
made up a relatively small portion of Mississippi’s convict population, they, too, were leased out. 
Oftentimes they worked “as domestics and prostitutes for those in charge.”61 Perhaps worse still, 
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children were being leased out. “…[The Mississippi] penal code did not distinguish between adult 
and juvenile offenders.”62 Therefore, courts tried and punished Black children just as adults – and 
just as unfairly. Children convicts became a huge part of the convict leasing system. “By 1880, at 
least one convict in four was an adolescent or a child – a percentage that did not diminish with 
time.”63 Courts convicted children as young as six for minor crimes and threw them into this 
heinous system.64  
Although the conditions faced by Black convicts in Mississippi were extreme, “Mississippi 
was hardly alone.”65 In Alabama, for instance, police arrested a Black man by the name of Green 
Cottenham for vagrancy and the prisons leased him out to a subsidiary of U.S. Steel. He was put 
to work in a mine called “Slope No. 12.” Within a single year, sixty men at Slope 12 had died 
either of the physical torture inflicted upon them by their White taskmasters or to the disease that 
ran rampant through the mine’s population.66 Furthermore, it was not only large corporations that 
were guilty of renting convicts. “The judges and sheriffs who sold convicts to giant corporate 
prison mines also leased even larger numbers of African Americans to local farmers, and allowed 
their neighbors and political supporters to acquire still more Black laborers directly from their 
courtrooms.”67 Convict leasing had become such an important part of Southern life that the state 
government was using the system to garner political favors from rich Whites and wealthy 
corporations. Blackmon goes on to say that “[b]y 1900, the South’s judicial system had been 
wholly reconfigured to make one of its primary purposes the coercion of African Americans to 
comply with the social customs and labor demands of Whites.”68 Furthermore, “[r]evenues from 
the neo-slavery poured the equivalent of tens of millions of dollars into the treasuries of Alabama, 
Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, and South Carolina – where more 
than 75 percent of the Black population in the United States then lived.”69  
Simply taking convict leasing into account is enough to prove that slavery continued 
beyond the end of the Civil War. Southern courts and penitentiaries systematically convicted and 
leased out African Americans to the benefit of rich Whites. And while it is true that the legal 
abolition of slavery served to protect many men and women from being bought and sold, convict 
leasing provided wealthy Whites an excellent way to work around the legal abolition of slavery. 
Once again, Whites were buying and selling Black men and women as commodities, just as they 
had under slavery. In fact, in many ways, David Oshinsky’s title was right. Convict leasing was 
worse than slavery. At least conditions under slavery were livable. They were not so under convict 
leasing. Unfortunately, Whites’ violence against Blacks was not confined to convict leasing. 
 Convict leasing represented the perfect combination of violence and law. However, 
violence against Blacks was much more widespread than the confines of the convict leasing 
system. Freedman’s Bureau reports are rife with reports of violence committed by Whites against 
the former slaves, which, more often than not, remained unpunished. For instance, one agent 
reported the case of Floyd Adams vs. Madison Doom, in which Doom, a White man, assaulted 
Adams. The court ruled in favor of Doom, allowing his actions to go unpunished. As the agent put 
it, “In my opinion the action of the Grand Jury in discharging Madison Dooms from accountability 
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was an act of gross injustice and … the jury [had] literally given the White man permission to 
knock the negro down without fear of molestation.”70 Despite gaining legal access to the courts, 
Blacks still found that Frederick Douglass’s assertion that “it was ‘worth but half a cent to kill a 
nigger,’” held true. 71 And of course, this was not an isolated incident. Crimes against Blacks were 
common, but courts almost never convicted Whites. In part, this was due to the difficulty of getting 
a case to trial.  
 
Generally, the air is full of outrages on the Freedmen by the Whites … but I understand 
you to mean violence, personal assaults, cruelty, of which very few cases have come to my 
knowledge, and then the facts were not clearly established, because the freedmen dare not 
testify through fear of yet greater violence.72 
 
In many instances, Whites prevented Blacks from testifying against them by threatening violence. 
Even those cases that ended up in the courtroom rarely resulted in the authorities punishing the 
White party. “The trials have … almost without exception where White persons have been parties 
the decisions have been in their favor - there have been several cases of assaults upon freedmen - 
in not one instance has any satisfaction been given the freedmen.”73 Despite Blacks’ attempts to 
receive justice, Whites consistently avoided punishment for violence against freedmen. Violence 
went beyond merely beating or assaulting freedmen. Whites often killed freedmen, one of the most 
popular methods for doing so was lynching, as depicted below. 
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“Thomas Shipp Abram Smith Lynching,” Lawrence Henry Beitler, photographer (August 7, 
1930). 
 
The key feature is that it was a public event. People came out to watch these extralegal hangings, 
and the authorities sanctioned the activity. In order for an event to be public, it must be common 
knowledge. The fact is that the police did nothing to stop such brutal acts of violence, at least by 
the time that Lawrence Beitler took this photograph. Throughout the Postbellum Period and a large 
part of the twentieth century, lynching loomed as a threat to the lives of Black men, women, and 
children. While an initial reading might suggest that the aforementioned violence was random and 
disorganized – and perhaps some of it was – it was part of a broader effort to force former slaves 
back into slavery in a war that has mistakenly been called Reconstruction.74 
 The name historians have given to the first part of the Postbellum Period, Reconstruction, 
is a misnomer that represents an attempt to deny the extreme violence that permeated the period. 
Reconstruction was a time period that began immediately following the end of the Civil War and 
ended in 1877. Ostensibly, Reconstruction reunited the country and rebuilt the South. However, 
several historians have recently asserted that Reconstruction was actually a war, among them John 
Daly. Daly calls the period “the Southern Civil War.” He asserts that it was fought between Ex-
Confederate Extremists on one side and a Biracial Coalition on the other. The former fought to 
destroy “the two local symbols of northern victory: the White unionist political organizations and 
the attempts by Blacks to live free.”75 In short, they were fighting to preserve slavery. The extreme 
violence throughout the period was in no way random or disorganized, either. There were “dozens 
of battles and thousands of violent incidents in the South between 1865 and 1877.”76 There was 
even a full scale pitched battle fought in the streets of New Orleans. 
 
In a deliberate attack, as many as eight thousand White Leaguers, protesting the biracial 
government of Republican Governor Kellog and intimidating voters in the upcoming 
election, devised barricades along Poydras Street and armed behind them.  Ex-Confederate 
Extremists faced an Ex-Confederate Republican opponent, James Longstreet, Robert E. 
Lee's second in command during the American Civil War.  Longstreet, led the combined 
forces of state government--the biracial militia of New Orleans and the biracial 
Metropolitan Police--against his former Confederate compatriots.   The Biracial Coalition 
army, fighting for fair elections and civil rights and led by one of the most famous 
Confederate heroes, numbered perhaps two thousand and were well-equipped with Gatling 
guns and artillery pieces….77 
 
The Ex-Confederates sought to destroy whatever freedoms that African Americans had obtained 
up to that point. They sought to restore slavery and reestablish themselves as the masters over the 
neoslaves. The violence was well-organized and coordinated. Reconstruction had all the trappings 
of a war, and the forces who aimed to reinstate slavery ultimately won. However, though they lost, 
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it is important to note, once again, that African Americans exercised their own agency. They fought 
alongside pro-freedom Whites to protect themselves. Just as in slavery, when slaves utilized what 
little agency they had to improve their conditions, so too did neoslaves utilize their greater agency 
to protect their freedom and their lives. Ultimately, this is perhaps why racist responses were so 
virulent; because slaves were free, they were a threat. 
 Both legally and violently, with convict leasing at the convergence of the two, Whites 
forced ex-slaves back into bondage. Thus, slavery was perpetuated, and even worsened in many 
practical ways. By no means do these represent the extent of the ways in which former masters 
sought to perpetuate slavery. One such example is sharecropping – a practice in which White 
plantation owners leased parcels of land and basic farming supplies to their former slaves in 
exchange for the neoslaves’ profits – but sharecropping and other forms of  economic oppression 
lie outside the scope of this paper. Despite Whites’ attempts to curtail Blacks’ freedom, former 
slaves remained determined to assert it. “No matter how each ex-slave chose to express [his or her 
freedom], many of them insisted that it be understood and acknowledged….”78 However, former 
masters were ultimately successful and effectively established neoslavery. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Frederick Douglass once wrote that “[u]nder the whole heavens there could be no relation more 
unfavorable to the development of honorable character than that sustained by the slaveholder to 
the slave.”79 Even people who, in the absence of slavery, would have been decent individuals were 
made indecent by the “Peculiar Institution.” Douglass’s assertion holds just as true to those who 
perpetuated slavery following the end of the American Civil War. The men who perpetuated 
slavery following the American Civil War were not decent or honorable. Slavery did not truly end 
in the United States until much later. Throughout the Postbellum Period and beyond, Whites forced 
former slaves and their families back into bondage. Legally, Blacks were deprived of their rights, 
and Whites violently rebuked or courts threw them into the appalling convict lease system when 
they attempted to assert a modicum of the rights they felt they were due as free people. Precisely 
for this reason, they were not free people. Slavery had ended only in name. 
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THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION OF THE “ROARING TWENTIES”: PRACTICE OR 
PERCEPTION? 
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Abstract 
Even after the passage of over 80 years, the perceived radical shift in morality in the 1920’s defies 
concrete definition. Many popular images seem to offer evidence that indicate a change in sexual 
propriety, with portrayals of scantily dressed flappers swigging illicit liquor from flasks, and racy 
advertisements for silk stockings showing off women’s legs, so soon after a time when women 
were covered from the neck to the ankle even at the beach. Religious and conservative leaders 
alluded to a total collapse of morality and blamed popular entertainment for degrading America’s 
youth. This paper analyzes primary sources from the 1920s in an effort to determine the attitudes 
of the people who experienced, and often shaped, the era. These sources suggest a wide variety of 
opinion among Americans and the existence of a fully developed sexual awareness lurking beneath 
the veneer of polite society long before the “roaring twenties.” Although it is not possible to prove 
or disprove a true “revolution” in sexual morality, this paper contributes to the ongoing discussion 
of the values which changed and those which were simply exposed by the light of a more tolerant 
time.  [Keywords: United States, 1920s, sexuality, sexual mores, morality, fashion, flappers] 
 
 
The 1920s were a time of monumental change in nearly every aspect of American life, but perhaps 
none more conspicuous than sexuality. Since the arrival of the Puritans, polite society in America 
gave the impression that human sexuality was acceptable only within the bounds of marriage, and 
only as a slightly distasteful means of procreation. There was doubt about the propriety of sexual 
education even when limited to informing young brides and grooms about what to expect on their 
wedding night, and it was not unusual for new brides to be shocked and disgusted when they 
discovered what was expected of them. Birth control was condemned by the church and the media, 
who could not justify preventing conception within marriage and certainly would not condone 
sexual activity outside of marriage.  
 As new forms of entertainment and communication contributed to an evolving popular 
culture, however, an interesting phenomenon became clear - people were interested in sexual 
behavior. In fact, they would pay to see it. Motion pictures, plays, songs, novels¸ and advertising 
all reflected the market for sexually-themed entertainment. Vice police, media, churches, and 
reform groups tried desperately to reign in the production and consumption of material they 
deemed to be obscene, but their efforts were met with limited success. Their dire warnings about 
the degeneration of America’s youth not only went unheeded but were met with increasing 
instances of the establishment defending the younger generation.  Through an examination of 
primary documents including books, magazine and newspaper articles, and social hygiene reports, 
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this paper will show that sexuality in the 1920’s underwent a more radical change in perception 
than in reality, while noting some real shifts in behavior among the younger generation.  
 To understand the shift in perception, we must first understand how sexuality was viewed 
prior to the 1920’s. American culture was heavily influenced by Protestant values, which included 
chastity, modesty, and the link between sexuality and original sin.1  In spite of the constant 
presence of prostitution, pregnancy outside of marriage, pornography, homosexuality, and other 
examples of “deviant” behavior, it appeared that the majority of society had overwhelmingly 
accepted the idea that sex was a private matter between a married man and woman, and not a 
source of recreation but a necessary evil for the serious business of procreation. Yet an eye-opening 
survey by Dr. Clelia Mosher, conducted between 1892 and 1920, reveals that a surprising number 
of educated Victorian women who participated in the survey had at least some knowledge about 
sex and reproduction prior to their marriages, and that many of them were enthusiastic wives who 
enjoyed healthy sexual relationships with their husbands.2 Many women, when questioned about 
the purpose of intercourse, listed pleasure along with reproduction and increased marital affection, 
chipping away at the notion that publicized values of the era were homogenously accepted.3  
 The epidemic of venereal disease among American soldiers during World War I led to a 
crisis in values regarding prophylaxis and shed light on some realities of sexual behavior. An 
estimated 96% of cases of venereal disease were contracted prior to a soldier’s entrance into the 
service, illustrating the prevalence of sexual activity even before reaching the brothels of Europe, 
in spite of mainstream America’s reluctance to acknowledge it.4 As men with sexually transmitted 
diseases such as syphilis and gonorrhea began filling infirmaries and seriously affecting the 
military’s available manpower, the reality became impossible to ignore.5 Distribution of the “male 
sheath” and sexual education for soldiers became a necessity of war for many nations, and just one 
of many dirty secrets of military service not to be discussed in polite company. As the war ended, 
however, the national discussion about prophylactics and birth control was just heating up. 
 Condoms and diaphragms were fiercely opposed by religious groups. Kathleen Tobin 
explained, “The nation’s churches would react to new notions of sexuality, the more conservative 
ones formulating close links between female immorality and contraceptives.”6 The federal 
government upheld that belief with the passage of the Comstock laws in 1873, defining 
contraception as obscene and making contraceptive distribution or discussion through the mail or 
across state lines a federal offense.7 Advocating the right of women to limit their pregnancies or 
prevent them altogether, Margaret Sanger countered, “I do not believe that a universal knowledge 
of contraceptives would lead to immorality.”8 Sanger defiantly opposed the position of the 
Catholic Church and the Comstock laws by publishing her opinions in her magazine, The Woman 
Rebel, and with a manual named Family Limitation, describing how to prevent pregnancy using 
contraceptives.9  The emerging ability to control pregnancy effectively contributed not only to 
smaller family sizes, but also enabled unmarried couples to engage in sexual relations without fear 
of unwanted pregnancy and reduced the spread of sexually transmitted diseases.   
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Sexual relationships outside of traditional marriage have been present throughout human 
history. They were usually regarded as immoral and unspeakable, and society generally faulted the 
woman involved, as she was considered the guardian of morality. The young women of the 1920’s, 
with the increased economic independence many found during and after the war, were less inclined 
to capitulate to the double standards of Victorian society.   Pioneering feminist and psychoanalyst 
Beatrice Hinkle wrote, “a sex morality imposed by repression and the power of custom creates 
artificial conceptions and will eventually break down.”10 Hinkle articulated the issue of the age- 
repression and custom were manufactured and maintained by society. As women broke some of 
the powers of repression, they could begin to dictate custom anew. Hinkle explained, “I do not 
mean to imply that traditional moral standards controlling women’s sexual conduct have never 
been transgressed…the great difference today lies in the open defiance of these customs with 
feelings of entire justification.”11  Hinkle’s statement here clearly defines the difference between 
the existence of women’s sexuality and the unapologetic, open acknowledgement of it.    
Not only did these young women embrace their sexuality, they often publicly displayed it. 
An explosion in the use of cosmetics and dramatic changes in fashion gave external expression to 
their acceptance of their sexuality, and a whole new breed of woman, the flapper, was born.12 As 
Family Court Justice Benjamin Barr Lindsay explained, “Excesses of all sorts are usually a 
rebound from an excess of forced conformity.”13 Women in the twenties were emerging from an 
era of corsets and ankle-length bathing suits, and many pushed back hard against a society which 
could have them arrested for showing too much skin, enforced by vice police bearing rulers. An 
unknown contributor to Flapper magazine commenting on the advertised fashion trends of the 
early twenties wrote, “Why in the name of common sense do the manufacturers of ladies clothing 
insist upon girls wearing long skirts, when we simply don’t want them? What do they think we 
are, a bunch of jellyfish with no minds of our own?”14  
 This new attitude among young women sparked panic and recriminations from defenders 
of conventional morality. Journalist Frederick Allen quoted President Murphy of the University of 
Florida as saying, “The low-cut gowns, the rolled hose and short skirts are born of the devil and 
his angels, and are carrying the present and future generations to chaos and destruction.”15 
Religious groups promoted the idea of a “moral gown,” which would be loose enough to obscure 
the lines of a woman’s figure and cover her from the neck to the wrist and ankle, and some states 
went so far as to promote laws requiring such standards.16 Author Steven Byington referred to “the 
day when the foremost civilized nations agreed that covering the skin of most of the body and 
disguising the principal contours of the person for at least one sex were absolutely essential to 
morality.”17 Byington clearly made reference to the standard women were held to as the keepers 
of morality, responsible for keeping themselves and the men of the world in check. By the time 
his article appeared in 1925, however, a revolution had taken place. Beatrice Hinkle commented, 
“It can be said that in the general disintegration of old standards, women are the active agents in 
the field of sexual morality and men the passive, almost bewildered accessories to the overthrow 
of their long and firmly organized control of women’s conduct.”18 
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Motion pictures were a clear example of changing morality in both practice and perception. 
The presence of sexually-charged motion pictures in the twenties certainly influenced the culture 
which watched them. Some found them instructional, such as the young man quoted by historian 
David Kyvig as saying, “It was directly through the movies that I learned to kiss a girl on her ears, 
neck, and cheeks, as well as on the mouth.”19 The greater fear of the opposition was that movies 
would promote sexual activity among the young, a concern which also had some basis in reality. 
Kyvig quotes a sixteen-year-old high school girl who said, “I know love pictures have made me 
more receptive to love-making…I always thought it rather silly until these pictures, where there is 
always so much love and everything turns out all right in the end, and I kiss and pet much more 
than I would otherwise.”20    
Yet that same culture also produced and formed a willing market for these films, proving 
that the movies were not solely responsible for the major shift in the perceived degradation of 
morality. More than anything, the success of racy movies exposed an interest which already 
existed. Author Gordon Craig prophesized, “In time there will be found a much lower stratum of 
our sentimentality and rubbish to which it will be possible to appeal…but already it is doing its 
best and appeals to the very lowest that can be found in us.”21  
Motion pictures were attacked by numerous groups hoping to protect traditional ideas of 
morality. The American Social Hygiene Association wrote, “There is still too much playing up of 
sexual immorality because ‘sex’ in a title or on a billboard spells dollars to the commercialists of 
filmdom.”22 Indeed, filmmakers did find these films profitable, and would often change original, 
“clean” titles of adapted stories to more suggestive sounding titles. In a survey of theater owners 
in 1922, “twenty-two of the respondents claimed that their audiences were larger when ‘sex-
pictures’ were being shown.”23 Theater owners described the demand and tolerance level for these 
movies, and how it differed between audiences from “the city” and the “neighborhood,” and the 
survey concluded, “the industry is trying to give its customers what they want, even though they 
may want questionable products.”24 There is no doubt that many people wanted their products, or 
that motion pictures had an influence on some people’s behavior, particularly the young. The 
pressure of reform groups and religious leaders combined with public sex scandals involving film 
star Fatty Arbuckle and others in the twenties finally led to the formation of the Motion Pictures 
Producers and Distributors of America in 1922. Led by Harding crony William Hays, the 
association was formed to “self-regulate” the content of movies without the interference of the 
Federal government. The MPPDA was greeted warmly by defenders of “traditional” values and 
provided for some limitations on content. However, Hays worked for the motion picture industry, 
and his interests lay in its success. He admitted, “the motion picture industry today is the greatest 
sales force in the world,”25 and that industry would continue to both shape and reflect American 
values.   
Motion pictures weren’t the only form of entertainment to raise eyebrows in the twenties. 
Novels and plays challenged Victorian morals as well and drew as much criticism as motion 
pictures. Authors such as Aldous Huxley, D.H. Lawrence, Wallace Thurman, and James Joyce 
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wrote more boldly on sexual themes than conservative and religious groups were comfortable with, 
and the success of the sex novel and play was disturbing to Victorian ideals.  The connection 
between these forms of entertainment and real-life consequences was clear to reform groups like 
the American Social Hygiene Association. 
 
In the novel and the drama sex relations are discussed with an abandonment of reserve 
that is morally pernicious. The idea of restraint and temperance is rejected and 
without yielding to the spirit of panic we must admit that venereal disease is on an 
increase and that this plague is being brought into homes where under normal 
conditions it would have been unlikely to enter.26 
 
The author definitively links the consumption of “morally pernicious” entertainment with the 
spread of venereal disease and a rejection of self-control.  Not everyone was prepared to accept 
this thesis, however, and a variety of people offered different points of view. Marshall Beuick, an 
editor at the People’s Home Journal explains, “the young people of America have a strangely 
limited knowledge of their sexual life. Thus, they seek reading that will make up for their 
deficiency in education.”27 Throughout the twenties, public opinion increasingly defended natural 
human interest and curiosity regarding sex and separated it from the concept of sin and morality. 
“It is clearly ridiculous to criticize fiction for dealing with sex, or to talk about sex dramas and sex 
novels as if the presence of such an interest made them evil,” Henry Canby wrote in an effort to 
lend perspective to the issue.28 
The presence of natural interest expressed by Canby and curiosity elicited by ignorance as 
described by Beuick highlighted the necessity of sexual education.   As Dr. Mosher’s survey 
illustrates, American children had no consistent, accurate source of information regarding sex and 
reproduction, and some were completely ignorant about their own bodies and development.29 
When asked what her knowledge of sexual physiology was before marriage, one respondent 
replied, “None to speak of…So innocent of the matter that until I was eighteen I did not know the 
origin of babies.”30  There were vast differences in the way individual children were educated, or 
kept ignorant, of sexual and reproductive matters, and natural curiosity helped to feed the 
popularity of sexually-themed entertainment. Dr. Frank Crane, reluctant to condemn entertainment 
for addressing sexuality, yet advocating a solid education offered by more appropriate sources, 
wrote “Apostles of the hush school take their stand…that literature should recognize nothing in a 
human being between the ankles and the chin…Sex relations…should be explained. But the person 
to teach these subjects is the physician, the parent, or the teacher, and not the novelist, or the poet, 
or the preacher,”31 Opposition to sex education was fierce, however, and went so far as to convict 
Brooklyn grandmother Mary Ware Dennett of obscenity for writing a sexual education pamphlet 
which was widely circulated for over ten years before her conviction.32 
Throughout the 1920s debate on sexuality, the question of the younger generation’s moral 
standing arose. Conservative and religious groups warned of the dire consequences of “immoral” 
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entertainment and activities. Author David Young, describing the ultimate fears of the Victorian 
generation, wrote “The consensus of opinion was that the children became too precocious about 
sex matters, that there was a general demoralizing effect on modesty and purity, that a disregard 
of marriage ties was fostered, and that the authority of teachers and parents was materially 
lessened.”33  
While the conservatives concerned themselves with virtue, another large segment of 
society looked to the effects of unrestrained sexuality on social refinement. Professor and critic 
Henry Seidel Canby wrote, “The youth who discusses coldly topics upon which age is warmly 
reticent has become a commonplace of satire.”34 Although not necessarily offended by sexual 
content, its overexposure began to be viewed as crass and tasteless by many. Judge Lindsay wrote, 
“During a recent trip to New York…I went to a notorious play…It was composed of a raw title, 
raw sex situations, and mediocre acting. It served no valid artistic end,” objecting not to the sexual 
content of the play but the lack of redeeming artistic qualities.35 Time Magazine also noted the 
waning public interest in overtly sexual material in its 1928 article “Diluted Sex,” detailing the 
decline of sexual content in magazines such as True Story. 36 
The young generation of the twenties had its defenders. Many authors of the time noted 
with amusement the similarity of the moral charges brought against the young to those of nearly 
every previous generation. Educators who were regularly exposed to teens and college age students 
often argued in favor of their values and behavior. H. Thomas Bates, a superintendent of schools, 
stated “My conclusion is that despite the fact that sex is unduly emphasized by fashions and the 
dance hall, we hear and know of no more immorality than at previous periods in the history of 
society.”37 Some quickly pointed out the generation’s role as consumers, not originators, of 
sexually charged materials. Thyosa Amos, Dean of Women at the University of Pittsburgh, 
explained “the social curriculum is being attacked because of social standards…the attack is 
unwarranted…no student wrote the sex play, no student wrote the present vulgar obscene songs; 
no student photographed the immoral film…all those are the gracious gifts of a commercialized 
society.”38 Overall, defenders of youth in the twenties did not view the sexual expressions of the 
era as a sign of immorality and degraded values. Instead, they saw the age-old fear of an older 
generation in conflict with changing times. Judge Lindsay wrote, “At present, the opposition Youth 
meets from the Older Generation constitutes a malign suggestion that what youth is doing is wholly 
futile and wrong.”39    
It is obvious that sexuality in America was embraced and enjoyed far more than earlier 
public discourse allowed, yet the twenties did have an impact on some people’s behavior that could 
be considered revolutionary. The generation which fought World War One was disillusioned by 
the senseless violence it had witnessed, and many young men and women began to question the 
conventional values they were brought up with. “Trial marriages” were spoken of as viable options 
for the practice of sexuality by a significant number of people, where just a few years earlier the 
concept may have shocked and appalled even the most liberal of minds. The concept of “open 
marriages,” or permissible adultery, was discussed and experimented with by some couples, testing 
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the limits of sexual progressivism in relationships.40 The promotion of “companionate marriage,” 
as opposed to permanent “procreative marriage,” by such prominent figures as Judge Benjamin 
Barr Lindsay revealed the increasing mainstream acceptance of sexual relationships not intended 
to produce children, and an openness to dissolve those marriages when desired if they remained 
childless.41 However, Judge Lindsay also cautioned “The younger generation is able, without 
psychic strain, to adopt new sex conventions and standards which are often devastating in their 
effects on adults who attempt to adopt them suddenly.”42 He warned that these evolving forms of 
sexual relationships were not necessarily appropriate for the older generation, and related the 
personal stories of some couples for whom sexual experimentations had unexpected negative 
effects.43 
Without much in the way of reliable statistics, it is impossible to prove the concrete effects 
of  the “sexual revolution” of the 1920’s on sexual activity, adultery, prostitution, and declining 
morality. The nation’s birth rate did decline from an average of 3.5 children in 1900 to 2.3 children 
in 1933, with the combined effects of contraception and a more thorough understanding of 
ovulation by the medical community.44 The divorce rate, which nearly doubled between 1910 and 
1930, is another indicator of change in attitudes, illustrating the increasing refusal of society to 
suffer unhappy conditions to satisfy social convention.45  
Historians have been challenged by how to interpret the remaining causes and effects. 
Writing just a few years after the end of the decade, journalist Frederick Allen describes the 
twenties as an “uneasy time,” when the initial breakdown of sexual taboos led to complete sexual 
obsession for a time, followed by the realization that some limits and restrictions may not be a bad 
idea.46 His ideas were borne out over the following years, when a general public backlash led to a 
reigning in of overt sexuality in motion pictures and other forms of entertainment. Those segments 
of society which were not offended by blatant sexual themes simply became bored by them. As 
the younger generation matured, they retained some of the changes ushered in during the “roaring 
twenties,” no longer connecting women smoking or drinking with men with moral decline, or 
considering the use of cosmetics a sure sign of prostitution. Men were generally more tolerant of 
the idea of “experienced” women, and marrying a young lady who was not a virgin was no longer 
an outrageous concept. Professor Paula Foss described the phenomenon of “petting parties,” where 
“young people did quite a lot of erotic exploration — kissing and fondling,” but explained, “These 
parties always stopped before intercourse. In that sense they had imposed limitations created by 
the group presence.”47  
The increasing acceptance of contraceptive use likely began before the twenties, but open 
discussion and the campaign led by Margaret Sanger to remove legal barriers and provide 
education began shrinking family size, and almost certainly lowered the rate of illegitimate births 
in unmarried relationships. It is impossible to determine whether the availability of contraceptives 
increased the rate of premarital sexual relationships, so historians can only speculate that the 
sexually charged atmosphere, combined with an acknowledged prevalence of “petting parties” and 
the decreased risk of pregnancy, probably led to increased sexual behavior.   
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 Yet as they left the decade behind, a new embrace of some traditional values occurred. 
Hemlines went back down, and the above-the-knee skirt of the flapper ceded to the floor-length 
gown of the thirties. Some couples found the aftermath of sexual experimentation and open 
relationships more difficult to bear than they had anticipated, and returned to the more conservative 
marital roles they had been raised under. The decades to follow would demonstrate occasional 
shifts in marriage, divorce, and birth rates, and varying acceptance of sexual themes in advertising 
and entertainment, but none as dramatic as those seen in the 1920s. Not until the 1960’s would 
America again witness such a challenge to the established idea of sexual morality and expression 
among its youth, when against the backdrop of another war, an entire generation questioned their 
parent’s values and rewrote the conversation on sexuality.  
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